



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.


About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

3 3433 07592893 1





HOWARD TOWNSEND, M. D.















18

J. Burgess

THE
CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC,

WHAT ARE HIS RIGHTS, HIS DUTIES, AND PRIVILEGES,
AND WHAT SHOULD BE HIS EDUCATION.

BY
Ancaldo Ceba,
A GENOESE REPUBLICAN OF THE 16TH CENTURY.



TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY
C. EDWARDS LESTER,
TRANSLATOR OF "THE CHALLENGE OF BARLETTA," "THE FLOREN-
TINE HISTORIES," &C., HONORARY MEMBER OF THE IMPERIAL
AND ROYAL ATHENEUM OF FLORENCE.

NEW YORK:
PAINE AND BURGESS, 62 JOHN STREET.
1845.

THE NEW YORK
PUBLIC LIBRARY
218497
ASTOR, LENOX AND
TILDEN FOUNDATIONS
1901

Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by
PAINE & BURGESS,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of
New York.

S. W. BENEDICT, Stereotyper
No. 16 Spruce street, New York.

TO THE

HON. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

DEAR SIR,—You have placed me under very deep obligation by allowing me to dedicate to you this translation of Ceba's "Citizen of a Republic." I am sorry I cannot accompany the act with some token of respect commensurate with the veneration I was taught, from my childhood, to feel for your name.

In earlier ages, when the publication of a book was regarded as an event of too much importance to be hazarded without the patronage of some powerful Prince, Authors were accustomed to fill up their dedications with extravagant, and often unmerited adulation. The poor Scholar, however, was *compelled* to wear the chain—the power of choice was not with him. It was enough for him if he could find some powerful Prince, who would pay the expense of publication, and shield the writer from the storm that gathered over the pathway of the Thinker. In those days and in those countries, where thought was a crime, and its free expression felony, this was often so signal a service, it could not but awaken in return the deepest gratitude. Let us

pardon, then, the dedications of the age of the Revival of Letters.

But Dedications have changed with the Ages. In our times, and particularly in our Country, no author need wear the chain. We are free to think and to write as our own free impulses guide us, and we dedicate our books to whom we will. We do not feel that we have a right to expect any signal service from the men at whose feet we lay our offering—we do not consider them responsible for any of our opinions—we do not try to shield ourselves from private malice or popular indignation by taking shelter under their protection. We have only one object in view, in our Dedications. We tender the fruits of our toil, the dearest and best Offering we can make, to One to whom we love to show honor. He may have won our gratitude in achieving some great service for our Country; he may have wielded a strong arm in battle, or guided the public councils with wisdom and with patriotism; he may have enriched the national Literature, and left some undying scroll in her Historic Archives; he may have rebuked the crimes or the corruption of a degenerate age, and saved his country from impending danger. But if he has done some great work worthy of a noble Citizen, or devoted his life with fidelity to the service of the Republic, all good men will delight to honor him. Wherever he goes the congratulations of the multitude attend his steps; they strew his pathway with roses, and throw

the laurel over his brow. The Scholar, too, who has long communed with him in spirit, comes forth from his solitude, and dedicates to him his Labors ; and when this is done, humble as they may be, he can show him no higher honor.

My limited knowledge of Italian literature has made me familiar with no book written during the 16th century, on a similar subject, in which I feel more sure you will concur. You have lived and acted with one generation of Americans, who have nearly all passed away. Like the pines of their own native hills, they once stood thick over the land they made free ; but like these patriarchs of the forest they have fallen. This book breathes the spirit of the generation, whose names will live always in the recollections and regards of mankind ; and to the most Illustrious of them still remaining it is offered with reverence and affection,

By his humble friend,

THE TRANSLATOR.

New York, August 19, 1845.



CEBA AND HIS TIMES.

THIS beautiful work was written by one of the most illustrious of those stern, heroic republicans who lived in the glorious days of the Medici. It was the child of his old age. In his youth he had known the hardships and excitements of war, and drank deeply into the new spirit that had gone abroad over the world. A great drama had begun to play, and the World was its stage. The scene opened in the East, where the Empire of the Christians fell at a single shock ; and the Crescent of the Infidels floated over the walls of Constantinople. Her venerable scholars had fled from the desolations that laid waste their pleasant places, and carried with them the treasures of all time. The Printer now began his lofty mission—he carefully unrolled the venerable scrolls of Antiquity, laid them under his cunning Press, and then scattered them to the ends of the world.

The teachers of the golden Ages of Pericles and Augustus became the Teachers of Mankind. Once rescued from the corrosion of time, Learning could never again die. The Mariners' Compass opened the path of the Navigator ; and Columbus led the way to the New World. Tired out with the cold formulas of the Church—disgusted with the heartless shuffling of the political Priest—indignant at the insulting tyranny of the engines of religious and civil power, the *world* awoke from its long sleep. Along the clouded shores of the Mediterranean, the beautiful light of the Italian Republics was streaming ; Genoa itself, one of the most free and powerful of all. At this brilliant

Period, her Annals are crowded with a galaxy of names, which have won the admiration of Europe. COLUMBUS annihilated at a single blow the vulgar superstitions of the multitude, and the low bigotry of the Priests and Philosophers of the schools, by lifting a continent from the deep. He covered his country with glory, and left for himself an imperishable name. A line of NAVIGATORS followed him, who drove their prows through unknown waters, to the discovery of new lands. DORIA, the great Admiral—the sagacious Statesman—the fervid Patriot, and the munificent Prince, had control of the Councils of his country, and guided her through one of the rudest storms that swept over Europe, from the reign of the Lombard Kings, down to the French Revolution. Francis I., Charles V., Henry VIII., and Solyman, of Constantinople, all courted the favor of the great Republican Doge. SPINOLA, one of her Merchant Princes, had covered the Mediterranean with his fleets, and filled the Magazines of the cities along her shores; and his wealth was so enormous, and his soul so vast, he came forward and purchased one of the most beautiful cities of Italy. (See the Florentine Histories of Machiavelli, vol. i., 2d Book.) Another noble Genoese of the same name, the ancestor of this buyer of cities, stabbed a foreign tyrant in the streets of Genoa, when he came to erect his black throne. This great—this marble city of marble palaces, with her Bank of St. George—her magnificent Churches, filled with paintings, sculptures, and gold, and gems, had Architects, and Painters, and Sculptors, and Orators, and Authors, and Poets; and above all a brave, free people; and when Ceba was fifty years old, his native city was the Light House of the World. She had won her way up, till she overlooked the Globe.

At this Period her literature was in its glory. Of all her political writers, CEBA is considered the best. Bold and independent in his spirit—rich and varied in his learning—lofty in his

heroism—pure in his patriotism—unsullied in his piety—full of years and ripe in experience, he wrote this beautiful Treatise. From the time it appeared, it became the text-book of young republicans in Italy; and while his other works are nearly unknown, *THE CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC* has been the manual of every generation of his countrymen.

“The Citizen of a Republic, written by Ansaldo Ceba, the illustrious Genoese, is a work enriched with elegant learning, and written with all that terseness and solemn earnestness of style, which characterized the great writers of the brilliant Ages of the Republics of antiquity. The man who best restrains his appetites and lusts—who is the most prudent in public deliberations—the most just in every private and public relation of family and of society; the man, in fine, who has taught himself most successfully to sacrifice his own private interests to the good of the State, is, in the estimation of Ansaldo Ceba, the best Citizen. To illustrate this noble sentiment, he has brought to his aid all the wisdom of the ancient philosophy; and the testimony of Ancient History confirms those wise maxims, which are the foundations of civil concord and prosperity.” Such is the language of one of the most illustrious Italian scholars of the present age.—Vol. vi., *Biblioteca Enciclopedica Italiana, Milano, 1839. Introduction.*

I know of no work in any language that covers exactly the same ground, nor any one so well adapted to the circumstances of the young American. I am afraid we are losing our veneration for the pure and lofty men who bore the flag of the Revolution triumphantly through those stormy periods. In the heat of party strife, we are apt to think no qualification so important to the success of the young Citizen as a knowledge of the movements and machinery of rival parties. It is natural the young should feel so when they have such fatal examples set before them—when party is too often dearer than

country—when office is too often esteemed the *right* of the brawler and the demagogue. This remark is not made with any invidious spirit. We know it is not applicable to any large proportion of our citizens. We have good men and true, who will neither countenance such a spirit, nor bow to it. One of the most cheering signs of the times, is that this impure spirit has been boldly rebuked by those who govern us. Men, who once dreamed that governments were established only as soldiers of fortune were banded together in the middle ages, to seize the spoils and then divide them, have many of them been recently taught that our Republic, at least, contemplates higher objects.

From all such spectacles and their malign influence we turn away with cheerfulness and hope to the young Republican of America. We believe that Washington, and Adams, and Jefferson, and Franklin, would have laid the broad seal of their approbation on this book. We believe its principles and its counsels would form men of that same school now.

I have taken some liberties with the text. Some things I have omitted as utterly useless to the Citizen of our times. But I have done no violence to the venerable Teacher who speaks. I found a solidity, a dignity, a brevity, and a scholastic air about the work which I did not wish to disturb. In taking this course, I have, I am conscious, sacrificed my own style, but I hope I have not dishonored that of the good Ceba.

As one of the citizens of our great and free Republic, I have wished, by the translation of this noble work, to render some humble service to my country. And when I could not have spoken such words of wisdom myself, I have unsealed a rich fountain. And in the cheering hope that its pure and healing waters may flow through the veins of our Republic, the translator has already reaped the reward of his labors.

C. EDWARDS LESTER.

New York, Aug. 20th, 1845.

CONTENTS.



	Page.
CHAPTER I.	
Political Education—Its Necessity and proper Design,	21
CHAPTER II.	
Indicates Certain Qualities necessarily presupposed in the Citizen to be formed in this Book,	23
CHAPTER III.	
An Apology for whatever Defects may exist in the Work,	24
CHAPTER IV.	
Shows the Necessity of Virtues in the Citizen of a Republic, and the ultimate Scope of our Argument,	25
CHAPTER V.	
Defines Virtue, resolving it into the Intellectual and the Moral, and specifies some of its particular Aspects under both,	26
CHAPTER VI.	
Treats generally of the Advantages of Person and Fortune which are necessary to the Citizen in the Exercise of Political Vir- tues,	28
CHAPTER VII.	
Proposes to speak specially of the Virtues necessary to the Citizen, and their use—omitting some unnecessary to individualize, ..	29

CHAPTER VIII.

- Inculcates the Advantage to the Citizen of understanding a Variety of Languages, and the manner of using them,..... 30

CHAPTER IX.

- The Necessity of the Art of Rhetoric to the Citizen, and how he should use it,..... 32

CHAPTER X.

- Insists upon the Citizen understanding Moral Philosophy, with a Classification of the Science into Parts, and points out what should be known in each, 36

CHAPTER XI.

- Treats of the Necessity of a Knowledge of History, and the kinds he should read,..... 40

CHAPTER XII.

- The Citizen must understand the Art of War,..... 42

CHAPTER XIII.

- The Citizen should not neglect the Reading of Poetry,..... 43

CHAPTER XIV.

- The Citizen should also have some Knowledge of Natural Philosophy, 46

CHAPTER XV.

- The Citizen should understand the Mathematical Sciences,..... 47

CHAPTER XVI.

- Treats of the Prudence necessary to the Citizen in Administering Political Affairs,..... 48

CHAPTER XVII.

- Continues to treat of the Moral Virtues necessary to the Citizen —showing the Difference between Habit and Disposition, and Natural and Acquired Virtues,..... 50

CONTENTS.		XV
		Page.
CHAPTER XVIII.		
The Citizen should be Firm, and How,.....		53
CHAPTER XIX.		
The Citizen should be Temperate, and How,.....		57
CHAPTER XX.		
The Citizen should be Liberal, and How,.....		60
CHAPTER XXI.		
The Citizen should be Magnificent, and How,.....		67
CHAPTER XXII.		
The Citizen should be Magnanimous, and How,.....		70
CHAPTER XXIII.		
The Citizen should be Moderate in Seeking Honors, and How,..		75
CHAPTER XXIV.		
The Citizen should be Mild, and How,.....		77
CHAPTER XXV.		
The Citizen should be Constant, and How,.....		79
CHAPTER XXVI.		
The Citizen should be Just, and How,.....		82
CHAPTER XXVII.		
The Citizen should be Clement, and How,.....		85
CHAPTER XXVIII.		
The Citizen should exercise the Virtues Heroically, and How,..		89
CHAPTER XXIX.		
Some thoughts on the Manner of Acquiring and Preserving these Virtues,.....		90

	Page.
CHAPTER XXX.	
The Distinction between Natural Advantages and those of Fortune, and their Necessity to the Citizen,.....	90
CHAPTER XXXI.	
The Citizen should possess a Robust Person,.....	92
CHAPTER XXXII.	
The Citizen should Promote and Preserve Physical Beauty,.....	94
CHAPTER XXXIII.	
How the Citizen should be Noble,.....	95
CHAPTER XXXIV.	
How the Citizen should be Rich,.....	97
CHAPTER XXXV.	
How the Citizen should have a Good Name among the People, ..	101
CHAPTER XXXVI.	
How the Citizen should seek to be Honored,.....	102
CHAPTER XXXVII.	
The Citizen should have Children,.....	103
CHAPTER XXXVIII.	
How the Citizen should possess Civil Power,.....	107
CHAPTER XXXIX.	
The Citizen should have Friends,.....	111
CHAPTER XL.	
Means necessary to acquire the Favor of Others, and with whom the Citizen should cultivate Intimacy,.....	115
CHAPTER XLI.	
The Citizen should Cultivate the Art of Pleasing,.....	117

	xvii
CONTENTS.	Page.
CHAPTER XLII.	
The Citizen must be Veracious in his Conversation,.....	117
CHAPTER XLIII.	
The Citizen should be Cheerful in Society,.....	119
CHAPTER XLIV.	
How the Citizen should Appear, Converse, and Conduct himself in Private Companies,.....	120
CHAPTER XLV.	
How a Citizen is to Conduct himself in reference to Public Squares, Banquets, Dress, Theatres, and Entertainments..	123
CHAPTER XLVI.	
The Citizen should shun all Gaming-Houses—What should be his plays?.....	125
CHAPTER XLVII.	
The Enticements of Women,	126
CHAPTER XLVIII.	
How the Citizen should conduct himself in reference to the Com- pany of his Countrymen, and of Foreigners, and particularly in Speaking of the Republic—How he should bear himself in the Senate or in Council—He should not be reluctant to Treat with the Great and the Little, for the Public Good,.....	144
CHAPTER XLIX.	
The Citizen should not hold much Communication with the Am- bassadors of Foreign Princes,.....	147
CHAPTER L.	
The Citizen must Practise what he Preaches,	148
CHAPTER LI.	
The Citizen should also Know how to Keep Silence,.....	148

CHAPTER LII.

The Citizen should contract no Obligation to the Powerful, although he ought to treat them Courteously, and with Particular Respect,.....	149
---	-----

CHAPTER LIII.

How the Citizen should regard the Friendship of Foreign Princes,	150
--	-----

CHAPTER LIV.

The Citizen should Honor Every One who has advanced the Dignity or the Virtue of the Republic,.....	152
---	-----

CHAPTER LV.

The Citizen should not Presume too much of Himself,.....	153
--	-----

CHAPTER LVI.

The Citizen must have no Party but Country, and strive to Reconcile all Enmities,.....	154
--	-----

CHAPTER LVII.

The Citizen must be Unwavering in his Support of Justice,.....	155
--	-----

CHAPTER LVIII.

How the Citizen should bear himself in the Magistracy with his Colleagues—How he should Conduct himself when his Opinion Prevails and how when it is Overthrown,.....	156
---	-----

CHAPTER LIX.

When the Citizen should Feel Ashamed, and when he should not,	157
---	-----

CHAPTER LX.

Should the Citizen Take or Refuse Presents ?.....	159
---	-----

CHAPTER LXI.

What the Citizen should be in his Public and Private Capacity,.	160
---	-----

CONTENTS.

xix
Page.

CHAPTER LXII.

The Citizen ought to Travel Six Years to gain Experience in Civil and Military Affairs,..... 165

CHAPTER LXIII.

Some Opinions, Considerations, and Examples the Citizen should fasten in his Mind in the Government of the Republic, and What he should Do when he Retires to Private Life, 166

CHAPTER LXIV.

How the Citizen shall Recover Himself when Publicly or Privately Assailed by Envy and Odium,..... 170

CONCLUSION, 176

NOTES, 179



THE
CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC.

~~~~~  
CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL EDUCATION,—ITS NECESSITY AND PROPER DESIGN.

Among the memorials Plutarch has preserved of the sayings of the Lacedemonians, he tells us that one of them, on being asked what he knew how to do, replied: "I know how to be free." I have often pondered over this saying, and finding it embraced the idea that liberty presupposes science, I have been inclined to doubt if there be many in our times who can properly be called free, since there are so few who care anything about the science of liberty, which so deeply concerns every man born in a free state, and should, therefore, not by the few only, but by the many, be profoundly understood.

And although shoemakers and tailors always consider it necessary to apply themselves with diligence to their trades in order to excel, yet very rarely the guide of civil education precedes the practice of the art of governing the republic. But still I confess I have never been able to find any excuse to justify mankind in so wonderful an oversight. For although nature ordinarily strikes some lights in our souls to guide us in the affairs of life, yet these lights are often clouded by the fogs of passion, and the evil dispositions of human nature, and with all their illuminations, they cannot serve as infallible guides in all the shifting circumstances of life; nor can we borrow from them the necessary aid for governing us wisely



in the administration of civil affairs. For this reason the Legislators of the most celebrated ancient states prescribed that those precepts should be inculcated in the minds of the young, which would prepare them to govern the republic wisely. The most profound Philosophers also made the chief aim of wise government to consist in the proper instruction of its young men. So that if in our times we paid proper regard to their sage counsels, we should open in our free cities, far more schools to teach our youth the art of becoming good citizens, than we have sinks of iniquity to contaminate them.

But since this necessity for public education immeasurably exceeds the provisions we have made for it,\* and even private persuasion often seems to be of little avail, I have thought it worth trying to see if the youth will not of themselves acquire what neither the republic, nor their own fathers, have furnished them. And reflecting how prone the young are to yield themselves to the fascinations of beauty, it occurred to me to set before them a beautiful model, which, by contemplating intently, they might perhaps feel more desire to imitate, than they would ever have been inspired to do by the necessity for public instruction, or the influence of private persuasion. And this model shall be A GOOD CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC.

---

\* Ceba was one of those lofty-minded and generous men who have had no little agency in the advancement of true civilisation. At the time he wrote, Genoa was adorned with a noble university and with many schools of learning. But the masses of her crowded population received little advantage, comparatively, from these splendid institutions. They shed their hallowed light upon the few, born to fortune, or to nobility. Like all writers who have laid down great principles of political economy, who have been honored and received by good men in all after times, he began with the lofty position that a free state was bound to provide the means of education *for all its citizens*. He felt the force of Socrates' wise saying: "Better spend gold in teaching men to become good citizens, than to bring them up in ignorance and support their crimes."

And although in writing this treatise, I shall have regard principally to the benefit of my own country, yet, whatever may receive my praise or censure, will be the result rather of my observations in other free states than in my own city ; for I do not intend either to accuse or defend my country in these writings, but to endeavor to ground it more firmly in the good it possesses, and provide it with what it lacks.

---

## CHAPTER II.

INDICATES CERTAIN QUALITIES NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSED IN THE  
CITIZEN TO BE FORMED IN THIS BOOK.

IN order then that our Citizen may be formed under favorable auspices, I presuppose, first of all, that he shall be a citizen of a *good Republic*, by which I mean one whose object is to secure the general prosperity, which can have no other foundation than the love and the practice of virtue. And as many other things are necessary to this, we constitute for its first foundation that the citizen to whom the Republic has committed its destinies ought to be provided principally with moral virtues. He will be fortunate too if he be favored with personal gifts and fortune, which are necessary for bringing them into exercise. In the second place he should not content himself alone with the possession of virtue, but cause it to shine out in his public life. Finally, in all he does he must cherish the public good dearer than his own personal emolument. Reasoning upon these premises, we shall proceed to delineate the characteristics of that citizen who may serve as the model after whom should be formed, or reformed, the character of every man who lives in a state worthy of being called free.\*

---

\* In these noble principles we have an illustration of two points which stand out in bold relief from the scrolls of the history of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages. The deep persuasion of the

## CHAPTER III.

## AN APOLOGY FOR WHATEVER DEFECTS MAY EXIST IN THE WORK.

ALTHOUGH we have in our reading gathered many illustrations of the principles we wish to establish in this work, yet we have preserved but a faint recollection of them. We shall, therefore, feel under special obligation to any one who will illustrate our principles of political life with proofs from history, and by executing the work better than we have done, supply our defects. But if in the definitions and divisions we are obliged to make in this treatise, and the disposition and order we adopt, we do not proceed with all that precision we know would be desirable, it is because the subject under consideration does not admit of ostentation, and our design is more to be useful by getting at the substance of things than to exhibit the work of a master.

---

truths of religion which seems to have been wrought more firmly into the minds of men, than at any subsequent era ; and, second, the heroic spirit of chivalry with which the glorious men of those days devoted themselves on the altar of their country. An atheist, in those times, was regarded with universal abhorrence ; and the man who was not willing to die for his country was deemed worthy only of the death of the traitor. I know it is the fashion either unduly to exalt or to despise all that is ancient—all that belongs to “ the old time ”—to the dark ages. But while we feel that into the narrow limits of our own national history, unnumbered bright examples of devotion to God and to the country are crowded, yet we do not believe that we have cherished sacredly enough the spirit of our fathers ; or that there now lives in our people the same enthusiasm for the national glory which fired the souls of the last generation.

## CHAPTER IV.

SHOWS THE NECESSITY OF VIRTUES IN THE CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC, AND THE ULTIMATE SCOPE OF OUR ARGUMENT.

To return then, to the point from which we set out. It will be necessary for our Citizen patiently to acquire those habits of virtue by which he can guide the republic to civil prosperity. Although some of these virtues may contribute more, and some less, to this common end, yet they are all so intimately connected with each other, that one cannot be perfectly cherished without possessing the rest, and sooner or later, in the changing scenes of life, they will all be found indispensable to the citizen who participates in the government of the republic. And if happiness, according to Aristotle, is begotten principally by the practice of perfect virtue, which is that pure and universal justice that embraces all others, it will no longer be doubted that to secure it, all the train of virtues must be possessed. To acquire them, we must know what they are. And as this field belongs particularly to moral philosophers, and they have cultivated it well, we shall invade their ground no farther than our plan renders it necessary, leaving the rest to its appropriate teachers.

## CHAPTER V.

DEFINES VIRTUE, RESOLVING IT INTO THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE MORAL, AND SPECIFIES SOME OF ITS PARTICULAR ASPECTS UNDER BOTH.

VIRTUE, then, in general terms, seems to us to be a habitude of the mind which is conformed to truth in action, and whose lofty motive in everything, is *the greatest good*. And since

## CHAPTER III.

## AN APOLOGY FOR WHATEVER DEFECTS MAY EXIST IN THE WORK.

ALTHOUGH we have in our reading gathered many illustrations of the principles we wish to establish in this work, yet we have preserved but a faint recollection of them. We shall, therefore, feel under special obligation to any one who will illustrate our principles of political life with proofs from history, and by executing the work better than we have done, supply our defects. But if in the definitions and divisions we are obliged to make in this treatise, and the disposition and order we adopt, we do not proceed with all that precision we know would be desirable, it is because the subject under consideration does not admit of ostentation, and our design is more to be useful by getting at the substance of things than to exhibit the work of a master.

---

truths of religion which seems to have been wrought more firmly into the minds of men, than at any subsequent era; and, second, the heroic spirit of chivalry with which the glorious men of those days devoted themselves on the altar of their country. An atheist, in those times, was regarded with universal abhorrence; and the man who was not willing to die for his country was deemed worthy only of the death of the traitor. I know it is the fashion either unduly to exalt or to despise all that is ancient—all that belongs to "the old time"—to the dark ages. But while we feel that into the narrow limits of our own national history, unnumbered bright examples of devotion to God and to the country are crowded, yet we do not believe that we have cherished sacredly enough the spirit of our fathers; or that there now lives in our people the same enthusiasm for the national glory which fired the souls of the last generation.

## CHAPTER IV.

SHOWS THE NECESSITY OF VIRTUES IN THE CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC, AND THE ULTIMATE SCOPE OF OUR ARGUMENT.

To return then, to the point from which we set out. It will be necessary for our Citizen patiently to acquire those habits of virtue by which he can guide the republic to civil prosperity. Although some of these virtues may contribute more, and some less, to this common end, yet they are all so intimately connected with each other, that one cannot be perfectly cherished without possessing the rest, and sooner or later, in the changing scenes of life, they will all be found indispensable to the citizen who participates in the government of the republic. And if happiness, according to Aristotle, is begotten principally by the practice of perfect virtue, which is that pure and universal justice that embraces all others, it will no longer be doubted that to secure it, all the train of virtues must be possessed. To acquire them, we must know what they are. And as this field belongs particularly to moral philosophers, and they have cultivated it well, we shall invade their ground no farther than our plan renders it necessary, leaving the rest to its appropriate teachers.

## CHAPTER V.

DEFINES VIRTUE, RESOLVING IT INTO THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE MORAL, AND SPECIFIES SOME OF ITS PARTICULAR ASPECTS UNDER BOTH.

VIRTUE, then, in general terms, seems to us to be a habitude of the mind which is conformed to truth in action, and whose lofty motive in everything, is *the greatest good*. And since

the mind may be divided into the part which understands and the part which wills, virtue itself must be both intellectual and moral, the former being acquired by the aid of science, and the latter by moral action.

Intellectual virtue is a habitude of the intellect, hence it embraces truth in things that exist from necessity, and directs operations in things contingent. That of the intellect is called speculative, the second practical, and both comprise respectively, intelligence, science, wisdom, art, and prudence, under which general names, all disciplines and separate faculties, whose object is either speculation or practice, are also embraced.

Intelligence consists in acquiring principles without demonstration; science in demonstrating conclusions; wisdom in considering things in the abstract; art in constructing that which might result differently; and prudence in regulating actions which can be controlled by advice. Among the habitudes of the speculative intellect, necessary to form the good citizen, we reckon all those which may in any manner aid civil action. Among those of the practical intellect, those which usually control them.

We class among the first, a knowledge of bodies, and of sidereal motions; intelligence of the various states of the air; a knowledge of places and the measure of the earth; and in a word, the knowledge of all the sciences which can be useful in any manner in securing the republic in the prosperity of peace, and fortifying it amidst the terrors of war.

Among the second, we class that prudence which must be exercised in the government of ourselves; that which must direct us in ruling our households, and that which should guide us in administering the affairs of the state,—three distinct qualities of one general principle, no one of which can easily exist alone, and all of which are necessary to form the good citizen.

This third kind of prudence, when contemplated in all the acts enjoined by the laws, is termed universal civil prudence, and when applied to those who govern, private civil prudence; one of whose attributes consists in giving counsel for the future, which is then called advisory; the other in pro-

nouncing sentence, which is termed *judicial*. All of which are alike composed of three qualities by which all the actions of mankind are brought to a harmonious end. The first is called good consultation, and is a wise decision which aids us in the end we have in view. The second, *foresight*, or a readiness in detecting the truth amidst falsehood and doubt. The third, discretion, or a rule by which we can distinguish justice from severity, according to circumstances.

Moral virtue is a habit depending upon the will, and consists in following the medium in human actions according to the guide of sober reason. The moral virtues are fortitude, temperance, liberality, justice, &c., &c. Some of the chief of which we will briefly describe, that we may unite them with others of the practical intellectual in our Citizen, for securing public felicity. Fortitude is the medium between timidity and audacity, which bears one through terrible crises, by the power of *integrity*, into which, to save repetition, we shall resolve all the moral virtues. Temperance is the medium between indulgence and insensibility in refraining from sensual pleasures. Liberality is the medium between avarice and prodigality in giving and taking. Magnificence is the medium between penury and vanity, in spending on great things. Magnanimity is the medium between ostentation and pusillanimity in being esteemed, and really being worthy of high honors. Virtue in acquiring honors, is the medium between too little and too much ambition. Gentleness is the medium between fury and stupidity in being excited. Constancy is the medium between pertinacity and instability, in carrying out good designs.

Justice is either universal or particular. Universal justice comprises all other virtues, and directs according to the laws, all noble actions in the republic. Particular justice is the medium between the extremes of too much and too little ; when it accords to each one due honors, it is termed distributive justice, and when it corrects the inequality of contracts, and adjusts punishment to crime, it is termed commutative. Clemency is the medium between cruelty and weakness in moderating penalties.



|                                                                                                                                                                       | Page. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| <b>CHAPTER LII.</b>                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| The Citizen should contract no Obligation to the Powerful, although he ought to treat them Courteously, and with Particular Respect,.....                             | 149   |
| <b>CHAPTER LIII.</b>                                                                                                                                                  |       |
| How the Citizen should regard the Friendship of Foreign Princes,                                                                                                      | 150   |
| <b>CHAPTER LIV.</b>                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| The Citizen should Honor Every One who has advanced the Dignity or the Virtue of the Republic,.....                                                                   | 152   |
| <b>CHAPTER LV.</b>                                                                                                                                                    |       |
| The Citizen should not Presume too much of Himself,.....                                                                                                              | 153   |
| <b>CHAPTER LVI.</b>                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| The Citizen must have no Party but Country, and strive to Reconcile all Enmities,.....                                                                                | 154   |
| <b>CHAPTER LVII.</b>                                                                                                                                                  |       |
| The Citizen must be Unwavering in his Support of Justice,.....                                                                                                        | 155   |
| <b>CHAPTER LVIII.</b>                                                                                                                                                 |       |
| How the Citizen should bear himself in the Magistracy with his Colleagues—How he should Conduct himself when his Opinion Prevails and how when it is Overthrown,..... | 156   |
| <b>CHAPTER LIX.</b>                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| When the Citizen should Feel Ashamed, and when he should not,                                                                                                         | 157   |
| <b>CHAPTER LX.</b>                                                                                                                                                    |       |
| Should the Citizen Take or Refuse Presents?.....                                                                                                                      | 159   |
| <b>CHAPTER LXI.</b>                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| What the Citizen should be in his Public and Private Capacity,                                                                                                        | 160   |

**CONTENTS.**

**xix**  
**Page.**

**CHAPTER LXII.**

**The Citizen ought to Travel Six Years to gain Experience in Civil and Military Affairs,..... 165**

**CHAPTER LXIII.**

**Some Opinions, Considerations, and Examples the Citizen should fasten in his Mind in the Government of the Republic, and What he should Do when he Retires to Private Life, 166**

**CHAPTER LXIV.**

**How the Citizen shall Recover Himself when Publicly or Privately Assailed by Envy and Odium,..... 170**

**CONCLUSION, ..... 176**

**NOTES, ..... 179**



THE  
CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC.



CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL EDUCATION,—ITS NECESSITY AND PROPER DESIGN.

AMONG the memorials Plutarch has preserved of the sayings of the Lacedemonians, he tells us that one of them, on being asked what he knew how to do, replied: "I know how to be free." I have often pondered over this saying, and finding it embraced the idea that liberty presupposes science, I have been inclined to doubt if there be many in our times who can properly be called free, since there are so few who care anything about the science of liberty, which so deeply concerns every man born in a free state, and should, therefore, not by the few only, but by the many, be profoundly understood.

And although shoemakers and tailors always consider it necessary to apply themselves with diligence to their trades in order to excel, yet very rarely the guide of civil education precedes the practice of the art of governing the republic. But still I confess I have never been able to find any excuse to justify mankind in so wonderful an oversight. For although nature ordinarily strikes some lights in our souls to guide us in the affairs of life, yet these lights are often clouded by the fogs of passion, and the evil dispositions of human nature, and with all their illuminations, they cannot serve as infallible guides in all the shifting circumstances of life; nor can we borrow from them the necessary aid for governing us wisely

in the administration of civil affairs. For this reason the Legislators of the most celebrated ancient states prescribed that those precepts should be inculcated in the minds of the young, which would prepare them to govern the republic wisely. The most profound Philosophers also made the chief aim of wise government to consist in the proper instruction of its young men. So that if in our times we paid proper regard to their sage counsels, we should open in our free cities, far more schools to teach our youth the art of becoming good citizens, than we have sinks of iniquity to contaminate them.

But since this necessity for public education immeasurably exceeds the provisions we have made for it,\* and even private persuasion often seems to be of little avail, I have thought it worth trying to see if the youth will not of themselves acquire what neither the republic, nor their own fathers, have furnished them. And reflecting how prone the young are to yield themselves to the fascinations of beauty, it occurred to me to set before them a beautiful model, which, by contemplating intently, they might perhaps feel more desire to imitate; than they would ever have been inspired to do by the necessity for public instruction, or the influence of private persuasion. And this model shall be A GOOD CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC.

---

\* Ceba was one of those lofty-minded and generous men who have had no little agency in the advancement of true civilisation. At the time he wrote, Genoa was adorned with a noble university and with many schools of learning. But the masses of her crowded population received little advantage, comparatively, from these splendid institutions. They shed their hallowed light upon the few, born to fortune, or to nobility. Like all writers who have laid down great principles of political economy, who have been honored and received by good men in all after times, he began with the lofty position that a free state was bound to provide the means of education *for all its citizens*. He felt the force of Socrates' wise saying: "Better spend gold in teaching men to become good citizens, than to bring them up in ignorance and support their crimes."

And although in writing this treatise, I shall have regard principally to the benefit of my own country, yet, whatever may receive my praise or censure, will be the result rather of my observations in other free states than in my own city ; for I do not intend either to accuse or defend my country in these writings, but to endeavor to ground it more firmly in the good it possesses, and provide it with what it lacks.

---

## CHAPTER II.

INDICATES CERTAIN QUALITIES NECESSARILY PRESUPPOSED IN THE  
CITIZEN TO BE FORMED IN THIS BOOK.

In order then that our Citizen may be formed under favorable auspices, I presuppose, first of all, that he shall be a citizen of a *good Republic*, by which I mean one whose object is to secure the general prosperity, which can have no other foundation than the love and the practice of virtue. And as many other things are necessary to this, we constitute for its first foundation that the citizen to whom the Republic has committed its destinies ought to be provided principally with moral virtues. He will be fortunate too if he be favored with personal gifts and fortune, which are necessary for bringing them into exercise. In the second place he should not content himself alone with the possession of virtue, but cause it to shine out in his public life. Finally, in all he does he must cherish the public good dearer than his own personal emolument. Reasoning upon these premises, we shall proceed to delineate the characteristics of that citizen who may serve as the model after whom should be formed, or reformed, the character of every man who lives in a state worthy of being called free.\*

---

\* In these noble principles we have an illustration of two points which stand out in bold relief from the scrolls of the history of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages. The deep persuasion of the

## CHAPTER III.

## AN APOLOGY FOR WHATEVER DEFECTS MAY EXIST IN THE WORK.

ALTHOUGH we have in our reading gathered many illustrations of the principles we wish to establish in this work, yet we have preserved but a faint recollection of them. We shall, therefore, feel under special obligation to any one who will illustrate our principles of political life with proofs from history, and by executing the work better than we have done, supply our defects. But if in the definitions and divisions we are obliged to make in this treatise, and the disposition and order we adopt, we do not proceed with all that precision we know would be desirable, it is because the subject under consideration does not admit of ostentation, and our design is more to be useful by getting at the substance of things than to exhibit the work of a master.

---

truths of religion which seems to have been wrought more firmly into the minds of men, than at any subsequent era ; and, second, the heroic spirit of chivalry with which the glorious men of those days devoted themselves on the altar of their country. An atheist, in those times, was regarded with universal abhorrence ; and the man who was not willing to die for his country was deemed worthy only of the death of the traitor. I know it is the fashion either unduly to exalt or to despise all that is ancient—all that belongs to “the old time”—to the dark ages. But while we feel that into the narrow limits of our own national history, unnumbered bright examples of devotion to God and to the country are crowded, yet we do not believe that we have cherished sacredly enough the spirit of our fathers ; or that there now lives in our people the same enthusiasm for the national glory which fired the souls of the last generation.

## CHAPTER IV.

SHOWS THE NECESSITY OF VIRTUES IN THE CITIZEN OF A REPUBLIC, AND THE ULTIMATE SCOPE OF OUR ARGUMENT.

To return then, to the point from which we set out. It will be necessary for our Citizen patiently to acquire those habits of virtue by which he can guide the republic to civil prosperity. Although some of these virtues may contribute more, and some less, to this common end, yet they are all so intimately connected with each other, that one cannot be perfectly cherished without possessing the rest, and sooner or later, in the changing scenes of life, they will all be found indispensable to the citizen who participates in the government of the republic. And if happiness, according to Aristotle, is begotten principally by the practice of perfect virtue, which is that pure and universal justice that embraces all others, it will no longer be doubted that to secure it, all the train of virtues must be possessed. To acquire them, we must know what they are. And as this field belongs particularly to moral philosophers, and they have cultivated it well, we shall invade their ground no farther than our plan renders it necessary, leaving the rest to its appropriate teachers.

---

  
CHAPTER V.

DEFINES VIRTUE, RESOLVING IT INTO THE INTELLECTUAL AND THE MORAL, AND SPECIFIES SOME OF ITS PARTICULAR ASPECTS UNDER BOTH.

VIRTUE, then, in general terms, seems to us to be a habitude of the mind which is conformed to truth in action, and whose lofty motive in everything, is *the greatest good*. And since



the mind may be divided into the part which understands and the part which wills, virtue itself must be both intellectual and moral, the former being acquired by the aid of science, and the latter by moral action.

Intellectual virtue is a habitude of the intellect, hence it embraces truth in things that exist from necessity, and directs operations in things contingent. That of the intellect is called speculative, the second practical, and both comprise respectively, intelligence, science, wisdom, art, and prudence, under which general names, all disciplines and separate faculties, whose object is either speculation or practice, are also embraced.

Intelligence consists in acquiring principles without demonstration; science in demonstrating conclusions; wisdom in considering things in the abstract; art in constructing that which might result differently; and prudence in regulating actions which can be controlled by advice. Among the habitudes of the speculative intellect, necessary to form the good citizen, we reckon all those which may in any manner aid civil action. Among those of the practical intellect, those which usually control them.

We class among the first, a knowledge of bodies, and of sidereal motions; intelligence of the various states of the air; a knowledge of places and the measure of the earth; and in a word, the knowledge of all the sciences which can be useful in any manner in securing the republic in the prosperity of peace, and fortifying it amidst the terrors of war.

Among the second, we class that prudence which must be exercised in the government of ourselves; that which must direct us in ruling our households, and that which should guide us in administering the affairs of the state,—three distinct qualities of one general principle, no one of which can easily exist alone, and all of which are necessary to form the good citizen.

This third kind of prudence, when contemplated in all the acts enjoined by the laws, is termed universal civil prudence; and when applied to those who govern, private civil prudence; one of whose attributes consists in giving counsel for the future, which is then called advisory; the other in pro-

nouncing sentence, which is termed *judicial*. All of which are alike composed of three qualities by which all the actions of mankind are brought to a harmonious end. The first is called good consultation, and is a wise decision which aids us in the end we have in view. The second, *foresight*, or a readiness in detecting the truth amidst falsehood and doubt. The third, discretion, or a rule by which we can distinguish justice from severity, according to circumstances.

Moral virtue is a habit depending upon the will, and consists in following the medium in human actions according to the guide of sober reason. The moral virtues are fortitude, temperance, liberality, justice, &c., &c. Some of the chief of which we will briefly describe, that we may unite them with others of the practical intellectual in our Citizen, for securing public felicity. Fortitude is the medium between timidity and audacity, which bears one through terrible crises, by the power of *integrity*, into which, to save repetition, we shall resolve all the moral virtues. Temperance is the medium between indulgence and insensibility in refraining from sensual pleasures. Liberality is the medium between avarice and prodigality in giving and taking. Magnificence is the medium between penury and vanity, in spending on great things. Magnanimity is the medium between ostentation and pusillanimity in being esteemed, and really being worthy of high honors. Virtue in acquiring honors, is the medium between too little and too much ambition. Gentleness is the medium between fury and stupidity in being excited. Constancy is the medium between pertinacity and instability, in carrying out good designs.

Justice is either universal or particular. Universal justice comprises all other virtues, and directs according to the laws, all noble actions in the republic. Particular justice is the medium between the extremes of too much and too little ; when it accords to each one due honors, it is termed distributive justice, and when it corrects the inequality of contracts, and adjusts punishment to crime, it is termed commutative. Clemency is the medium between cruelty and weakness in moderating penalties.

Thus much will suffice to serve as a specimen in the abstract, of the virtues most necessary to our citizen, reserving them, as well as others, for a more minute survey in our future disquisitions, when we shall discuss them with greater minuteness as they occur in the progress of the work.

---

## CHAPTER VI.

TREATS GENERALLY OF THE ADVANTAGES OF PERSON AND FORTUNE WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO THE CITIZEN IN THE EXERCISE OF POLITICAL VIRTUES.

THE practice of some of the principal virtues being often impeded by the want of advantage of person and fortune, it may be well to define them, that the good citizen may use all his endeavors to acquire, preserve, and augment them.

By advantages of person we mean health, good looks, robustness, agility, inurement to fatigue, and in a word, all those gifts of nature which render the citizen more adequate to the public service. By advantages of fortune we understand nobility, wealth, pure fame, honor, children, and political influence, with all those kindred advantages which can in any manner contribute to the exercise of virtuous habits. And as friendship may be reckoned one of the chief of these valuable possessions, it will not be inappropriate to add here a brief definition of it—for we shall treat of it more minutely when speaking of those of the mind we come to show how our Citizen must get and use the advantages of person and fortune.

Although friendship, by reason of its foundation, may be reckoned among the internal, yet, being in some measure dependent upon those who love, it would seem more properly to be classed among the external advantages. Friendship, then may be defined a reciprocal and generous benevolence between those who love each other. One specimen of it is between equals, the other between superiors and inferiors. Friendship

between equals is divided into the useful, the pleasing, and the disinterested; the useful proposes gain—the pleasing enjoyment—the disinterested virtue—and thus we define a reciprocal and candid benevolence between virtuous men. Friendship between superiors and inferiors is either domestic or civil; the former exists between husband and wife, father and children, master and servant—civil, between prince and subjects, and public and private persons. And in all these circumstances the superior should be equally inspired with benevolence, and the inferior with respect.

---

## CHAPTER VII.

PROPOSES TO SPEAK SPECIALLY OF THE VIRTUES NECESSARY TO THE CITIZEN, AND THEIR USE—OMITTING SOME UNNECESSARY TO INDIVIDUALIZE.

HAVING thus defined and classified those advantages of mind, person and fortune, necessary to the advancement of civil happiness, we will now more particularly inquire how our Citizen should acquire and use them for the good of his republic. This was the substance of the three considerations we proposed in reference to his duty, in the beginning of this treatise. And as we do not intend to discuss topics foreign to our main design, we shall leave the Christian virtues, and take it for granted that our Citizen shall never be without them. For those ought to be honest men who control civil affairs, and without a speculative and a practical knowledge of the faith of Christ you can never form a good citizen, or a pure republic. We therefore warn our readers that we shall never so eulogise the practice of the moral virtues as to forget the doctrine of Paul, "Though I speak with the tongue of men and of angels" (1 Corin., c. xiii.) &c. For the doctrine of the apostle teaches us if the citizen be not inspired, and the republic pervaded by *charity*, they "are nothing." We take it

for granted then, that he who would govern a republic justly, must possess true religion as the foundation of all other virtues. And since its efficacy consists not only in faith but in works, every citizen who would devote himself to the good of his republic, should in everything make his will and his actions subservient to the glory of God. If in a false religion Numa Pompilius by his laws, and Scipio Africanus by his victories, shed so much splendor upon the city of Rome, through the reputation for piety they had with their citizens, what ought those to do with the true religion, who live not to honor themselves but to glorify God, and in their public administration follow the injunctions of the Evangelical Law? A law which, without any exception, we establish as the touchstone by which all the principles of this work should be tried—for we declare that we shall neither esteem that to be good or true which is not conformed to it perfectly.

---

## CHAPTER VIII.

INCUPLICATES THE ADVANTAGE TO THE CITIZEN OF UNDERSTANDING  
A VARIETY OF LANGUAGES, AND THE MANNER OF USING THEM.

THE elements of Christian faith then, being cherished by the citizen, without which every other principle is worthless, we reckon a knowledge of foreign languages among his necessary acquisitions.\* By means of them he not only becomes familiar

---

\* It has long been a matter of astonishment to the Europeans, that in this country we have paid so little attention to foreign languages; and I believe Americans who go abroad are not a little surprised at it themselves. Few of our countrymen are able, when they land on the continent of Europe, to hold conversation with anybody but Englishmen. The French, German, and Italian, have formed no part of their early education. They have devoted years perhaps to Greek and Latin; and I have seen an American Divine,

with many arts and histories not common to his own tongue, which on various occasions may be useful in public life, but they afford him great facilities in holding intercourse with foreign nations, when he is appointed ambassador or minister to negotiate the affairs of his republic. But if in such a station he would be jealous of the dignity of his republic, and escape the imputation of personal vanity, however well he may know the language of a foreign prince, we would advise him not to converse at court in any language but his own, unless it becomes necessary. In his debates with his more favorite courtiers on matters foreign to his mission, he may also do so for pastime—since under such circumstances he could not fail to win their good opinion, by showing himself without parade accomplished in foreign languages.

We remember Plutarch notices this accomplishment among the charms of Cleopatra, which captivated the heart of Antony. Besides a knowledge of foreign tongues will serve our citizen in a variety of circumstances which may occur in public life—as for instance writing or registering what cannot or ought not to be done in one's own tongue. But since these languages are numerous, and we have only a short time for their acquisition, we shall limit the knowledge of them to Italian, Latin,

---

who could read Hebrew and its cognate languages, with Latin and Greek, who was obliged, when he went hungry into an Italian Café, to communicate his wishes by odd signs and gestures, for he could not ask for his bread and butter, either in French, German, or Italian. Very rarely are our ambassadors, *chargés-d'affaires* or consuls, able to make themselves understood except in English. They even delay their presentation at court as long as possible, in the hope of "picking up" a small stock of words in the mean time with which to "get through" the scene. They are of necessity exiled from society, or else subjected to a mortification few men are proof against. Such exhibitions are really strange enough to the European; and he very coolly remarks of a very dignified and able ambassador, "He looks like a gentleman, but really it's a pity his early education has been so much neglected; he does look like a very *nice man*." Men who solicit such appointments should consider such things.

for granted then, that he who would govern a republic justly, must possess true religion as the foundation of all other virtues. And since its efficacy consists not only in faith but in works, every citizen who would devote himself to the good of his republic, should in everything make his will and his actions subservient to the glory of God. If in a false religion Numa Pompilius by his laws, and Scipio Africanus by his victories, shed so much splendor upon the city of Rome, through the reputation for piety they had with their citizens, what ought those to do with the true religion, who live not to honor themselves but to glorify God, and in their public administration follow the injunctions of the Evangelical Law? A law which, without any exception, we establish as the touchstone by which all the principles of this work should be tried—for we declare that we shall neither esteem that to be good or true which is not conformed to it perfectly.

---

## CHAPTER VIII.

INCLUCATES THE ADVANTAGE TO THE CITIZEN OF UNDERSTANDING  
A VARIETY OF LANGUAGES, AND THE MANNER OF USING THEM.

THE elements of Christian faith then, being cherished by the citizen, without which every other principle is worthless, we reckon a knowledge of foreign languages among his necessary acquisitions.\* By means of them he not only becomes familiar

---

\* It has long been a matter of astonishment to the Europeans, that in this country we have paid so little attention to foreign languages; and I believe Americans who go abroad are not a little surprised at it themselves. Few of our countrymen are able, when they land on the continent of Europe, to hold conversation with anybody but Englishmen. The French, German, and Italian, have formed no part of their early education. They have devoted years perhaps to Greek and Latin; and I have seen an American Divine,

with many arts and histories not common to his own tongue, which on various occasions may be useful in public life, but they afford him great facilities in holding intercourse with foreign nations, when he is appointed ambassador or minister to negotiate the affairs of his republic. But if in such a station he would be jealous of the dignity of his republic, and escape the imputation of personal vanity, however well he may know the language of a foreign prince, we would advise him not to converse at court in any language but his own, unless it becomes necessary. In his debates with his more favorite courtiers on matters foreign to his mission, he may also do so for pastime—since under such circumstances he could not fail to win their good opinion, by showing himself without parade accomplished in foreign languages.

We remember Plutarch notices this accomplishment among the charms of Cleopatra, which captivated the heart of Antony. Besides a knowledge of foreign tongues will serve our citizen in a variety of circumstances which may occur in public life—as for instance writing or registering what cannot or ought not to be done in one's own tongue. But since these languages are numerous, and we have only a short time for their acquisition, we shall limit the knowledge of them to Italian, Latin,

---

who could read Hebrew and its cognate languages, with Latin and Greek, who was obliged, when he went hungry into an Italian Café, to communicate his wishes by odd signs and gestures, for he could not ask for his bread and butter, either in French, German, or Italian. Very rarely are our ambassadors, *chargés-d'affaires* or consuls, able to make themselves understood except in English. They even delay their presentation at court as long as possible, in the hope of "picking up" a small stock of words in the mean time with which to "get through" the scene. They are of necessity exiled from society, or else subjected to a mortification few men are proof against. Such exhibitions are really strange enough to the European; and he very coolly remarks of a very dignified and able ambassador, "He looks like a gentleman, but really it's a pity his early education has been so much neglected; he does look like a very *nice man*." Men who solicit such appointments should consider such things.



French, and Spanish, by means of which communication may be carried on with nearly all the nations of Europe. As for the principal Greek writings, they are so well translated into the Latin that without the fatigue of acquiring the original, those works can be well understood. In order, therefore, not to absorb other faculties which may be of service to the republic, we would not insist upon the citizen's studying other languages, which demand so much time for their acquisition; and besides subjecting their possessor to the envy of others, as says Medea in Euripides, generally draw away the mind from the duties of active life, and bury its powers in seclusion. This seems to have been the idea of Marcus Cato, when in regretting that with the arrival of Carneades and Diogenes, Athenian ambassadors, Greek letters had reached Rome, he strove under an honest pretext to dismiss them—telling them it was better they should return to dispute in their schools with the children of the Athenians, and leave the Roman youth to their proper avocations—obeying the laws and the magistrates of their country.

---

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE NECESSITY OF THE ART OF RHETORIC TO THE CITIZEN, AND HOW HE SHOULD USE IT.

AFTER acquiring the languages we judge it necessary to take up the study of Rhetoric, which in a free state is reputed by Marcus Tully to be master and queen of all things, since in war and peace it may be made of signal service to the public necessities by enabling the citizen to detect and confound the frauds and deceits of those who would take undue advantage. Hence we are quite sure that Demosthenes dealt a heavier blow upon the Macedonian squadrons with the withering sarcasm of his tongue, than the Athenian soldiers with the edge of the sword. We believe, too, that despite the powers of the orator Demodes,

he could not conceal his malice from the penetration of Phocion.

It is true, that in the practice of this art it is necessary to distinguish carefully the persons to whom we speak, for the minds of all are not to be gained by the same persuasion. It is not unlikely the rude speech of Menenius Agrippa on the Sacred Mount moved the Roman rabble to return to the city, more powerfully than the eloquence of Cicero or Hortensius could ever have done. Farinata degli Uberti, too, struck the Ghibelline multitudes, who were bent upon the destruction of the city of Florence, more effectually by opening his harangue with two low proverbs of the country, than if he had spoken with the gravity of Camillus when he implored his fellow-citizens not to desert Rome. For this cause the citizen will sometimes reason according to the political mode, and sometimes according to rhetoric, as may best suit the place, the time, and the hearers. The manner he should adopt must be a matter of study, as for example, a tone of conciliation if he supposes his hearer will give him credit, and the enthymene if he perceives him to be intent only upon the question—an affecting tone if he perceives he is in a state to be controlled by his passions, whose agitation, in the judgment of Aristotle, is rather an accident than the substance of rhetoric.

However, as we do not always address the tribunal of the Areopagus, it is desirable to know the art of arousing the passions to be of service to the republic according to the urgencies of the occasion. If the cause he advocates be just, the measure he proposes one of utility, and the person he praises meritorious, the good Citizen will not disdain the aid of any means whatever, although they may be accidental. Even Aristotle himself endeavored to take advantage of the weakness of his hearers, and Plato affirms that the principal artifice of the orator lies in skilfully rousing the passions, which, like so many cords of the soul, cannot be skilfully touched but by the hand of a master. It is very true that in the tribunals it would be very wrong to avail oneself of unjust means even in the advocacy of justice, nor in bestowing praises should we go so far as to excite the suspicion of flattery; and above all

(although contrary to deliberative usage) we should never in public harangues advise any measure of utility inconsistent with honesty and truth. Hence if in executing some design of state, a thought occurs which is opposed to justice and religion, let it instantly be adjured ; for whatever face it may wear, that can never be good policy for the state which does not accord with the Divine will.

It will not be forgotten that the suggestion of Themistocles to set fire to the arsenal of the Lacedemonians, although it would have been of great advantage to them, was however disapproved by the Athenians as unjust. But since those who control the councils of republics in our times may also err on the other side, through excess of scruples, our Citizen ought attentively to consider if the measures he proposes are really inconsistent with the law of God, the constitutions of the Christian Church, or true ecclesiastical liberty. If they are, let him not only refrain from executing them himself, but violently oppose all their advocates. But if, on the other hand, his counsel is opposed neither to the laws, the liberty, nor the constitution spoken of, let him proclaim it and sustain it courageously, for the love of God, nor heed the murmurs of those who are too ignorant to discern the truth, nor regard the criticism of those who oppose him from malice, but prepare to discharge his duty to his country and his God. He will thus, in our judgment, at the same time prove himself a good citizen and a good Christian.

Our Citizen will then make himself familiar with the art of Rhetoric, but exercise it with great modesty : and whatever may be the charm or the power of his eloquence, let him not exercise it on every trivial occasion. Nor let him ever feel any false delicacy in yielding to the opinion of others, if he can give a reason for his own. Nor will he be hasty to contradict in the state councils the opinions of his colleagues, unless he knows them to be false, nor indulge in protracted exordiums or frequent epilogues, unless the nature of the theme and the peculiarity of the circumstances demand it. In a word, he will select the time and the occasion with so much wisdom, that any one may perceive he does not speak to win the

other branches of natural philosophy, to enable him to understand, reason, and act in all the exigencies of a public administration.

---

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES.

To Mathematical Studies he must devote himself with greater diligence, as their necessity will oftener arise, particularly in military affairs. He should endeavor to comprehend the movements of the heavenly bodies,—the states of the natural elements,—the divisions of the material universe,—the reasons of measure and number,—the modes of constructing and storming fortifications. He should in fact, be master of the principles of every science which may be necessary to his aid in all the occasions to which we have alluded.

Let him not consider such acquisitions of little consequence in the art of war. Homer's Ulysses not only regulated his voyages at sea, but his battles on land, by the indications of the rising and setting of the stars. And it is perfectly certain, that through ignorance of some of these sciences, the gravest mistakes have been sometimes committed. We will refer to only one or two, mentioned by Polybius, although history abounds with them.

Cleomenes, King of Sparta, in getting possession of the city of Megalopolis by treachery, arranged that the traitors should meet the army at the third watch, on the side where they garrisoned the walls, but without thinking that the nights in the season of the Pleiades are very short, he set out on his march so late that it was daybreak before he arrived. Being detected, he was obliged to resort to force, and was driven back with loss and shame. This never could have happened had he possessed any knowledge of astronomical observations.

## CHAPTER X.

INSISTS UPON THE CITIZEN UNDERSTANDING MORAL PHILOSOPHY,  
WITH A CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCE INTO PARTS, AND POINTS  
OUT WHAT SHOULD BE KNOWN IN EACH.

To a knowledge of Rhetoric, one who is to participate in the government of the republic should also join the study of Moral Philosophy and History, for without this he will not only lack materials for exercising his rhetoric, but fail in the necessary guide to the knowledge of the virtues indispensable to the promotion of public felicity. Under the name of Moral Philosophy, we embrace not only the primary part which concerns

---

We are too impatient and restive to take the necessary steps. We leap from the school into the Congress chamber, the pulpit, the bar, the lecture-room; and our speeches are too often characterized by a loose, desultory, unconnected, imaginative air, which stands but a poor comparison with the dense, brief, penetrating speeches of the English, the French, and the Italian. I do not believe many great speeches have ever been delivered in any country without careful preparation and intense study. The noble speech of Patrick Henry in the Virginia House of Delegates was not, as some suppose, a sudden, unpremeditated burst of eloquence. He had often said the same thing in conversation, and Mr. Wirt once remarked, that this glorious Virginian had written out that same speech the day before. Who supposes Mr. Webster's great efforts are sudden eruptions of fire? I was told an anecdote some time ago of this wonderful man, which illustrates this point well. After Mr. Hayne had finished his bold attack upon the Massachusetts Senator, the friends of Mr. Webster for a while felt fearful of the result. In passing out of the chamber, Mr. Clay took Webster's arm, and offering him his snuff-box, said, "Well, Mr. Webster, what will you do with your friend from Carolina?" "Do, sir?" Mr. Webster replied, as he took a part of the pinch and scattered the rest flying into the air. "Before I've done with him, I'll leave him finer than that!" Mr. Webster did not sleep that night; and the next day Mr. Hayne found there was a meaning to his words.

the government of one's self, but the second, which relates to family government, and the third, which must guide us in governing the republic. And although they may be referred particularly to moral action, we shall, nevertheless, speak of them in this place under the aspect of intellectual habitudes, since we can, in this manner, better accomplish the object we have in view.

As to the first part, he will learn in what human happiness consists, and what is necessary to its acquisition. He will learn the nature of virtue, both intellectual and moral, distinguish between habit and disposition, discern virtue from vice, through circumstances, and establish in his own mind clearly the means necessary to secure public prosperity. But in this study he should be forewarned that if he content himself with the theory only of virtue, he will make no better citizen than any uncultivated man, in the government of the republic; and we insist upon this with more zeal, because we have known many who were valorous in the theory of moral philosophy, while we have known very few intelligent in its practice, without which we are persuaded the former is more apt to embarrass than to aid its possessor. For this reason we cannot but confess we feel a much deeper reverence for the memory of Socrates, who taught moral philosophy in his life, than we ever felt for Aristotle, who only made it the theme of his writings.

As to the government of his own house, he will seek to learn the art of regulating it so well, that as a part properly ordered, it may contribute to the beauty of the whole social fabric. He will endeavor to establish a proper rule to regulate the intercourse of superiors and inferiors—what system to observe in begetting children and educating them—what course he shall follow in the acquisition of wealth, and the means he should adopt for its preservation;—in a word, what provisions should be made to secure harmony in his social life, prosperity to his offspring, and independence to his fortune; for as he who governs his own house well will most probably rule the state with wisdom, so, in the language of *Æschines* to *Timarcus*, he who cannot regulate his own house-

hold, will not be very likely to administer wisely a commonwealth. Had Catiline been well governed in his father's house, he would most probably never have plotted against the liberty of his country. There is a saying of Isocrates, that poverty is often the mother of crime; and recklessness of one's own goods, and usurping those of others, are two things which Plutarch teaches us are by necessary relations chained together.

But in the art of governing the republic, which may be called Political Economy, he must expend more toil and patience than in acquiring all the rest. By consulting the works of those who have written most sensibly on this matter, he will learn what are the elements that compose a political state, and how a republic is constructed from them—what is the property of each—what the objects they have in view, and which of them are best—what rules preserve them, and what are the causes of their defeat—and, in a single word, he must learn in what consists the essence and the difference of a kingdom and a tyranny, of a dictatorship and an oligarchy, of a regulated commonwealth and an unruly rabble. He will observe how the first state degenerates into the second—the third into the fourth—the fifth into the sixth; he will see what union can be made of the best three to constitute a republic which shall not be subjected to the changes that beset any unmixed form of government. With these general acquisitions he will recognize more clearly what constitutes him a citizen; he will be prepared to do his share in averting causes that may work the downfall of his country, and promoting those measures and principles which have a tendency to preserve it. To execute such an intention, he must not only understand the system upon which his republic is constructed, and consequently the peculiar dangers to which it is exposed, but diligently investigate all its minuter features, that he may conform his counsels and measures to the principles which should govern a wise administration. What sadder sight than a company of men, called together to consult of peace or of war,—to make laws or repeal them—to impose taxes or remove them—who are ignorant of the powers, the institutions, and the wants of the republic for which they legislate! For this

reason Biante teaches that the first prerequisite of a counsellor is perfectly to understand the subject in hand, otherwise he will be sure to blunder. And Aristotle cites a case in point, that nothing could persuade the Athenians to declare war, till they were perfectly acquainted with the strength of their forces, the amount of their revenue, and the number and power of their friends and foes.

The Citizen must know the particular position of all the cities of the state—the virtues and the defects of its fortifications—the advantages and the dangers of its ports—the difficulties and the accesses the enemy would meet with ; the obstacles most insuperable to be thrown in his way—the most secret places for ambush—the districts most abounding in provisions, and the best heights for fortifications. He should know whether the republic can better centre her force upon the land or the water—the number and the power of her armament, and how large a force could be sent to sea—the number and the character of the common soldiers—the caprices and inclinations of captains, the satisfaction and discontent of citizens—the number which could, in case of emergency, be gathered in every district, who would make them good leaders—the help to be relied on from abroad—the concord that would prevail at home ; and above all, if foreign garrisons are powerful and domineering, that they may keep the citizens in awe.

He must know the nature and extent of the expenditures and the public revenue—how the one can be increased and the other diminished—what disposition citizens may feel in aiding the work, and what determination they have for universal self-defence. He should recal the fortunes of his country in her former wars, and how her enemies came out from their struggles—he should consider the advantages to be gained from victory, and the disasters that might come from defeat—how foreign princes are affected towards the republic, and the republic towards them—what force allies have to aid the republic, and how heavy a blow the enemy could strike—what bonds the one may have to maintain peace, and what pretensions the other may have for war ; and, in fine, what advantage, or what injury the republic may look for in any event.



On the subject of governing in times of peace, the citizens should not only understand the constitution and form of the republic, but all its statutes which relate to private affairs, and the object for which each was enacted, and if any of them are improper or unjust. He should know the functions and authority of the magistrates, and why they were instituted—the virtue and the acquirements of his fellow-citizens, and the fidelity and valor of ministers. In one word, there should be no constitution, usage, or peculiarity of the republic, of which he should not have at least sufficient information to enable him to counsel and provide for the wants of the state without committing those blunders which are begotten by ignorance of the first principles of wise government.

And since in free cities there are sometimes certain classes of persons, who, in consequence of being either malcontent, or desiring to domineer, nourish spirits little in harmony with equality and civil concord, it will not be amiss to pay some attention to them, to be prepared for passing judgment upon them, when the occasion arises of weighing their will against the public good. Nor are such acquisitions, in consequence of the end they have in view, to be held in less esteem than to be too moderately suspicious of citizens or foreigners, who may sometimes conspire against the security and prosperity of the state, and by a rapid consummation of their designs, bring serious calamities upon the commonwealth.

---

## CHAPTER XI.

### TREATS OF THE NECESSITY OF A KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORY AND THE KINDS HE SHOULD READ.

THE exercise of Rhetoric in political affairs will be incalculably aided by a diligent study of ancient and modern History. It serves the orator with proofs to sustain his propositions—examples for persuasions, and light in public deliberations. It directs the judgment in counsel—awakes the powers in con-

trovery—inculcates moderation in passing sentence—inspires a desire for lofty actions, and nerves the soul for their achievement. To embrace the whole in few words, it garnishes prudence with all those lights, and elevates the will by all those stimulants necessary to guide and sustain the Citizen in the achievement of the end he should have in view.

He will then read the histories of kingdoms and of tyrannies—of legitimate and violent powers—of regulated and anarchical republics; and discriminating among them all conservative and destructive principles, that which embellishes, and that which vivifies—that which benefits, and that which hurts good government—he can learn many lessons of wisdom, which, as occasions arise, may enable him to serve his country.

Neither should the republican citizen pass by the lesson to be learned from the history of a Tiberius or a Gaius, since, in our opinion at least, there is no stimulus so likely to excite the mind to the love of liberty, or learning better calculated to illumine it in the study of its preservation than the historical representations of tyrannical crimes. Nor can we understand why the annals of Cornelius Tacitus should be more consulted in the courts of princes, than the schools of republics, unless it may be that those who legislate according to their own will, may perceive the rules by which to govern it; and they who come forth with flatteries, may discover the art of constructing them. However, let us not be thought to apply this to those lords and courtiers, who read such works only for the erudition of learning, or the knowledge of history.

But the Citizen must be far more familiar with the fortunes of his own republic. Such information will enable him to construct arguments far more effectual in sustaining or refuting opinions in matters which concern the state. For those who counsel the republic in our times, are, so to speak, the same persons who, in former ages, stood in similar circumstances; and as history shows the folly or the wisdom of those measures, we may with safety conclude that they will in our own times be followed by similar results. We would not, however, deny that change of circumstances may offer exceptions to this general rule; but we do say, that conclusions drawn from for-

mer examples in our own history, are a much surer guide than those borrowed from foreign nations.

We trust that what we have said on the necessity and utility of civil philosophy and history will suffice, leaving the rest for the Citizen himself to gather in the course he will make of these studies. I will, however, repeat, that he should enter upon these and all other investigations only with the design of reducing his acquirements to practice. We except, of course, those studies which are more adapted for ideal contemplation, than for action. But as such acquisitions will be called into less active service in administering the affairs of the republic, he will still be bound to consecrate them to the literature of his country, and thus his name may live long after the mere statesman's has been forgotten.

---

## CHAPTER XII.

### THE CITIZEN MUST UNDERSTAND THE ART OF WAR.

WE also propose the Citizen should join a knowledge of the Art of War to the study of political economy. For although modern warfare differs materially from the ancient, yet many of its leading principles still remain and always will the same. Weapons and armory, dress of the soldier, modes of revolution, and the system of sieges, are entirely changed; yet we presume little change has taken place in the qualifications necessary to a captain in conducting an enterprise, and the soldier in executing it—the directions for knowing when to give battle, and when to avoid it—in relying more upon ambush than open attack—upon stratagem than batteries—in confiding more to the advantages of position than the power of troops—in harassing the enemy more by want of provisions than the uncertainty of assaults; and, in short, a thousand secrets of war as occasions may be presented are the same in modern as in ancient times. By accompanying these acquirements with some experience,

as we shall have occasion to show, the Citizen will be reasonably armed when the crisis arrives, against all the enemies of liberty who would lift their arms against her.

---

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD NOT NEGLECT THE READING OF POETRY.

WE do not esteem the Art and the Reading of Poetry so indispensable to one who is to manage the affairs of the republic as political economy and history; but we think Alexander had a reason for keeping Homer's Iliad under his pillow. And Scipio, with many other illustrious men in the old republics, carried with them the noblest Poets of Greece, for any reason in the world but to tickle the ear. And although a Philosopher of great fame has judged Poetry to be a dangerous thing in a well regulated republic, yet we can hardly adopt his opinion; particularly since the fame of Homer—according to Dionysius Harlicarnassus,—made this same Philosopher pass sleepless nights! And in his language and in his actions, he seems to have held the authority of the poets in no less veneration than the discipline of political economists. But as between his person and our own there is no parallel, and we do not in this place discuss the utility of poets in a republic—but whether the Citizen in power can derive any advantage from reading them,—we shall dispense with the task of refuting his reasons, and briefly adduce the substance of our own.

All worthy the name of poets are either Comic, Tragic, or Epic. The Comic poet paints the manners of common men, and brings his piece to a good termination. He produces a good result, for he makes the citizen contented with his state. The Tragic poet paints the deeds of the great, and gives them a tragic end; and thus becomes useful to the citizen for the same reason. The Epic poet paints the achievements of Heroes, and gives them a glorious termination; and thus inspires the hearts

of men with magnanimous feelings and determinations. The comic poet reproves the disorders of every-day life, by bringing them to the light. The tragic poet elevates the passions of terror and pity, by exciting them upon proper objects. The epic poet brings the blandishments of the senses into contempt. And all three, by painting virtue and vice, excite the mind to the love of the one, and the abhorrence of the other, more effectually than historians themselves; who narrate things as they are, and not as they should be. For this reason Aristotle esteemed Poetry more philosophical than History.

The poet often speaks with a language more than human, and wields so magical a power in his representations, it is nearly impossible to withhold our conviction from the doctrines he inculcates, or the opinions he maintains. For this reason many a great man has often borrowed a poetical argument to establish a proposition of science. And Aristotle, in his illustrations of the power of rhetoric, assigns by no means the last place to the writings of the poets. For the magic of harmony, and the power of numbers, gain a firmer hold upon the memory of men than all other writings, and consequently they may be more readily called into use by the statesman whenever an occasion arises. Besides, some of the lyric poets have brought out the divine and human virtues into such bold and touching relief, that the reader can scarcely fail to feel a desire to imitate them.

Their writings often abound, too, in the most important doctrines and the weightiest sentiments, whose reading and study, without a question, might be profitable to the statesman. It is even to be lamented they are not in general use in our times, when they might be turned so essentially to the advantage of republican governments.

All other poetical writers, properly speaking, are versifiers, rather than poets. Although they frequently write things of great use in civil life, yet as they are so often scribblers of what has none too good an influence, they should be omitted by the Citizen;—at least until he is firmly established in the practice of moral virtue. He may then read anything he pleases, for even among trash he can find much that may be turned to

account. Without contamination he can separate the gold from the dross, and use it for the public good, while he condemns the dissoluteness of the poet. This we consider a cogent reason why the Citizen may read any poem whatever, not only with advantage but without any injury. We, however, pre-suppose a firmly established moral character, or, at least, something similar to it, over which the blandishments of sense and passion can have little or no control. Perhaps even Plato himself, who advocated the moral virtues in the formation of his citizens, had he thought of the shield virtue throws before its votaries, would not with so much rigor have banished the poets from his Republic. For in spite of the injury they may sometimes bring upon minds unfortified with virtue, the well-trained Citizen may gather from them such signal advantage, they could not be banished from commonwealths whose young men are taught to restrain the passions, without prejudice to the public good.

Isocrates seems to have special reference to this point where he exhorts Dominicus to study the best poets. Plato, too, with all his severity, could not abstain from telling Socrates they were the fathers and chiefs of wisdom. But as this subject has been treated by a person of much greater reputation than myself, I shall dismiss it; and only beg our Citizen, with all his reading of the poets, never to get an itching to become one himself, if he would be of any service to his country: for, in fact, nothing makes a man so much of a fool and a foreigner, too, in civil affairs, as the dreams of poetry. No one should become so inflamed with this infatuation as to forget the reply of Themistocles to the man that asked him whom he would rather have been, Achilles or Homer:

“ And thou, who wouldst thou choose to be, the victor at the Olympic Games, or the crier of the victory ?”

But we would not discourage any one from writing poetry who is gifted with extraordinary poetical genius, even at the expense of sacrificing his aid in public affairs; but we would oblige him to make his country feel the benign fruit of his labors, and win glory from the excellence of his art.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD ALSO HAVE SOME KNOWLEDGE OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.\*

It will by no means be a useless acquirement, if the Citizen shall gain some knowledge of the Natural Sciences. Plutarch tells us, that Pericles derived no small advantage from them in administering the Athenian State.

But as a long time cannot be devoted to these studies, a general knowledge of them must suffice. As, for example, an idea of the soul, as a principle of life to the body formed to receive it; of being; of feeling; of hearing, and moving. The first of the faculties embraced under this definition, is the vegetative, which can exist without the rest,—as in the plants: the second, the sensitive which embraces the vegetative also—as in animals: the third, the intellectual, which cannot exist without the first and second—as in men: the fourth, the moving power, which is common to all animate existences.—That the vegetative faculty is a principal and a formal cause to the living body of nourishing it, of increasing and generating.—The sensitive, a principal and formal cause in animals of receiving objects of sense.—The intellectual, a principal and formal cause in men of appreciating intelligible objects.—And the moving power, a principal and a formal cause in animate existences of moving from place to place. And in conclusion, he should endeavor at least to acquire the first principles of the knowledge of the faculties of the mind and body, and the

---

\* It may seem strange to the reader that so enlightened a statesman as Cæsar should pass so lightly over such a subject. But it should be borne in mind that he wrote this treatise before Newton, and Kepler, and Galileo lived—when science was in its infancy, and a knowledge even of its first principles was regarded as the business only of the scholar.

other branches of natural philosophy, to enable him to understand, reason, and act in all the exigencies of a public administration.

---

## CHAPTER XV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES.

To Mathematical Studies he must devote himself with greater diligence, as their necessity will oftener arise, particularly in military affairs. He should endeavor to comprehend the movements of the heavenly bodies,—the states of the natural elements,—the divisions of the material universe,—the reasons of measure and number,—the modes of constructing and storming fortifications. He should in fact, be master of the principles of every science which may be necessary to his aid in all the occasions to which we have alluded.

Let him not consider such acquisitions of little consequence in the art of war. Homer's Ulysses not only regulated his voyages at sea, but his battles on land, by the indications of the rising and setting of the stars. And it is perfectly certain, that through ignorance of some of these sciences, the gravest mistakes have been sometimes committed. We will refer to only one or two, mentioned by Polybius, although history abounds with them.

Cleomenes, King of Sparta, in getting possession of the city of Megalopolis by treachery, arranged that the traitors should meet the army at the third watch, on the side where they garrisoned the walls, but without thinking that the nights in the season of the Pleiades are very short, he set out on his march so late that it was daybreak before he arrived. Being detected, he was obliged to resort to force, and was driven back with loss and shame. This never could have happened had he possessed any knowledge of astronomical observations.



Philip, King of Macedon, having formed a similar plot against the city of Melita, fell into the same error, but not through the same blunder. He was ignorant of geometrical measures, the scaling ladders he carried were too short, and he also went home under the same reproach. And Niceas, Captain of the Athenians in the Sicilian enterprise, having chosen the night for the safety of his army, felt so much superstition at an eclipse of the moon, he deferred his departure till the following night, giving the enemy time to discover his design, and the consequence was, that he with all his host fell into their hands. This ruin would certainly have been averted by a knowledge of eclipses, which teaches us that when the earth comes in a direct line between the sun and the moon, the latter must of course be in eclipse. In a word the heavens and the earth, the air and the sea are full of phenomena, which in consequence of not being foreseen, have often brought about serious catastrophes.

---

## CHAPTER XVI.

### TREATS OF THE PRUDENCE NECESSARY TO THE CITIZEN IN ADMINISTERING POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

AFTER he has made those acquisitions, which although they contemplate the actions of our Citizen, we have, in consequence of their relation to science, classed under the speculative intellect, he should form Practical Habits—learning prudence in all its aspects, without which no man can ever either in governing himself, his own house, or the republic, conduct any action to a praiseworthy end. And to remove all confusion, we premise that as prudence is active life governed with true discretion, and consequently inspired by moral virtue, it is a very different thing from opinion or shrewdness. For although they both resemble it in many respects, yet they may exist without that true reason which is conferred upon prudence by a

virtuous life. Hence, says Alexander Aphodisens, although prudence is that quality which, with Aristotle, he calls by a name corresponding with our word shrewdness (*astuzia*), yet they differ in this, that the first only investigates the means to the right, and the second those means which conduce to any end whatever. And perhaps Socrates understood the same thing, where, as Plato tells us in urging fathers to speak contemptuously of it to their children, he says that all science, unaccompanied by virtue, merits rather the name of shrewdness than wisdom.

However, let the Citizen not be deceived by the confusion of terms, but endeavor to be prudent in our acceptation of the term. And although the acquisition of this virtue may be exceedingly difficult to one who through extreme youth cannot possess a knowledge of those particulars in which it consists, yet the reading of history, and the study of the arts we have mentioned, will greatly facilitate the beginning of that which shall be consummated by experience. He will thus observe the circumstances which demand the exercise of prudence, and why all actions should be confined within its limits, viz. the thing to be done, and the reason for doing it: to what extent and in what manner, and when and where, and why it is best; conditions we shall refer to, when we treat of the exercise of the moral virtues. He will recognize the office of wise consultation in discovering the means best adapted to the end. How, for example, Scipio, to rid Italy of the Carthaginian arms, carried the war into Africa. He will observe the power of enlightened sagacity in detecting truth in the midst of doubt. How, for example, Solomon, to discover the real mother of the child claimed by the two women, ordered the sword to divide it between them. He will discern the rule of discretion in distinguishing equity from severity. As was illustrated by Agesilaus, who to avoid the danger of condemning so many of the nobility that had turned their backs in the defeat of Leuctra, advised to let the Spartan law which branded cowards in battle, sleep one day. Finally he will examine the reasons why either by accident or design in the government, of himself, his house, and the republic, other struggles have come to

a happy, or a miserable end. He will thus more or less provide himself with the light necessary to guide him in all the circumstances we have supposed. Reading and experience will so perfect the work of self-discipline that his maturer life may be conformed to the maxims of perfect discretion.

---

## CHAPTER XVII.

CONTINUES TO TREAT OF THE MORAL VIRTUES NECESSARY TO THE CITIZEN—SHOWING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HABIT AND DISPOSITION, AND NATURAL AND ACQUIRED VIRTUES.

HAVING discussed the intellectual virtues which we consider necessary to the education of the Citizen, we must speak of the moral virtues equally essential to the end we contemplate, that the will may be conformed to the dictates of reason, and the intellectual powers subjected to the control of the precepts of wisdom. We still suppose him to be adorned with the Christian virtues, without whose foundation we can never raise a stable edifice.

Observing the order proposed, we shall begin with the virtue of *Fortitude*, and successively discuss those we defined, and some we have not, which seem to form a necessary part of the education of the Republican Statesman. But as the resemblance between habit and disposition may sometimes occasion a misapprehension of our meaning, we will first premise what may seem necessary to illustrate the nature of the moral virtues, and then, commencing with *Fortitude*, contemplate the practice of each in the Citizen we have undertaken to instruct.

The violent passions which the stimulus of pleasure or the scourge of pain kindle in the soul, are either so controlled that they implicitly yield to the sway of reason, or are so unrestrained, that they follow the impulses of sensuality, or they waver in obeying the one or yield to the other with reluctance. In the one case we say they do so from habit, and in the other

from disposition. And therefore the habit of virtue or of vice is nothing more than being for a long time accustomed to control well or ill the passions of the mind ; and the disposition a means to acquire this habit of persevering in the above-mentioned operation. The disposition which inclines the passions to or from the appetite of lust, is called Continnence or Incontinence, as it may be well or ill directed ; and that which exercises them in irascibility, termed Tolerance or Tenderness, follows the same rule. Continnence and tolerance are not, properly speaking, virtues, but tendencies to become such, as incontinence and tenderness are not yet vices, but strong tendencies towards them ; hence the first were termed *unformed virtues*, and the second *unformed vices*, by the Pythagorean Philosophers. He who overcomes an evil tendency of this nature, will not come off victorious without a struggle ; and he who is overcome in the conflict will know the feeling of remorse, while he who is accustomed for a long time to subdue his lust, will conquer by the power of habit ; and the victim of his passions, by yielding to their sway, will at last get beyond the feeling of shame.

By natural virtue we understand that inclination which is impressed upon the mind from infancy. Hence we often see persons perform deeds of fortitude or abstinence under the mere impulses of nature. And by Virtue, properly so called, we understand that habit which is acquired by moral discipline, and which, once firmly seated in the will, can never afterwards be entirely rooted out. But, as between shrewdness and prudence there is the same resemblance as between natural and moral virtue, we thought the subject worthy of a moment's reflection.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE FIRM, AND HOW.

**FIRMNESS**, if we are not mistaken, is to be esteemed one of the virtues most essential to the formation of the good Citizen. For if we understand the quality properly called by this name, which consists in braving courageously in battle the most appalling dangers, the occasions for exercising it may often arise. If we speak of political firmness, which consists in sustaining positions the most trying, to escape shame, or acquire honor, it will be even more frequently called into requisition.

But, since firmness in battle, by reason of the glory of the end contemplated, is esteemed more noble than firmness in civil affairs, the Citizen should labor to acquire it with more diligent solicitude. And when he has attained the lofty sublimity of Horatius, who, forgetting everything but his country, launched himself against the whole Tuscan army on the bridge of Sublicius, he may esteem himself infinitely superior to Hector or Diomedes, one of whom, through fear of the reproaches of Polidamantes, encountered the fury of Achilles, and the other, through dread of the reproaches of Hector, did not fly from the violence of the Trojans. And since a person destitute of political courage may in a variety of ways expose himself, and by showing contempt for danger, imitate in some degree the virtue of firmness, our Citizen should be careful not to be deceived and confound one thing with another.

We must consider the motive by which such a person is influenced, for if necessity rather than his own choice throw him into the front rank of battle for his country, he will not take to himself the credit of having exercised the virtue of true courage; nor let him think he has been valorous if he fought with ardor only to escape the punishment Hector threatened to inflict upon his cowardly soldiers. Neither will he be esteemed to have gained the reputation of a brave man, if through expe-

rience in war, or the hope of victory, or ignorance of danger, he met the enemy valorously ; for courage makes a man expose his life through the lofty motive of public good, and by this rule, none of these exhibitions of intrepidity could stand the test.\* For such men often turn their backs when danger outweighs hope, and the stimulus of pride and the ferocity of the moment give way. So it was with the soldiers that fought for the city of Coronea, against Onomacretus ; they no sooner saw one of their companions slain than they betook themselves to flight. Even the Argives too, when they found that instead of dealing with the Sicyoni, they were grappled by the Lacedæmonians, shamefully turned their backs.

It often happens that men who are fired by anger or base lust rather than by *reason*, come courageously to the gathering, but lacking the inflexible purpose more indispensable in prolonging the battle than even the stimulus of courage itself, retreat without shame when the terror of danger annihilates the impetus of passion. For all the learning of the Portico could not show that such impulses ever nerved brave men in military achievements.

In this light we must interpret Aristotle in his Rhetoric, and Homer with many other poets, when they seem to confound anger with the virtue of fortitude. And as it controls fears and hopes that are more particularly excited amid the dangers of battle than in other scenes of life, it will not be amiss if we dwell upon it for a moment, that our Citizen may know by what actions he can legitimately win the glory of being called brave. Fear or courage contemplate terrible circumstances, which vary so widely as sometimes to render praiseworthy those passions which are at other times to be condemned.

---

\* Tried by this standard we may readily solve the mystery why Benedict Arnold, who was base and cowardly enough to betray his country, fought so desperately in several engagements afterwards. One of the bravest of all the British Generals declared, when he heard of the astonishing feats of prowess Arnold achieved, that *that* did not prove he was a brave man—it only proved he was a man of *nerve*. “A brave man,” said he, “is always a man of honor”

A horrible thing is poverty, infirmity, loss of friends, and other sad strokes of misfortune, but as they do not happen through our fault, we cannot cherish fear of them without blame, nor are we entitled for sustaining them courageously to be praised for any other virtue than that which is termed fortitude by resemblance, and of which we shall perhaps say something when we treat of Constancy. Among awful occurrences are the infidelity of a wife, the shame of children, and all those disasters which brand families with the stamp of infamy; but as we cannot call him weak who dreads such ignominies, so one who through sheer stupidity sustains them *spiritedly* cannot be called firm in any acceptance of the word.

Death, when it finally comes, is formidable, but the insensibility of the Celts, who considered it a shame to fly before their houses fell in and the waves had covered them, was far from being a noble sentiment. They once told Alexander they feared no other ruin but the fall of heaven. Neither is the courage of those commendable who withstand violence with intrepidity without achieving any deeds worthy of being recorded. For although the brave man never loses his spirit even in the midst of the dangers we have spoken of, his sublimity of character is shown when he goes loftily inspired to the achievement of some bold deed, feeling that to encounter death in its accomplishment would be no misfortune. Such instances occur more frequently in the prosecution of wars undertaken for the good of the country, and by moderating the extremes of fear and reckless daring, the Citizen will show he is inspired with genuine courage.

In this, as well as in all the moral virtues, let him follow the guide of circumstances. We will say a word to illustrate this point.

Minutius did not regard the circumstances of time, for in making an untimely charge upon Hannibal, he frustrated the consummate design of Fabius, who had made his arrangements to destroy the Carthaginians without a battle. He erred through excess of boldness. Fabius, on the contrary, wisely consulted circumstances in avoiding a pitched battle with his

enemy, and incurred no imputation of a want of true courage, which is sometimes perfectly consistent with a degree of caution which, under other circumstances, would amount to timidity. Hence no one, in pronouncing judgment upon the two Consuls, under whom the disastrous battle of Cannæ was lost, would not commend the courage of Paulus, who feared to risk an unequal battle, and condemn the temerity of Varro, who had the rashness to provoke it.

Coriolanus committed a great error: for although he worked prodigies in arms in favor of the Volsci, yet he could not be called a brave man, for he fought against his country. And Julius Cæsar transgressed this principle; for although he bore himself courageously in the battle of Pharsalia, yet he was not actuated by that courage which is inspired by integrity, when he lifted his sword against Pompey, to become the tyrant citizen.

We might adduce other illustrations, but it will suffice if we hint that, in exposing oneself to danger, the fault of excess is committed, when public good is not certain to result from certain death. For the life of a brave man should not be recklessly thrown away—it must not be sacrificed but for the glory of his country. But when certain death is likely to serve one's country, it is not only a bestial vice to fear it, but brave, heroic courage must launch the Citizen into the midst of extremest dangers.

For this reason the intrepidity of Horatius was sublime when, under the charm of this single thought, he disputed the ground against the whole army of Porsena. The example of Mucius is above all praise, when, in attempting to kill the enemy's king in his own tent, he did not hold his own life so dear as the good of his country. Sublime, too, the example of the Decians, who, to save the Roman Legions, offered to sacrifice themselves. Codrus, too, and Curtius, and Egisteus, to save their native country, were fired by the same spirit. And Munazius Plaucus, when he protested before the senate and the people of Rome: "*Ut vel omnem impetum belli in me convertere non recusem; si modo meo casu aut confirmare patriæ salutem, aut periculum morari possim,*" (1) meaning by this, he would have



sacrificed his life only for the safety of his country—which is not only not contrary to the virtue of courage, but so entirely its own spirit, that Plutarch nobly appreciates those to be the most noble cavaliers Homer introduces into his battles, who came best armed for the conflict; and Socrates (Plato tells us) observes, that Æneas was commended by the same poet as sagacious in the art of defending himself. And he mentions to his honor that he knew when to fly. Pelopidas, who behaved so valorously among the Thebans, may appear to have disregarded this principle, in placing no value upon his life while he was in the prison of Alexander of Pheræ, for he did not restrain himself from calling him traitor and perjurer; but we think he was guilty of no imprudence in his audacity: for the tyrant asking him why he was in so much fret to die, he replied, “that the Thebans, enraged by my death, may the sooner take vengeance for your treachery against them.” And if in dying he had become the occasion of their vengeance, it could not be said that even the death of Pelopidas had not been of some service to his country.

In the midst of trying dangers, our Citizen will follow the dictates of discretion, and he will thus be furnished with an infallible guide in all his intercourse with mankind. Distinguishing, by the light of his own judgment, genuine from spurious courage, he will conform himself to the distinctions we have given. I will merely add that a display of courage when the danger is foreseen, or making a great cry before the battle is fought, or waging it with lusty strength, are no proofs that men are courageous. But intrepidity in dangers unforeseen, entering upon them with firmness, and fighting through lofty principle, even feebly, are far better indications.

But however necessary the acquisition of the virtue of fortitude may be in the Citizen of a republic, he should guard diligently against seeking occasions for its exercise at the hazard of public safety. Let him never forget that the ambition of Alcibiades, in urging the Athenians on to the Sicilian conquest, occasioned them loss which they would not have sustained had they followed the counsel of Nicias. As the signature of Mont' Aperti would not have fallen upon the

Florentine Republic,\* if, instead of seconding the rashness of that chief who persuaded them to move the army against the Sienese, they had followed the prudence of Tegghiaio Aldobrandi, who, although a great warrior, did not think it best to make a display of his ability at the expense of the republic.

---

## CHAPTER XIX.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE TEMPERATE, AND HOW.

HAVING discussed Fortitude, the great virtue which controls the irascibility of the mind, we proceed to speak of Temperance, which moderates inordinate desire, and is no less necessary to the good republican Citizen. It teaches him to refrain from those sensual pleasures that enslave the will, and fits him for the duties of a freeman, which he cannot discharge unless he be free himself,—and it emancipates the soul from the dominion of the senses. This is the office of that kind of temperance of which we are to speak, in which, says Socrates, every one was instructed from childhood who was destined to rule over Persia, that he might learn how to be free himself before he governed others.

Temperance being no longer considered in the light of painful self-denials, unless it afflict a temperate man to deny his lusts, we may say that it consists in the moderate indulgence of the corporeal pleasures we appreciate through the senses. In sensual pleasures, our Citizen should follow a middle course, dictated by enlightened Christian reason, which teaches us to enjoy in moderation all the good things Heaven has provided for the sustenance and pleasures of His creatures. And, therefore, while he avoids, on the one hand, the extreme austerity of the ascetic monk, who dies by slow starvation, and fancies he purchases heaven by his suicide, he will loathe the glut-

---

\* See Macchiavelli's Florentine Histories.

tony of Philossenes, who wished he had a neck longer than a crane.

But to restrain inordinate appetites, which are inflamed by sensual pleasures, it will be well first to inquire what these pleasures are, and then contemplate their effects. The study of moral discipline, and the reading of history, will furnish illustrations in abundance. Let the Citizen, then, first consider the name those sensual pleasures merit which are common to men and to brutes—contemplate the filthiness of the means by which they are procured, which cannot be remembered without abhorrence—measure the time they last—for their beginning and end are almost the same thing—the infamy of those who voluntarily abandon themselves up to their control, and the shame and mortifications which inseparably attend them. From all this he will conclude that the vice of brutally indulging the senses surpasses, in meanness, cowardice amid the dangers of battle. And then, as to the effects they produce, he will be reminded what visages were those into which the Witch of Virgil transformed men :

“ Quos hominum ex facie Dea sæva potentibus herbis  
Induerat Circe in vultus ac terga, ferarum.”(2)

What must be that bestiality Virgil could personify only by the hideous spirit of the infernal regions—a bestiality which has such an infernal power in defacing the human form, and brutalizing those who thus shamefully abandon themselves to its sway! He will remember, that although the arms of Rome were too weak to tame the fierceness of the Carthaginians, they fell before the luxuries and the women of Capua. That it was not the army of Octavius that made Antony fly, but the shameful chain of Cleopatra which enslaved him. That the Decemvir no where gave such signal signs of his tyranny as in the excesses he was urged into by his passion for Virginia. Nor did that Consul in anything so extravagantly surpass the limits of his Gallic administration, as in the untimely execution of a man to give delight to the eyes of a mistress.

If the Citizen needs the stimulus of striking contrasts, let

benignity of Voluminus in distributing the spoils—“ *benignitatem per se gratam comitate adjuvabat.*” (5)

Under these conditions a trifling gift appears magnificent, and without them, however great, it seems contemptible. He who possesses this virtue knows what opportunities to improve for its exercise; for what would be esteemed and appreciated at one time will be disregarded and dispraised at another. Seron, king of Syracuse, who was a master in this art, hearing of the discomfiture the Romans had met from Hannibal at the lake Thrasymenus, sent them a quantity of corn and a weight of gold which, although worthy perhaps of the giver, would however have been esteemed under other circumstances vile in the eyes of that people, who, with immensity of soul, sought the dominion of the universe. But with a spirit of genuine liberality the donor took care to stamp the gold with the image of victory—which, if nothing more, would compel the Romans from delicacy of feeling not to reject his gift.

He who does not use art in giving will often show, that the soul retains what the hands offer. To the above conditions the liberal man will unite *distinction of persons*, considering again the question of *how much*.

First of all, then, never give with indifference; since this would, as Socrates says, make prostitutes of the Graces, who are virgins. A proper choice is necessary in the objects of your favor. Let them be kindred, friends, citizens, those who will prize you for virtue, and those who are not needy through vice, and above all, those, who, although they deserve much, ask nothing. Archilaus, King of Macedon, presented the goblet of gold which had been asked from him by an importunate applicant, to Euripides, who had never requested it, saying to the one, he was worthy of asking and not obtaining, and to the other, he deserved to obtain it, although he had not asked for it. In the second place, give not equally to all, but to one more, and another less, according to the quality and the necessities of persons. With this excuse, Antigonus appears to have colored his unwillingness to give to the Cynic philosopher. He begged of him a drama. The Cynic replied: it was not a gift

fit for a king ; and when he asked the sovereign for a talent, he replied : it was not a gift fit for a Cynic.

But in addition to all these considerations, the liberal Citizen must regard no end but the lofty motive of truth, which is never to be consulted, says Seneca, but for its own sake. And although his motive may not be generally understood, nor the receiver be aware of it himself, yet the donor will not for this reason neglect the exercise of this noble virtue. He will still have his reward, although his exalted motives may not be known only to his own heart. The scholars of Archesilaus were not ignorant of the same principle. Learning from their master the poverty and infirmity of one of his friends, and aware of the delicacy he felt in making known his condition, they hit upon a happy artifice for relieving his wants. One morning he found under his pillow a present of gold, although he knew not who were his benefactors.

He who is adorned with the virtue of liberality, will not only regard these considerations in giving only, but also in *taking*—in which it is necessary to consult the medium of extremes. Of the abundance of land his fellow-citizens offered to Pittacus, in return for the signal service his arms had rendered to his country—he refused to accept a larger tract than he could shoot an arrow across with his own hands. Among the magnificent gifts the Consul Postumius laid before Martius, in recognition of his valor, the generous Roman would accept only a prisoner who was his friend, and a war-horse he could use in battle. And who would say whether he deserves more praise for meriting such honorable gifts, or for refusing to take them ?

We may ascertain the extremes of this virtue, as we fixed its medium. Prodigality exceeds in giving, and lacks in taking. Avarice is its opposite in every respect, and therefore, the former is more easily remedied than the latter, for as the one harmonizes with virtue in the act of giving, it is sometimes made to conform to the conditions required, while this is seldom the case with the other, which is in its very nature at war with liberality. For this reason, among others, prodigality is less culpable than avarice ; although, we confess, we have sometimes met with spendthrifts, who have dissipated their substance in

vice, and fallen into the lowest abyss of avarice, carrying upon their face the brand of both these vices at the same time: "*Alieni appetus, sui profusus,*" (6) says Sallust of Catiline. Tacitus, in speaking of the libertine Claudius, who by uniting the two vices rivalled the depravity of Nero, "*Cujus abditis adhuc vitiis per avaritiam ac prodigantiam mire congruebat.*" (7)

In *spending*, the proper medium lies between liberality and prodigality; in *saving*, between parsimony and avarice. But, as one may be easily deceived in this matter, he who would exercise this virtue with discretion, should, before he opens or shuts his hand, carefully examine his conscience, and following the guide we have offered give or withhold as enlightened reason may dictate. Had Spurius Melius done thus in distributing corn among the Roman people, he could easily have discovered he was violating the virtue of liberality, for his very profusion militated against the liberty of his country. Had Pirfidius Horacianus followed this guide, in limiting his expenses, even he would have foreseen, that being so little a friend of himself, as the poet said, parsimony so far from being commendable was only a display of contemptible sordidness. For although extreme economy in one's private expenses may be a virtue if it spring from modesty, and not from meanness of soul, and it may be commendable to guard against display in giving; yet, such a man gives reason to suspect the purity of his motives, if he does not open freely to others the hand he would not open for himself.

This seems to have been the spirit of Paulus Emilius, in the conquest of the realm of Macedon, for without advancing the fortunes of his own family, he magnanimously divided among others, the rich spoils brought home from his conquest. These considerations will, we trust, aid our Citizen in adopting a proper medium in communicating and laying up his substance. He can appreciate the advantage such a course will secure to the State, by the extent of the injuries that so clearly result from disregarding it. He, who is extravagant in spending for himself or others, cannot avoid at last being wrecked on the shoals of poverty; which not only increases the difficulty of rendering public service to the country, but often urges men into schemes

of violence, as in the case of the Catiline conspiracy, and many others of which history speaks.

When we assign poverty as the cause of similar public crimes, we wish to be understood as always referring to that poverty which is brought on by vice ; for indigence honored by virtue never excited its subjects to perverse schemes. Epaminondas was a poor man, but he levelled a blow against the tyrant who would enslave his country. Besides, the spendthrift nourishes a class of people, who are the depositaries of all the low passions, and he thus becomes a corrupter of the morals of the youth, and should be banished from the republic. Poverty too deprives the state of those subsidies that might be furnished in times of public necessity—for what solid benefit can be derived from citizens who are overwhelmed by the miseries of poverty ?

And, finally, as prodigality begets effeminacy and daintiness of living, it at last makes a man a slave to those lusts which render him unable to sustain bodily fatigues, or display liberty of soul, when it becomes necessary to task the physical strength of the one, or manifest the powers of the other, for the safety of the republic. But the worst of all these evils is the horrible example the spendthrift sets before others, who, mistaking for magnanimity of soul that which is only vileness and baseness of spirit, esteem themselves less if they do not imitate their wretched prototypes. If they are not in the fashion, they take all pains to get into it, and to accomplish their object, they give themselves little trouble about the road they take, whether it be straight or crooked. First of all they commit, in acquiring, every kind of injustice, and afterwards prostitute in prodigality the splendors of their families.

The grand cause of all these disorders, as we before remarked, lies in mistaking that for virtue and liberality, which is only the vice of prodigality. Hence Stazio, in Dante, speaking of this deception, says :

Allor m'accorsi, che troppo apri l'ali  
 Potean le mani a spender, e pentirmi  
 Così di quel come degli altri mali,

vice, and fallen into the lowest abyss of avarice, carrying upon their face the brand of both these vices at the same time: "*Alieni appetus, sui profusus,*" (6) says Sallust of Catiline. Tacitus, in speaking of the libertine Claudius, who by uniting the two vices rivalled the depravity of Nero, "*Cujus additis adhuc vitiis per avaritiam ac prodigantiam mire congruebat.*" (7)

In *spending*, the proper medium lies between liberality and prodigality; in *saving*, between parsimony and avarice. But, as one may be easily deceived in this matter, he who would exercise this virtue with discretion, should, before he opens or shuts his hand, carefully examine his conscience, and following the guide we have offered give or withhold as enlightened reason may dictate. Had Spurius Melius done thus in distributing corn among the Roman people, he could easily have discovered he was violating the virtue of liberality, for his very profusion militated against the liberty of his country. Had Pirfidius Horacianus followed this guide, in limiting his expenses, even he would have foreseen, that being so little a friend of himself, as the poet said, parsimony so far from being commendable was only a display of contemptible sordidness. For although extreme economy in one's private expenses may be a virtue if it spring from modesty, and not from meanness of soul, and it may be commendable to guard against display in giving; yet, such a man gives reason to suspect the purity of his motives, if he does not open freely to others the hand he would not open for himself.

This seems to have been the spirit of Paulus Emilius, in the conquest of the realm of Macedon, for without advancing the fortunes of his own family, he magnanimously divided among others, the rich spoils brought home from his conquest. These considerations will, we trust, aid our Citizen in adopting a proper medium in communicating and laying up his substance. He can appreciate the advantage such a course will secure to the State, by the extent of the injuries that so clearly result from disregarding it. He, who is extravagant in spending for himself or others, cannot avoid at last being wrecked on the shoals of poverty; which not only increases the difficulty of rendering public service to the country, but often urges men into schemes



annihilated by avarice—*namque avaritia fidem, probitatem, cæterasque artes bonas subvertit.* (10)

But if avarice does not always bring such grave misfortunes upon the state, avaricious citizens can be of little or no service in it, for they are too intent upon their own private gain, to pay at least more than a superficial regard to the public interests; and they need but a slight motive to put all their decency to flight, and leave justice partially administered, and deliberations suspended. They are like servants who play till they hear the voice of their master, then leave the rubber and run to the call.

So thought, and so spoke Cato, when he independently pronounced the following sentence against the Roman Senate:

*Ubi vos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis; ubi domi voluptatibus, his pecuniæ, aut gratiæ servitis, eo fit ut impetus fiat in vacuum rempublicam.* (11)

To embrace, then, in few words, what we have said in many, the avaricious man either exceeds in extorting, or lacks in giving, or only thinks of his own interests, and the republic can never be secure from his treachery, nor aided by his talents, nor governed by his prudence. If such be its nature, let every one who would become a good citizen of the republic, purge this giant vice for ever from his soul. When Pericles offered himself to his fellow citizens as a proper candidate for the government, he declared he had never been swayed by its foul motives. Agesilaus ascribed to Xenophon infinitely more glory for exterminating these base passions from his heart, than for beating down the walls of the enemy. This noble work will not be achieved without a struggle, and if obstacles of nature or habit are to be overcome, it will prove a hopeless undertaking, unless he fights valorously before nature shall, by indulgence, become hopelessly invincible.

## CHAPTER XXI.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MAGNIFICENT, AND HOW.\*

THE virtue of Magnificence is not so indispensable to the republican citizen as Liberality, for its privation cannot result in so many evils to the state, but its possession is always a great ornament, and sometimes of no little utility to one who has less regard in its exercise to his own honor, than the public dignity.

Magnificence properly consists in works that confer a lasting honor by their dignity, their utility, and their splendor; and as nobler materials are afforded for its display in public, rather than in private stations, the former should have the preference.

Many Roman citizens became illustrious by the erection of temples, theatres, and public works, which impart the greatest magnificence to the city. Nor would we discourage our Citizen from occasionally indulging in magnificent and profuse expenditures, under the influence of the same motive, although no durable work may be the result; such as feasts, spectacles to the people, maintaining troops, and hiring an army; but it appears more becoming the magnificence of the Citizen to indulge in those expenses which confer the most evident and lasting grandeur upon his state. In doing it, too, he should be guided by an enlightened judgment, and contemplate a noble end. Such a judgment consists in adapting the expense to the

---

\* This entire chapter breathes the noble spirit that filled the minds of the Italians of that period—when gorgeous palaces sprang up as if by enchantment. In the single city of Genoa there were two hundred of these magnificent structures, where foreign ambassadors were entertained by private republican citizens with more splendor than surrounded even the courts themselves of the princes these ambassadors represented; when churches, and cathedrals, and monasteries were erected by private munificence and on a scale of grandeur unrivalled by all after times.

means, the works to the dignity of the subject, and both should be in just proportion. The end proposed should be that contemplated by all the moral virtues—lofty integrity!

He will err in judgment who indulges in great expenses with small means, or undertakes the same expenses in a private as in a public station. He who knows not how to make the expense worthy of the work, and the work worthy of the expense, and distinguish where to augment the one or the other, will fail also; as he, too, will transgress the proper end in view, who, through vanity of showing his wealth, rather than through zeal for country, undertakes the same work. Those who are destitute of this virtue are called mean and little, while those who indulge it in some extravagant form, are called vainglorious, and ignorant of propriety. Those, then, who would escape the baseness of the one and the vanity of the others, will be more solicitous, when an occasion presents itself of exercising the virtue of magnificence, how they may construct a great work, than how they can finish it with small expense: *little* men look principally at this last point, and he should consider how he may escape those extravagances of which vain-glorious men are guilty. He will remember the purple the Megaresi spread under the feet of the actors as they came upon the stage; the expense unproportioned to his fortune, which Themistocles once made, to become the rival of Cimon at the Olympic Games, by which he won rather a reputation for ostentation than magnificence: for while magnificence is removed from all such extremes, its works are filled with grandeur. A work may be very rich, yet, if it be small, it cannot be so characterized. The statue, by Pericles, of Olympian Jove could not have been called magnificent, if, instead of conforming its size to the subject, he had erected it of a precious material.

But since by far the most important consideration is, not to lose sight of the end such works contemplate, it is noble *never to inscribe one's name upon a public work*. The author has more satisfaction in the consciousness of his virtue, than in proclaiming it to others; and the republic will be sure to supply with its gratitude what he was restrained from doing by

modesty. He will act wisely in not being very ready to accept recompenses offered him — for being elevated above others in privileges, which all perceive, will generally end at last in exciting envy. The people, says Plutarch, feel under obligation to their public servants as long as they refuse such honors, and generally become the enemies of those who accept them; esteeming that what they have done for the republic has been through the vile motive of the pay; and popular odium and envy can do the Citizen no good in the public service. To allay these passions Epimenides and Anaxagoras acted with prudence. The one for the merit of having purified the city of Athens, would accept of only a branch of olive that had been consecrated in the castle of the city; the other, for having educated it in the sciences, consented to no other reward than that, on the day of his death, the boys should be free to go to the schools. And, perhaps, the second understood this matter better than the first; for honor paid to the dead seldom excites odium or envy. The three hundred statues Demetrius Phalerius gained while living, were ignominiously broken to pieces before his own eyes. But as works which render a citizen magnificent towards his country are of a great variety, let him choose such as will be of the greatest service; preferring security to convenience, and convenience to ornament: as, for example, fortifying the walls to levelling the streets, and the size of the terrace to the workmanship of the sculpture. If he be inclined to indulge in magnificent expenditures which have no durable worth, he will prefer the useful to the pleasing. Hence, it will be much better to maintain troops amidst the dangers of war, than treat the multitude to tournaments in times of peace.

And, finally, let him remember that his reputation for magnificence will be in proportion as he shall prefer public to private occasions for its exercise, and the honor, rather than the adornment, of the state.\*

---

\* Although our country is still in the heat and excitement of youth, yet we are not wanting in illustrations of this noble spirit. Our universities, and colleges, and schools of learning; our libraries,

## CHAPTER XXII.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MAGNANIMOUS, AND HOW.

MAGNANIMITY springs almost spontaneously from the possession of the other virtues, without which it cannot exist, while it stimulates each one in its proper sphere to a higher degree of perfection. But it has certain virtues of its own, which render its possession desirable to the Citizen of a republic.

As it is or may appear to be in some respects inconsistent with the virtue of Christian humility, he should exercise it with great caution, attempering any appearance of pride by

---

our hospitals, and galleries of art; and a few of our fine churches and public edifices owe their existence to the munificent donations of private individuals. As we go on in our career of advancement, every year will bring us nobler examples still. Abbott and Astor are names which cannot be forgotten; and when the glorious library of the New York merchant shall be founded, and its golden gates thrown open to the scholar, his fame will be established upon a foundation which time never can shake. Millions will pronounce the name of the generous Smithson with affection, as generations sweep by; other men will arise who will establish galleries and schools of art and of design—for the time cannot be far distant when our institutions for art and design, and our public libraries, will surpass all rival foundations in the old world. Those who have amassed themselves great fortunes will not forget that those to whom they shall prove benefactors, will be the surest and safest guardians of their fame! If the Astor estate should go undiminished into the hands of its heirs, will they take any pains to heap honor upon the tomb of the man who amassed it? With the income for only one year of that estate, well expended, I'll engage Mr. Astor may write his name in letters of gold upon the last arch that overshadows the last column that distant ages will find standing among the ruins of New York.

uprightness of intention, and, at all events, cultivating it no farther than may be consistent with that humility which is the only foundation of true virtue. The magnanimous Citizen who is adorned with all the virtues, is judged worthy of illustrious honors, and accepts them with a proper feeling of gratification from worthy men; but he disdains honors offered for small things and by low people: and he who recognizes them as conferred by Heaven, may receive them with satisfaction, not only without a spirit of pride, but with the zeal of piety, that the gifts conferred upon him by God are honored by good men.

But he will do well to adhere to the safe side, and act on the principle that the virtue of Magnanimity teaches mankind, that all they say and do for themselves is only base selfishness. He will, however, guard against placing so false an estimate upon the gifts God has imparted to him, as to judge himself unworthy of all honors: for thus he may fail to acquire those possessions necessary to the practice of virtue, and in like manner fail in his duty to the republic. Recognizing the source of all good, he will studiously provide himself with those instruments, and embrace with readiness those occasions by which God may be glorified and the country served. He will also be ready to listen to reproof, when administered by good men, although more severe than he has merited. He, too, exercises greatness of mind, who, in the midst of wealth and power, restrains himself within the limits of modesty, who controls himself in good and evil fortune with moderation, not being puffed up by the one, nor overwhelmed by the other; for he who lives for virtue does not consider the acquisition or the loss of any other possession a matter of much consequence. He feels a greater satisfaction in giving than receiving. In conferring a benefit upon another, he esteems himself to have excelled; receiving it from another, that he has been excelled himself. The one is peculiarly the province of the virtue he cherishes; the other contrary to it. He seeks to render to others infinitely more than he has received, that he who was the giver at first may become the debtor at last. For when he is obliged to ask favors of others, he does it unwillingly, but

serves every one with cheerfulness. Among men who are advanced in dignity and fortune, he studies to appear with dignity; among ordinary men he bears himself without ostentation: for in overcoming the first, he has achieved a dignified and lofty action; to surpass the second would be very easy, but very base. Above all, he loves and hates openly; esteeming it a vice of cowardice to conceal his real sentiments. He prizes truth dearer than opinion, and will not be swayed by the popular clamor. He never conceals the truth unless he may, in speaking of himself, leave his virtues unnoticed. He cannot be a flatterer; for this is the vice of a servile soul, and he is as careful in injuring the reputation of others as his own. Nor does he dwell upon his misfortunes, but rises above them. Honor is dearer to him than gratification or gain.

His envy is never excited against those who have become illustrious like himself, for he loves his country, and is mindful of the advantage and the glory it borrows from its great men; indeed the magnanimous man never troubles himself with the thought that others may rival him.

Cyrus of Persia seems to us to have given indication of a great and noble heart, when to avoid giving mortification to his courtiers he contended with them in those studies and exercises in which he knew he should be overcome. Apollonius the Peripatetic gave proof of a generous soul. To convince those of their mistake, says Plutarch, who affirmed that honor and glory could have no rivals, he procured more honor for Sotione, his brother, than for himself. And although Aristotle esteemed it a weakness to display any feeling for a benefit received, yet in following his counsel one would, it seems to us, incur the vice of ingratitude, which Seneca esteems one of the deformities of human nature; although, according to Homer, Thetis, in praying Jove to help her son, did not enumerate to him the services done to him; and although the Spartan ambassadors, when they appealed to the Athenian Republic for help in the discomfiture of Leuctra, only reminded the Athenians of the services they had received from them in former times; yet we believe both Thetis and the ambassadors did so rather in obedience to the law of silence, which a benefactor should

uprightness of intention, and, at all events, cultivating it no farther than may be consistent with that humility which is the only foundation of true virtue. The magnanimous Citizen who is adorned with all the virtues, is judged worthy of illustrious honors, and accepts them with a proper feeling of gratification from worthy men; but he disdains honors offered for small things and by low people: and he who recognizes them as conferred by Heaven, may receive them with satisfaction, not only without a spirit of pride, but with the zeal of piety, that the gifts conferred upon him by God are honored by good men.

But he will do well to adhere to the safe side, and act on the principle that the virtue of Magnanimity teaches mankind, that all they say and do for themselves is only base selfishness. He will, however, guard against placing so false an estimate upon the gifts God has imparted to him, as to judge himself unworthy of all honors: for thus he may fail to acquire those possessions necessary to the practice of virtue, and in like manner fail in his duty to the republic. Recognizing the source of all good, he will studiously provide himself with those instruments, and embrace with readiness those occasions by which God may be glorified and the country served. He will also be ready to listen to reproof, when administered by good men, although more severe than he has merited. He, too, exercises greatness of mind, who, in the midst of wealth and power, restrains himself within the limits of modesty, who controls himself in good and evil fortune with moderation, not being puffed up by the one, nor overwhelmed by the other; for he who lives for virtue does not consider the acquisition or the loss of any other possession a matter of much consequence. He feels a greater satisfaction in giving than receiving. In conferring a benefit upon another, he esteems himself to have excelled; receiving it from another, that he has been excelled himself. The one is peculiarly the province of the virtue he cherishes; the other contrary to it. He seeks to render to others infinitely more than he has received, that he who was the giver at first may become the debtor at last. For when he is obliged to ask favors of others, he does it unwillingly, but



serves every one with cheerfulness. Among men who are advanced in dignity and fortune, he studies to appear with dignity; among ordinary men he bears himself without ostentation: for in overcoming the first, he has achieved a dignified and lofty action; to surpass the second would be very easy, but very base. Above all, he loves and hates openly; esteeming it a vice of cowardice to conceal his real sentiments. He prizes truth dearer than opinion, and will not be swayed by the popular clamor. He never conceals the truth unless he may, in speaking of himself, leave his virtues unnoticed. He cannot be a flatterer; for this is the vice of a servile soul, and he is as careful in injuring the reputation of others as his own. Nor does he dwell upon his misfortunes, but rises above them. Honor is dearer to him than gratification or gain.

His envy is never excited against those who have become illustrious like himself, for he loves his country, and is mindful of the advantage and the glory it borrows from its great men; indeed the magnanimous man never troubles himself with the thought that others may rival him.

Cyrus of Persia seems to us to have given indication of a great and noble heart, when to avoid giving mortification to his courtiers he contended with them in those studies and exercises in which he knew he should be overcome. Apollonius the Peripatetic gave proof of a generous soul. To convince those of their mistake, says Plutarch, who affirmed that honor and glory could have no rivals, he procured more honor for Sotione, his brother, than for himself. And although Aristotle esteemed it a weakness to display any feeling for a benefit received, yet in following his counsel one would, it seems to us, incur the vice of ingratitude, which Seneca esteems one of the deformities of human nature; although, according to Homer, Thetis, in praying Jove to help her son, did not enumerate to him the services done to him; and although the Spartan ambassadors, when they appealed to the Athenian Republic for help in the discomfiture of Leuctra, only reminded the Athenians of the services they had received from them in former times; yet we believe both Thetis and the ambassadors did so rather in obedience to the law of silence, which a benefactor should

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

w.  
or-  
ty to  
y cir-  
in any



serves every one with cheerfulness. Among men who are advanced in dignity and fortune, he studies to appear with dignity; among ordinary men he bears himself without ostentation: for in overcoming the first, he has achieved a dignified and lofty action; to surpass the second would be very easy, but very base. Above all, he loves and hates openly; esteeming it a vice of cowardice to conceal his real sentiments. He prizes truth dearer than opinion, and will not be swayed by the popular clamor. He never conceals the truth unless he may, in speaking of himself, leave his virtues unnoticed. He cannot be a flatterer; for this is the vice of a servile soul, and he is as careful in injuring the reputation of others as his own. Nor does he dwell upon his misfortunes, but rises above them. Honor is dearer to him than gratification or gain.

His envy is never excited against those who have become illustrious like himself, for he loves his country, and is mindful of the advantage and the glory it borrows from its great men; indeed the magnanimous man never troubles himself with the thought that others may rival him.

Cyrus of Persia seems to us to have given indication of a great and noble heart, when to avoid giving mortification to his courtiers he contended with them in those studies and exercises in which he knew he should be overcome. Apollonius the Peripatetic gave proof of a generous soul. To convince those of their mistake, says Plutarch, who affirmed that honor and glory could have no rivals, he procured more honor for Sotione, his brother, than for himself. And although Aristotle esteemed it a weakness to display any feeling for a benefit received, yet in following his counsel one would, it seems to us, incur the vice of ingratitude, which Seneca esteems one of the deformities of human nature; although, according to Homer, Thetis, in praying Jove to help her son, did not enumerate to him the services done to him; and although the Spartan ambassadors, when they appealed to the Athenian Republic for help in the discomfiture of Leuctra, only reminded the Athenians of the services they had received from them in former times; yet we believe both Thetis and the ambassadors did so rather in obedience to the law of silence, which a benefactor should

observe, than through fear of offending the magnanimity of those whom they prayed.

We could not call a person magnanimous who chose to dis-curse of his beneficence, for besides violating the rule which requires the giver to be silent, and the receiver to speak, he esteems that to have been a great thing at least in himself, which greatness of soul would cause him to esteem of little virtue. We do not deny then, that being more ready to do a favor than to ask one, is evidence of a magnanimous man ; but where all others in a republic demand favors he should not be the only one who will not seek them, since such singularities often lead others to suppose that a person wishes to be thought to know or to be more than others, and consequently subject him to odium. Hence, although rarely and with strong claims, he will ask his share of those favors republics are accustomed to bestow ; let him not feel he has done anything inconsistent with greatness of soul. He will guard against the vice of flattery, but he will never withhold his praise from those who have in any manner devoted themselves valorously to their country. *In excitando autem, et ina cuendo* (says Marcus Tully, writing to Trebonius), *plurimum valet, si laudes eum, quem cohortere*(12). It seems to us also highly becoming the character of a magnanimous man never to speak evil even of his enemies.

Plutarch quotes the authority of a great poet to show the magnanimity of Hercules, who, he says, took no more notice of slanders and reproaches than of the buzzing of flies. Nothing can be more beautiful or magnanimous, he says, too, than to be reviled by an enemy without indulging in passion—a virtue, he tells us, Socrates exercised at home with his wife to enable him to practise it when he went out into the world.

Pericles must have displayed this virtue in an astonishing degree, when after supporting for an entire day undisturbed, the ribaldry of a villain, he made his servant light the torches and accompany him home. He seems to have taken that noble vengeance upon his enemy which Philemon inculcates, when he says, that when one bears patiently the abuse of another, the biter is bitten ; he inflicts the wound, John Chrysostom speaks

of, "if you wish to take vengeance, be silent, and you will give a mortal wound."

Finally, although he should in everything cherish a magnanimous spirit, yet he should endeavor to do so principally in five ways. First, in holding the prosperity of fortune under his feet. Second, in taking no notice of injuries. Third, in cherishing truth dearer than public opinion. Fourth, in being moderate in prosperity. Fifth, in maintaining his spirit and resolution in the midst of misfortunes. History will furnish him noble illustrations of all these virtues; as for example, of the first, in Fabricius, when he spurned the gold of Pyrrhus; of the second, in Fabius Rullianus, when he nominated his enemy, Papirius, Dictator; of the third, in Fabius Maximus, who ran the risk of being esteemed a coward by flying, rather than endanger the Roman empire by giving battle; of the fourth, in Paulus Emilius, when having deserted the house of Alexander the Great, with the ruin of Persius, he spoke with so much sadness of the inconstancy of human fortune; and of the fifth, in the Lacedemonians and the Romans, who, in spite of the disasters of Leuctra and of Cannæ, still maintained their valor so gloriously.

In conclusion, we will say a word of the extremes of magnanimity, pompousness, and pusillanimity; but having already spoken at length of the medium from which these extremes may be easily inferred, we shall be very brief. The inflated man resembles the magnanimous in many of the foregoing qualities; but he is destitute of the foundation of the other virtues, which can alone endow him with magnanimity of soul. Hence in Marcus Drusus we have an example of the vice of arrogance rather than the virtue of magnanimity. When this Tribune of the people, on being summoned to appear before the Senate of Rome, he not only refused to present himself, but thought it even reasonable for the Senate to come to him, that he might appear superior to them. Nor did Umberto Aldobrandeschi despise the people so much because he was persuaded of his own virtue, as, says Dante, in speaking of his person, because he was proud of the nobility and achievements of his ancestors.

L'antico sangue, e l'opere leggiadre  
 De' miei maggior mi fer si arrogante,  
 Che non pensando alla comune madre  
 Ogni uomo ebbi 'n dispetto tanto avante,  
 Ch' io ne mori, 'ecc. (13)

And the pusillanimous man on the contrary resembles the magnanimous in the possession of other virtues, but differs from him in the qualities indispensable to greatness of soul. He has no appreciation of his own virtues, and consequently does not judge himself worthy of any honor. Nor is he able to breast himself up against the tide of popular opinion or withstand the inconstancies of fortune. For this reason Timoleon Corinthus seems to us pusillanimous; for although in defence of the liberty of his country he had killed his brother, he could not support the curse of his mother nor the reproaches of the rabble. And had not Epaminondas with sadness of countenance and dress corrected on the following day the mirth that overcame him on the preceding, he would have incurred for another reason the same imputation.

---

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MODERATE IN SEEKING HONORS, AND HOW.

THE acquisition of honors is also to be esteemed praiseworthy. It bears the same relation to magnanimity, as liberality to magnificence. We cannot speak of such a man except by circumlocution, for he had not in the Greek, neither has he in any tongue, any peculiar title.

He who departs from the medium by excess, is called ambitious, and he who is too dilatory and insensible in such matters is said to be wanting in proper regard to his reputation. We esteem the medium between these extremes exceedingly diffi-

cult; and being a virtue so seldom practised, it has not yet acquired a distinct name.

It would be well for each one to leave his merits to be decided entirely by those who have the bestowment of honors, were it not for the blindness and ignorance of mankind. But since very often they neglect their obligations, to the detriment of the public, we will not condemn our Citizen when he esteems himself able to render a noble service to the republic, if in a proper manner he seek to arrive at the point necessary to execute his design; and would suggest as a guide he may follow with safety, the example of Cato the Uticanian, who was induced to ask the Tribuneship of the people for no other reason than to suppress the folly of Metellus; nor did he seek the dignity of the Consulship except to oppose the designs of Cæsar. Such examples show that integrity of purpose renders it commendable to seek for honors.

If therefore he would conduct himself with discretion and avoid exciting among his fellow citizens the suspicion of seeking his own glory, let him take our advice and solicit only those dignities which enable him to render a greater service to the country than emolument to himself. As for example, in the Republic of Venice, he would seek rather to be elected councillor of the Ten to protect the liberty of the state from the pride of some tyrannical Doge, than to be declared Procurator of S. Marco, with a title of honor.

And this noble sentiment does not seem to us very different from that of the generous-minded Brutus. While writing to Marcus Tully of those who refused to honor him, he makes use of these words: *Interpellent me quo minus honoratus sim, dum ne interpellent quo minus respublica a me commode administrari possit.* Our Citizen will act nobly if, on the other hand, he is called to an office ill adapted either to his merit or the importance of his person, he imitate the moderation of Aristides who in reproving the Athenians once who wished to elect him Treasurer of the Public Revenue, said it would not be well to place him at the head of an office where he should be obliged to treat the robbers of the community with too much leniency. And he will also be worthy of great praise, if, when elevated to a dignity, in the exer-

cise of which he may feel himself, through incapacity, in danger of bringing some detriment to the republic, he shall follow the example of Nicias, who, although he had been elected by the people Athenian Captain of the Sicilian enterprise, yet foreseeing he might bring an unhappy result to the country even after it was settled, endeavored to dissuade them from it, without any regard to his own exaltation. We praise him for his perseverance, since he had more regard to his country than to himself; but the good Citizen should not thwart the councils of those who are opposed to him unless he is sustained by the Republic.

---

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MILD, AND HOW.

Those who control the fortunes of states will bring many evils upon their country, unless they have long learned to discipline and moderate the passion of anger. We say moderate it, in the Peripatetic sense; for to annihilate it entirely, as the Stoics thought, is more easy to talk about than to do; and even were it easy, we are not very certain it would result in any good; on the contrary, we think it may be timely and moderately aroused greatly to the utility of the republic. Aristotle would have it like a stone cut for the foundation of a fortress. Plato says it is unconquerable, and the soul that is not subdued by it is great. Plutarch calls it the helper of virtue, and adds that he who uses it wisely will find it will give no little aid in military and political affairs. In the battle between the Romans and the people of Cisalpine Gaul, says Livy, *ibi quantam vim ad stimulandos animos ira haberet apparuit.*(15) And in the ardor of Lucretius and of Valerius, to follow Brutus the Liberator of his country, *totique ab luctu versi in iram.*(16)

We have observed that Phineas praises this stimulus in Basilus, in the punishment he administered to the Tambii, and to



means, the works to the dignity of the subject, and both should be in just proportion. The end proposed should be that contemplated by all the moral virtues—lofty integrity!

He will err in judgment who indulges in great expenses with small means, or undertakes the same expenses in a private as in a public station. He who knows not how to make the expense worthy of the work, and the work worthy of the expense, and distinguish where to augment the one or the other, will fail also; as he, too, will transgress the proper end in view, who, through vanity of showing his wealth, rather than through zeal for country, undertakes the same work. Those who are destitute of this virtue are called mean and little, while those who indulge it in some extravagant form, are called vainglorious, and ignorant of propriety. Those, then, who would escape the baseness of the one and the vanity of the others, will be more solicitous, when an occasion presents itself of exercising the virtue of magnificence, how they may construct a great work, than how they can finish it with small expense: *little* men look principally at this last point, and he should consider how he may escape those extravagances of which vain-glorious men are guilty. He will remember the purple the Megaresi spread under the feet of the actors as they came upon the stage; the expense unproportioned to his fortune, which Themistocles once made, to become the rival of Cimon at the Olympic Games, by which he won rather a reputation for ostentation than magnificence: for while magnificence is removed from all such extremes, its works are filled with grandeur. A work may be very rich, yet, if it be small, it cannot be so characterized. The statue, by Pericles, of Olympian Jove could not have been called magnificent, if, instead of conforming its size to the subject, he had erected it of a precious material.

But since by far the most important consideration is, not to lose sight of the end such works contemplate, it is noble *never to inscribe one's name upon a public work*. The author has more satisfaction in the consciousness of his virtue, than in proclaiming it to others; and the republic will be sure to supply with its gratitude what he was restrained from doing by

modesty. He will act wisely in not being very ready to accept recompenses offered him — for being elevated above others in privileges, which all perceive, will generally end at last in exciting envy. The people, says Plutarch, feel under obligation to their public servants as long as they refuse such honors, and generally become the enemies of those who accept them; esteeming that what they have done for the republic has been through the vile motive of the pay; and popular odium and envy can do the Citizen no good in the public service. To allay these passions Epimenides and Anaxagoras acted with prudence. The one for the merit of having purified the city of Athens, would accept of only a branch of olive that had been consecrated in the castle of the city; the other, for having educated it in the sciences, consented to no other reward than that, on the day of his death, the boys should be free to go to the schools. And, perhaps, the second understood this matter better than the first; for honor paid to the dead seldom excites odium or envy. The three hundred statues Demetrius Phalerius gained while living, were ignominiously broken to pieces before his own eyes. But as works which render a citizen magnificent towards his country are of a great variety, let him choose such as will be of the greatest service; preferring security to convenience, and convenience to ornament: as, for example, fortifying the walls to levelling the streets, and the size of the terrace to the workmanship of the sculpture. If he be inclined to indulge in magnificent expenditures which have no durable worth, he will prefer the useful to the pleasing. Hence, it will be much better to maintain troops amidst the dangers of war, than treat the multitude to tournaments in times of peace.

And, finally, let him remember that his reputation for magnificence will be in proportion as he shall prefer public to private occasions for its exercise, and the honor, rather than the adornment, of the state.\*

---

\* Although our country is still in the heat and excitement of youth, yet we are not wanting in illustrations of this noble spirit. Our universities, and colleges, and schools of learning; our libraries,

## CHAPTER XXII.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MAGNANIMOUS, AND HOW.

MAGNANIMITY springs almost spontaneously from the possession of the other virtues, without which it cannot exist, while it stimulates each one in its proper sphere to a higher degree of perfection. But it has certain virtues of its own, which render its possession desirable to the Citizen of a republic.

As it is or may appear to be in some respects inconsistent with the virtue of Christian humility, he should exercise it with great caution, attempering any appearance of pride by

---

our hospitals, and galleries of art; and a few of our fine churches and public edifices owe their existence to the munificent donations of private individuals. As we go on in our career of advancement, every year will bring us nobler examples still. Abbott and Astor are names which cannot be forgotten; and when the glorious library of the New York merchant shall be founded, and its golden gates thrown open to the scholar, his fame will be established upon a foundation which time never can shake. Millions will pronounce the name of the generous Smithson with affection, as generations sweep by; other men will arise who will establish galleries and schools of art and of design—for the time cannot be far distant when our institutions for art and design, and our public libraries, will surpass all rival foundations in the old world. Those who have amassed themselves great fortunes will not forget that those to whom they shall prove benefactors, will be the surest and safest guardians of their fame! If the Astor estate should go undiminished into the hands of its heirs, will they take any pains to heap honor upon the tomb of the man who amassed it? With the income for only one year of that estate, well expended, I'll engage Mr. Astor may write his name in letters of gold upon the last arch that overshadows the last column that distant ages will find standing among the ruins of New York.

uprightness of intention, and, at all events, cultivating it no farther than may be consistent with that humility which is the only foundation of true virtue. The magnanimous Citizen who is adorned with all the virtues, is judged worthy of illustrious honors, and accepts them with a proper feeling of gratification from worthy men; but he disdains honors offered for small things and by low people: and he who recognizes them as conferred by Heaven, may receive them with satisfaction, not only without a spirit of pride, but with the zeal of piety, that the gifts conferred upon him by God are honored by good men.

But he will do well to adhere to the safe side, and act on the principle that the virtue of Magnanimity teaches mankind, that all they say and do for themselves is only base selfishness. He will, however, guard against placing so false an estimate upon the gifts God has imparted to him, as to judge himself unworthy of all honors: for thus he may fail to acquire those possessions necessary to the practice of virtue, and in like manner fail in his duty to the republic. Recognizing the source of all good, he will studiously provide himself with those instruments, and embrace with readiness those occasions by which God may be glorified and the country served. He will also be ready to listen to reproof, when administered by good men, although more severe than he has merited. He, too, exercises greatness of mind, who, in the midst of wealth and power, restrains himself within the limits of modesty, who controls himself in good and evil fortune with moderation, not being puffed up by the one, nor overwhelmed by the other; for he who lives for virtue does not consider the acquisition or the loss of any other possession a matter of much consequence. He feels a greater satisfaction in giving than receiving. In conferring a benefit upon another, he esteems himself to have excelled; receiving it from another, that he has been excelled himself. The one is peculiarly the province of the virtue he cherishes; the other contrary to it. He seeks to render to others infinitely more than he has received, that he who was the giver at first may become the debtor at last. For when he is obliged to ask favors of others, he does it unwillingly, but

serves every one with cheerfulness. Among men who are advanced in dignity and fortune, he studies to appear with dignity; among ordinary men he bears himself without ostentation: for in overcoming the first, he has achieved a dignified and lofty action; to surpass the second would be very easy, but very base. Above all, he loves and hates openly; esteeming it a vice of cowardice to conceal his real sentiments. He prizes truth dearer than opinion, and will not be swayed by the popular clamor. He never conceals the truth unless he may, in speaking of himself, leave his virtues unnoticed. He cannot be a flatterer; for this is the vice of a servile soul, and he is as careful in injuring the reputation of others as his own. Nor does he dwell upon his misfortunes, but rises above them. Honor is dearer to him than gratification or gain.

His envy is never excited against those who have become illustrious like himself, for he loves his country, and is mindful of the advantage and the glory it borrows from its great men; indeed the magnanimous man never troubles himself with the thought that others may rival him.

Cyrus of Persia seems to us to have given indication of a great and noble heart, when to avoid giving mortification to his courtiers he contended with them in those studies and exercises in which he knew he should be overcome. Apollonius the Peripatetic gave proof of a generous soul. To convince those of their mistake, says Plutarch, who affirmed that honor and glory could have no rivals, he procured more honor for Sotione, his brother, than for himself. And although Aristotle esteemed it a weakness to display any feeling for a benefit received, yet in following his counsel one would, it seems to us, incur the vice of ingratitude, which Seneca esteems one of the deformities of human nature; although, according to Homer, Thetis, in praying Jove to help her son, did not enumerate to him the services done to him; and although the Spartan ambassadors, when they appealed to the Athenian Republic for help in the discomfiture of Leuctra, only reminded the Athenians of the services they had received from them in former times; yet we believe both Thetis and the ambassadors did so rather in obedience to the law of silence, which a benefactor should

observe, than through fear of offending the magnanimity of those whom they prayed.

We could not call a person magnanimous who chose to dis-course of his beneficence, for besides violating the rule which requires the giver to be silent, and the receiver to speak, he esteems that to have been a great thing at least in himself, which greatness of soul would cause him to esteem of little virtue. We do not deny then, that being more ready to do a favor than to ask one, is evidence of a magnanimous man ; but where all others in a republic demand favors he should not be the only one who will not seek them, since such singularities often lead others to suppose that a person wishes to be thought to know or to be more than others, and consequently subject him to odium Hence, although rarely and with strong claims, he will ask his share of those favors republics are accustomed to bestow ; let him not feel he has done anything inconsistent with greatness of soul. He will guard against the vice of flattery, but he will never withhold his praise from those who have in any manner devoted themselves valorously to their country. *In excitando autem, et ina cuendo* (says Marcus Tully, writing to Trebonius), *plurimum valet, si laudes eum, quem cohortere*(12). It seems to us also highly becoming the character of a magnanimous man never to speak evil even of his enemies.

Plutarch quotes the authority of a great poet to show the magnanimity of Hercoles, who, he says, took no more notice of slanders and reproaches than of the buzzing of flies. Nothing can be more beautiful or magnanimous, he says, too, than to be reviled by an enemy without indulging in passion—a virtue, he tells us, Socrates exercised at home with his wife to enable him to practise it when he went out into the world.

Pericles must have displayed this virtue in an astonishing degree, when after supporting for an entire day undisturbed, the ribaldry of a villain, he made his servant light the torches and accompany him home. He seems to have taken that noble vengeance upon his enemy which Philemon inculcates, when he says, that when one bears patiently the abuse of another, the biter is bitten ; he inflicts the wound, John Chrysostom speaks

of, "if you wish to take vengeance, be silent, and you will give a mortal wound."

Finally, although he should in everything cherish a magnanimous spirit, yet he should endeavor to do so principally in five ways. First, in holding the prosperity of fortune under his feet. Second, in taking no notice of injuries. Third, in cherishing truth dearer than public opinion. Fourth, in being moderate in prosperity. Fifth, in maintaining his spirit and resolution in the midst of misfortunes. History will furnish him noble illustrations of all these virtues; as for example, of the first, in Fabricius, when he spurned the gold of Pyrrhus; of the second, in Fabius Rullianus, when he nominated his enemy, Papirius, Dictator; of the third, in Fabius Maximus, who ran the risk of being esteemed a coward by flying, rather than endanger the Roman empire by giving battle; of the fourth, in Paulus Emilius, when having deserted the house of Alexander the Great, with the ruin of Persius, he spoke with so much sadness of the inconstancy of human fortune; and of the fifth, in the Lacedæmonians and the Romans, who, in spite of the disasters of Leuctra and of Cannæ, still maintained their valor so gloriously.

In conclusion, we will say a word of the extremes of magnanimity, pompousness, and pusillanimity; but having already spoken at length of the medium from which these extremes may be easily inferred, we shall be very brief. The inflated man resembles the magnanimous in many of the foregoing qualities; but he is destitute of the foundation of the other virtues, which can alone endow him with magnanimity of soul. Hence in Marcus Drusus we have an example of the vice of arrogance rather than the virtue of magnanimity. When this Tribune of the people, on being summoned to appear before the Senate of Rome, he not only refused to present himself, but thought it even reasonable for the Senate to come to him, that he might appear superior to them. Nor did Umberto Aldobrandeschi despise the people so much because he was persuaded of his own virtue, as, says Dante, in speaking of his person, because he was proud of the nobility and achievements of his ancestors.

L'antico sangue, e l'opere leggiadre  
 De' miei maggior mi ser si arrogante,  
 Che non pensando alla comune madre  
 Ogni uomo ebbi 'a dispetto tanto avante,  
 Ch' io ne moni, 'ecc (13)

And the pusillanimous man on the contrary resembles the magnanimous in the possession of other virtues, but differs from him in the qualities indispensable to greatness of soul. He has no appreciation of his own virtues, and consequently does not judge himself worthy of any honor. Nor is he able to breast himself up against the tide of popular opinion or withstand the inconstancies of fortune. For this reason Timoleon Corinthus seems to us pusillanimous; for although in defence of the liberty of his country he had killed his brother, he could not support the curse of his mother nor the reproaches of the rabble. And had not Epaminondas with sadness of countenance and dress corrected on the following day the mirth that overcame him on the preceding, he would have incurred for another reason the same imputation.

---

### CHAPTER XXIII.

#### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MODERATE IN SEEKING HONORS, AND HOW.

THE acquisition of honors is also to be esteemed praiseworthy. It bears the same relation to magnanimity, as liberality to magnificence. We cannot speak of such a man except by circumlocution, for he had not in the Greek, neither has he in any tongue, any peculiar title.

He who departs from the medium by excess, is called ambitious, and he who is too dilatory and insensible in such matters is said to be wanting in proper regard to his reputation. We esteem the medium between these extremes exceedingly diffi-



cult; and being a virtue so seldom practised, it has not yet acquired a distinct name.

It would be well for each one to leave his merits to be decided entirely by those who have the bestowment of honors, were it not for the blindness and ignorance of mankind. But since very often they neglect their obligations, to the detriment of the public, we will not condemn our Citizen when he esteems himself able to render a noble service to the republic, if in a proper manner he seek to arrive at the point necessary to execute his design; and would suggest as a guide he may follow with safety, the example of Cato the Uticanian, who was induced to ask the Tribuneship of the people for no other reason than to suppress the folly of Metellus; nor did he seek the dignity of the Consulship except to oppose the designs of Cæsar. Such examples show that integrity of purpose renders it commendable to seek for honors.

If therefore he would conduct himself with discretion and avoid exciting among his fellow citizens the suspicion of seeking his own glory, let him take our advice and solicit only those dignities which enable him to render a greater service to the country than emolument to himself. As for example, in the Republic of Venice, he would seek rather to be elected councillor of the Ten to protect the liberty of the state from the pride of some tyrannical Doge, than to be declared Procurator of S. Marco, with a title of honor.

And this noble sentiment does not seem to us very different from that of the generous-minded Brutus. While writing to Marcus Tully of those who refused to honor him, he makes use of these words: *Interpellent me quo minus honoratus sim, dum ne interpellent quo minus respublica a me commode administrari possit.* Our Citizen will act nobly if, on the other hand, he is called to an office ill adapted either to his merit or the importance of his person, he imitate the moderation of Aristides who in reproving the Athenians once who wished to elect him Treasurer of the Public Revenue, said it would not be well to place him at the head of an office where he should be obliged to treat the robbers of the community with too much leniency. And he will also be worthy of great praise, if, when elevated to a dignity, in the exer-

cise of which he may feel himself, through incapacity, in danger of bringing some detriment to the republic, he shall follow the example of Nicias, who, although he had been elected by the people Athenian Captain of the Sicilian enterprise, yet foreseeing he might bring an unhappy result to the country even after it was settled, endeavored to dissuade them from it, without any regard to his own exaltation. We praise him for his perseverance, since he had more regard to his country than to himself; but the good Citizen should not thwart the councils of those who are opposed to him unless he is sustained by the Republic.

---

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MILD, AND NOW.

Those who control the fortunes of states will bring many evils upon their country, unless they have long learned to discipline and moderate the passion of anger. We say moderate it, in the Peripatetic sense; for to annihilate it entirely, as the Stoics thought, is more easy to talk about than to do; and even were it easy, we are not very certain it would result in any good; on the contrary, we think it may be timely and moderately aroused greatly to the utility of the republic. Aristotle would have it like a stone cut for the foundation of a fortress. Plato says it is unconquerable, and the soul that is not subdued by it is great. Plutarch calls it the helper of virtue, and adds that he who uses it wisely will find it will give no little aid in military and political affairs. In the battle between the Romans and the people of Cisalpine Gaul, says Livy, *ibi quantam vim ad stimulandos animos ira haberet apparuit.*(15) And in the ardor of Lucretius and of Valerius, to follow Brutus the Liberator of his country, *totique ab luctu versi in iram.*(16)

We have observed that Phineas praises this stimulus in Basilus, in the punishment he administered to the Tambii, and to

the effeminate Madianitides, Samuel to Agag, the king of the Amalekites, and Elijah to the priests of Jezebel, whom he says he killed with reasonable indignation, and this passion too he affirms to be the cause frequently of noble and just deeds.

But since the evils that spring from the excesses of this passion are numerous and grave, our Citizen should take infinite pains to fortify himself against them, into which—says Seneca—he may so easily be hurled; and which—as Giovanni Villani says—were illustrated strikingly in the person of Guido Cavalcanti; whose virtues he praises, but at the same time he says, he was too easily transported with passion. He should equally guard against any approach towards haughtiness, or—says Gregorio Nissenus—he can never be justified in indulging his anger.

In conquering his passion he will acquire the virtue of self-control, which is a habit that sometimes represses it altogether, because it becomes necessary; and sometimes again, gives it vent in that proportion, for those reasons; and at such time, and for such space, and towards those persons, and for such an object as sober reason dictates. As we may suppose for example, in the case of Camillus, who restrained his indignation against his country, although he had been spurned from it with so much ingratitude, and vented it upon the barbarian king; who, in weighing out the gold the besieged had covenanted for the ransom of their country, put his foot in the scale for a weight. Through excessive indulgence our Citizen is liable frequently to fall into grievous errors. The Roman people, in the disgraceful election of Lettorius, done to oppose the Consuls; and in the shameful flight from the Volsci, to show their spite against Appius; with a thousand other examples, illustrate the truth of what we have said; while through a want of this passion, we are not accustomed either to see so many or so dangerous examples. Not to be angry on proper occasions, is rather a negative than a positive fault; and if it be not through cowardice or insensibility of feeling—as it appears to have been in that king of Cyprus, who, Boccaccio says, was of so cowardly a spirit as to bear every manner of insult, it is not only not to be taken as a defect of self-control, but even

to be commended as an evidence of magnanimity. For never to resent injuries, when provoked by others, seems to indicate an effeminate and servile soul, rather than a disciplined and magnanimous spirit. We cannot tell what opinion Aristotle, who said a magnanimous man would never resent an insult, would have passed upon Antigonus, who, with so much mildness, bore the slanders of the courtiers: or what he would have thought of Augustus, who with so little scruple punished the reproaches of Timagenes. Both of whom we esteem greater princes for the empire they swayed over themselves, than for the dominion they held over others. "*Nihil gloriosius principe impune laeso,*" says Seneca, in our favor, where he teaches, "*magni animi esse injurias in summa potentia pati.*"(17)

---

## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CONSTANT, AND HOW.

ALTHOUGH the virtue of Constancy may perhaps in some manner be embraced in those of magnanimity and fortitude, yet as it particularly includes a certain perseverance of purpose, which, considered in itself, may be the cause of many advantages to the state, we have thought it necessary to say something of it separately, that our Citizen may have some rule to guide him in investigating it more carefully in works which treat of moral philosophy.

Its field for action, then, is any deed, or disposition, or council, in which he may contemplate steadfastness and instability, and control himself in such a manner, that being guarded from the excess of pertinacity, and the defect of fickleness, he may persevere in his proposed undertakings, with proper regard to circumstances as they arise. For this reason, he is constant who is not swayed either by the violence of citizens or the menaces of tyrants. Says Horace :

"Justum et tenacem propositi virum,  
 Non civium ardor prava jubentium,  
 Non vultus instantis tyranni,  
 Mente quatit solida."(18)

And Socrates seems to have been endowed with this firmness, while against the fury of the Athenian people, who wished to put to death the ten captains who had routed the division of the Lacedæmonian army, he undertook firmly their defence, with the imminent danger of sharing their fate. "I judged," he says (Plato tells us), "it was better for me to endanger myself, with the law and with justice on my side, than through fear of a prison or death to abet the injustice of your counsels." And when he had shown his contempt for the condemnation of the Thirty Tyrants, he would not take Leontes Salaminius with him to be killed by them; he adds, in the same place: "Because that dreadful power did not so much alarm me as to cause me to commit an act of injustice." And Quintus Scævola made a magnanimous display of the same virtue, when in the very face of Sylla, he refused to declare Marius an enemy of his country." "*Quinetiam truculentus,*" Valerius says of him, "*sibi minitanti Syllæ, licet, inquit, mihi agmina militum, quibus curiam circumsedisti, ostentes, licet mortem identidem miniteris, nunquam tamen efficies, ut propter exiguum senilemque sanguinem meum, Marium, a quo urbs et Italia conservata est hostem judicem.*"(19) Constant, too, will any one be called, who having taken good and safe counsel, follows it with a resolution that cannot be shaken, till his work is done. Such was Fulvius Flaccus when he proposed to destroy the entire senate of Capua, and would not open the letters of the messenger from Rome before he had executed his purpose.

The virtue of Constancy shone forth from the course of Fabius Maximus, who steadily adhered to his resolution not to give Hannibal battle, although he felt himself transfixed by the cutting clamors of his soldiers. That, too, was firmness of soul in Phocion, who—notwithstanding the victory which, against his opinion the Athenians reported of Cassander—after giving vent to his joy for their success, persevered in affirming, that still his own counsel would have been better.

And finally, all those have a just claim to be called constant, who, resisting the sway of those passions which assail the hearts of men with the greatest violence, remain unshaken in deliberations they have either publicly or privately established as best. Nor are we wanting in examples in point from history, among which we cannot forget that of *Esulte*, when in passing judgment upon the habits of *Democratius*, he showed himself a more constant citizen to condemn the vice of the father, than compassionate lover to bear the intercession of the son. The example, too, of *Metellus Numidicus* is memorable. Rather than consent to the seditious laws of *Saturninus* he chose to deprive himself of his dignity and his country.

But let the Citizen take warning that all is not constancy which seems to bear its image, for sometimes a work may seem to be praiseworthy because it is lasting, although otherwise it cannot stand the test. As for example, *Thrasea* was steadfast to liberate *Antistius* from death contrary to the will of *Nero*, in as much as he felt that, says *Tacitus*, *Sueta firmitudine animi et ne gloria intercideret*: nor were they constant who executed the monarch's pleasure; "*pars ne principem obsequium invidia viderentur, plures numero tuti.*"(20)

And the excess of obstinacy, in consequence of perseverance, sometimes necessarily results from stability, but the rule of circumstances, as with the other virtues, is that which widely distinguishes one habit from the other. Nor will any one be found who will call *Caius Martius* constant with all the firmness he showed in despising the prayers of the Roman ambassadors, nor will one be found who will apply this epithet to *Cneus Piso* for condemning the innocent soldier to die only because he had decided he was guilty; but the first in persisting to make war against his country, and the second in his bold violation of justice, will be called headstrong by all men. The want of stability is shown in changing deliberations once decided upon without substantial reasons. An example in point seems to be furnished in *Cesennius Petus*, of whom *Tacitus* says: "*et eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, si Peto aut in suis aut in alienis consiliis constantia fuisset; verum ubi a*

*viris militaribus aduersus urgentes casus firmatus erat, rursus ne aliena sententia indigenis videretur, in diversa ac deteriora transibat.”(21)*

Since therefore the passions which oppose the exercise of the noble virtue of constancy are numerous and exceedingly violent, our Citizen must valorously conquer them, and appreciating the infamy of being fickle through fear or cupidity, and the disgrace of being obstinate through ambition or stubbornness, he will conclude that to restrain himself within the limits of moderation, is one of the most important disciplines he can learn for the good of his country.

---

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE JUST, AND HOW.

THE general subject of Justice extends far beyond the scope of our treatise, and we shall therefore confine ourselves to those suggestions likely to throw some light on its necessity to our Citizen, and open the way for its acquisition by those who have only before dwelt upon its theory.

Its general definition is a habit of willing and doing what is right. Socrates defines political justice to be what the laws of the republic impose, and he cannot be a good citizen who does not regard them, nor be morally just whose life is not conformed to the principles of right. Says Eutidemo in Xenophon, no man can be a good citizen unless he be just. And as we said in the beginning, when the laws are observed through regard to the public good, it is called legal and universal justice, and it is that perfect virtue in whose operation Aristotle supposed public happiness principally to consist. When it comes into practice in the matter of honors or of any other desirable thing, it is termed distributive, and when it concerns the correction of contracts or the imposition of penalties, it is termed commutative.

In the practice of legal justice all those virtues are brought into exercise which the occasion may offer in contributing to the prosperity of the state, since actions that proceed from these virtues are enjoined by the laws. Hence they who perform them in obedience to those requisitions are said to be governed by the principle of legal and universal justice. It shuns any violation of ordinances, committing adultery, defrauding the revenue, and outraging citizens; it shows itself firm in battle, temperate in sensual indulgences, liberal in substance, and mild in vengeance.

That was a work of justice in Furius Camillus, who, although proclaimed Captain by the Roman squadrons, who had been levied to rebuke the insolence of the Gauls, would not listen to the word until he had been legitimately confirmed by the besieged in the Campidoglio. Quite another character we see displayed in Caius Flaminius, when, without having offered the sacrifices, or consulted the anguries according to the custom before armies put themselves in movement, rushed madly on to fight against Hannibal.

The principle of distributive justice is brought into operation in conferring dignities and rewards according to the merits of individuals, and in proper proportion, that the recompense may correspond with the pains taken, and be adapted to the person who receives it; as for example, something useful should be given to a person in a low condition—something honourable to the noble, more or less as they may each have merited.

In dividing the spoils and treasures taken from enemies in war, the Roman captains did not give the same portion to officers and to common soldiers; and they did not class the Centurion who performed the duties of Tribune, in the same grade with other officers, or confound the rank of the Tribune with that of a Legate, but both in magnitude and quality, they endeavored to adjust their awards to the merit and the dignity of the individual. The Senate, too, were governed by the same spirit in the triumphs they decreed to the Consuls, making them correspond with the magnificence of their victories. Thus when a triumph was decreed to Scipio, for his achieve-



ments in Africa, and the oration to Sentilus for what he had done in Spain, the Senate were governed by the principle of distributive justice, for they displayed a regard to the proportions of which we have spoken. And yet the same Senate seem to have violated this principle, when, without any just regard to the proportion of the merit to the reward, they decreed a triumph to Cornelius and Bebius, who, without *bearing arms*, had forced their armies among the Ligurian mountains. By equalling their reward with Scipio's, they were guilty of that extreme injustice which Cirillus says consists in giving the same reward to men of widely different merit.

In the operation of commutative justice, the *inequality* of contracts is corrected, and crimes are made to receive a corresponding penalty, not according to the proportion we have established in distributing justice, but so conformed to reason, that it results equally for both the contracting parties. In like manner, too, it adapts the punishment to the crime, with no other distinction than that sometimes the penalty is altered in persons of unequal condition, but never in unfair proportion.

The punishment the Romans inflicted upon Spurius Cassius, who aspired to be a tyrant, seems to have been meted out in harmony with this principle; for, without any regard to the splendor of his three consulates and two triumphs, and the glory they had shed upon his name, they brought him to trial and dealt out to him just punishment for his crime, as they would have sentenced the most ignoble citizen. We find, we think, an illustration of exactly the opposite principle in the judge who was deputed by Charles, King of Naples, to sentence Corradino, nephew of the Emperor Frederick; for, without reflecting that the same youth had been guilty of no other crime against the person of the French King, than fighting valorously with him to recover the state which he held, that rightfully belonged to him, he adjudged him worthy of death; hence, we can excuse Robert of Flanders, son-in-law of the same Charles, who immediately took vengeance for so outrageous a sentence. But the very same Roman Pontiff, although disobeyed by Corradino, could not but commend the propriety of the sentence. Since the law, however, which is made for all, cannot provide

for all in every case that may arise, it is the duty of the judge to provide for such exigencies himself, conforming his sentence to that which, in his opinion, the legislators of the same code would have themselves decided if they were present.

Under this aspect we contemplate equity, not as opposed to justice, but as furnishing rule of interpretation for the law where it seems to apply unjustly to the exigencies in hand, which did not occur to its framers.

Our Citizen will thus, from moral discipline, acquire with diligence the substance and the possession of the habit of justice. The reading of Hesiod will teach him the prosperity it will bring to the republic, and he will perceive the necessity of taking great pains in reducing the principle of justice to practice; for it is not enough that his theories be correct, he must make his life an illustration of them. "*Execute justice*," is the command of God, by which we are to understand that acts of genuine justice are done through love of justice itself; otherwise, although they may appear praiseworthy, they are destitute of the true spirit. And since, in the administration of justice to individuals, the mind of the judge may sometimes be swayed by passions that influence his personal feelings towards the litigants, he must utterly forget himself, and remember that Aristides being once reminded by a party on the trial, that he had often received repeated injuries from the other, replied: "What he may have done to me is not the question now; for I am here to award justice to your person and not to my own."

---

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CLEMENT, AND HOW.

WE may appropriately follow the discussion of Justice, which inflicts punishment, by some remarks upon Clemency which extends pardon. This is a matter full of interest to the Citizen,

the effeminate Madianitides, Samuel to Agag, the king of the Amalekites, and Elijah to the priests of Jezebel, whom he says he killed with reasonable indignation, and this passion too he affirms to be the cause frequently of noble and just deeds.

But since the evils that spring from the excesses of this passion are numerous and grave, our Citizen should take infinite pains to fortify himself against them, into which—says Seneca—he may so easily be hurled; and which—as Giovanni Villani says—were illustrated strikingly in the person of Guido Cavalcanti; whose virtues he praises, but at the same time he says, he was too easily transported with passion. He should equally guard against any approach towards haughtiness, or—says Gregorio Nissenus—he can never be justified in indulging his anger.

In conquering his passion he will acquire the virtue of self-control, which is a habit that sometimes represses it altogether, because it becomes necessary; and sometimes again, gives it vent in that proportion, for those reasons; and at such time, and for such space, and towards those persons, and for such an object as sober reason dictates. As we may suppose for example, in the case of Camillus, who restrained his indignation against his country, although he had been spurned from it with so much ingratitude, and vented it upon the barbarian king; who, in weighing out the gold the besieged had covenanted for the ransom of their country, put his foot in the scale for a weight. Through excessive indulgence our Citizen is liable frequently to fall into grievous errors. The Roman people, in the disgraceful election of Lettorius, done to oppose the Consuls; and in the shameful flight from the Volsci, to show their spite against Appius; with a thousand other examples, illustrate the truth of what we have said; while through a want of this passion, we are not accustomed either to see so many or so dangerous examples. Not to be angry on proper occasions, is rather a negative than a positive fault; and if it be not through cowardice or insensibility of feeling—as it appears to have been in that king of Cyprus, who, Boccaccio says, was of so cowardly a spirit as to bear every manner of insult, it is not only not to be taken as a defect of self-control, but even

to be commended as an evidence of magnanimity. For never to resent injuries, when provoked by others, seems to indicate an effeminate and servile soul, rather than a disciplined and magnanimous spirit. We cannot tell what opinion Aristotle, who said a magnanimous man would never resent an insult, would have passed upon Antigonus, who, with so much mildness, bore the slanders of the courtiers; or what he would have thought of Augustus, who with so little scruple punished the reproaches of Timagenes. Both of whom we esteem greater princes for the empire they swayed over themselves, than for the dominion they held over others. "*Nihil gloriosius principe impune laeso,*" says Seneca, in our favor, where he teaches, "*magni animi esse injurias in summa potentia pati.*"(17)

---

## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CONSTANT, AND HOW.

ALTHOUGH the virtue of Constancy may perhaps in some manner be embraced in those of magnanimity and fortitude, yet as it particularly includes a certain perseverance of purpose, which, considered in itself, may be the cause of many advantages to the state, we have thought it necessary to say something of it separately, that our Citizen may have some rule to guide him in investigating it more carefully in works which treat of moral philosophy.

Its field for action, then, is any deed, or disposition, or council, in which he may contemplate steadfastness and instability, and control himself in such a manner, that being guarded from the excess of pertinacity, and the defect of fickleness, he may persevere in his proposed undertakings, with proper regard to circumstances as they arise. For this reason, he is constant who is not swayed either by the violence of citizens or the menaces of tyrants. Says Horace :

## CHAPTER XXII.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MAGNANIMOUS, AND HOW.

MAGNANIMITY springs almost spontaneously from the possession of the other virtues, without which it cannot exist, while it stimulates each one in its proper sphere to a higher degree of perfection. But it has certain virtues of its own, which render its possession desirable to the Citizen of a republic.

As it is or may appear to be in some respects inconsistent with the virtue of Christian humility, he should exercise it with great caution, attempering any appearance of pride by

---

our hospitals, and galleries of art; and a few of our fine churches and public edifices owe their existence to the munificent donations of private individuals. As we go on in our career of advancement, every year will bring us nobler examples still. Abbott and Astor are names which cannot be forgotten; and when the glorious library of the New York merchant shall be founded, and its golden gates thrown open to the scholar, his fame will be established upon a foundation which time never can shake. Millions will pronounce the name of the generous Smithson with affection, as generations sweep by; other men will arise who will establish galleries and schools of art and of design—for the time cannot be far distant when our institutions for art and design, and our public libraries, will surpass all rival foundations in the old world. Those who have amassed themselves great fortunes will not forget that those to whom they shall prove benefactors, will be the surest and safest guardians of their fame! If the Astor estate should go undiminished into the hands of its heirs, will they take any pains to heap honor upon the tomb of the man who amassed it? With the income for only one year of that estate, well expended, I'll engage Mr. Astor may write his name in letters of gold upon the last arch that overshadows the last column that distant ages will find standing among the ruins of New York.

uprightness of intention, and, at all events, cultivating it no farther than may be consistent with that humility which is the only foundation of true virtue. The magnanimous Citizen who is adorned with all the virtues, is judged worthy of illustrious honors, and accepts them with a proper feeling of gratification from worthy men; but he disdains honors offered for small things and by low people: and he who recognizes them as conferred by Heaven, may receive them with satisfaction, not only without a spirit of pride, but with the zeal of piety, that the gifts conferred upon him by God are honored by good men.

But he will do well to adhere to the safe side, and act on the principle that the virtue of Magnanimity teaches mankind, that all they say and do for themselves is only base selfishness. He will, however, guard against placing so false an estimate upon the gifts God has imparted to him, as to judge himself unworthy of all honors: for thus he may fail to acquire those possessions necessary to the practice of virtue, and in like manner fail in his duty to the republic. Recognizing the source of all good, he will studiously provide himself with those instruments, and embrace with readiness those occasions by which God may be glorified and the country served. He will also be ready to listen to reproof, when administered by good men, although more severe than he has merited. He, too, exercises greatness of mind, who, in the midst of wealth and power, restrains himself within the limits of modesty, who controls himself in good and evil fortune with moderation, not being puffed up by the one, nor overwhelmed by the other; for he who lives for virtue does not consider the acquisition or the loss of any other possession a matter of much consequence. He feels a greater satisfaction in giving than receiving. In conferring a benefit upon another, he esteems himself to have excelled; receiving it from another, that he has been excelled himself. The one is peculiarly the province of the virtue he cherishes; the other contrary to it. He seeks to render to others infinitely more than he has received, that he who was the giver at first may become the debtor at last. For when he is obliged to ask favors of others, he does it unwillingly, but

## CHAPTER XXII.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MAGNANIMOUS, AND HOW.

MAGNANIMITY springs almost spontaneously from the possession of the other virtues, without which it cannot exist, while it stimulates each one in its proper sphere to a higher degree of perfection. But it has certain virtues of its own, which render its possession desirable to the Citizen of a republic.

As it is or may appear to be in some respects inconsistent with the virtue of Christian humility, he should exercise it with great caution, attempering any appearance of pride by

---

our hospitals, and galleries of art; and a few of our fine churches and public edifices owe their existence to the munificent donations of private individuals. As we go on in our career of advancement, every year will bring us nobler examples still. Abbott and Astor are names which cannot be forgotten; and when the glorious library of the New York merchant shall be founded, and its golden gates thrown open to the scholar, his fame will be established upon a foundation which time never can shake. Millions will pronounce the name of the generous Smithson with affection, as generations sweep by; other men will arise who will establish galleries and schools of art and of design—for the time cannot be far distant when our institutions for art and design, and our public libraries, will surpass all rival foundations in the old world. Those who have amassed themselves great fortunes will not forget that those to whom they shall prove benefactors, will be the surest and safest guardians of their fame! If the Astor estate should go undiminished into the hands of its heirs, will they take any pains to heap honor upon the tomb of the man who amassed it? With the income for only one year of that estate, well expended, I'll engage Mr. Astor may write his name in letters of gold upon the last arch that overshadows the last column that distant ages will find standing among the ruins of New York.

uprightness of intention, and, at all events, cultivating it no farther than may be consistent with that humility which is the only foundation of true virtue. The magnanimous Citizen who is adorned with all the virtues, is judged worthy of illustrious honors, and accepts them with a proper feeling of gratification from worthy men; but he disdains honors offered for small things and by low people: and he who recognizes them as conferred by Heaven, may receive them with satisfaction, not only without a spirit of pride, but with the zeal of piety, that the gifts conferred upon him by God are honored by good men.

But he will do well to adhere to the safe side, and act on the principle that the virtue of Magnanimity teaches mankind, that all they say and do for themselves is only base selfishness. He will, however, guard against placing so false an estimate upon the gifts God has imparted to him, as to judge himself unworthy of all honors: for thus he may fail to acquire those possessions necessary to the practice of virtue, and in like manner fail in his duty to the republic. Recognizing the source of all good, he will studiously provide himself with those instruments, and embrace with readiness those occasions by which God may be glorified and the country served. He will also be ready to listen to reproof, when administered by good men, although more severe than he has merited. He, too, exercises greatness of mind, who, in the midst of wealth and power, restrains himself within the limits of modesty, who controls himself in good and evil fortune with moderation, not being puffed up by the one, nor overwhelmed by the other; for he who lives for virtue does not consider the acquisition or the loss of any other possession a matter of much consequence. He feels a greater satisfaction in giving than receiving. In conferring a benefit upon another, he esteems himself to have excelled; receiving it from another, that he has been excelled himself. The one is peculiarly the province of the virtue he cherishes; the other contrary to it. He seeks to render to others infinitely more than he has received, that he who was the giver at first may become the debtor at last. For when he is obliged to ask favors of others, he does it unwillingly, but



serves every one with cheerfulness. Among men who are advanced in dignity and fortune, he studies to appear with dignity; among ordinary men he bears himself without ostentation: for in overcoming the first, he has achieved a dignified and lofty action; to surpass the second would be very easy, but very base. Above all, he loves and hates openly; esteeming it a vice of cowardice to conceal his real sentiments. He prizes truth dearer than opinion, and will not be swayed by the popular clamor. He never conceals the truth unless he may, in speaking of himself, leave his virtues unnoticed. He cannot be a flatterer; for this is the vice of a servile soul, and he is as careful in injuring the reputation of others as his own. Nor does he dwell upon his misfortunes, but rises above them. Honor is dearer to him than gratification or gain.

His envy is never excited against those who have become illustrious like himself, for he loves his country, and is mindful of the advantage and the glory it borrows from its great men; indeed the magnanimous man never troubles himself with the thought that others may rival him.

Cyrus of Persia seems to us to have given indication of a great and noble heart, when to avoid giving mortification to his courtiers he contended with them in those studies and exercises in which he knew he should be overcome. Apollonius the Peripatetic gave proof of a generous soul. To convince those of their mistake, says Plutarch, who affirmed that honor and glory could have no rivals, he procured more honor for Sotione, his brother, than for himself. And although Aristotle esteemed it a weakness to display any feeling for a benefit received, yet in following his counsel one would, it seems to us, incur the vice of ingratitude, which Seneca esteems one of the deformities of human nature; although, according to Homer, Thetis, in praying Jove to help her son, did not enumerate to him the services done to him; and although the Spartan ambassadors, when they appealed to the Athenian Republic for help in the discomfiture of Leuctra, only reminded the Athenians of the services they had received from them in former times; yet we believe both Thetis and the ambassadors did so rather in obedience to the law of silence, which a benefactor should

observe, than through fear of offending the magnanimity of those whom they prayed.

We could not call a person magnanimous who chose to dis-course of his beneficence, for besides violating the rule which requires the giver to be silent, and the receiver to speak, he esteems that to have been a great thing at least in himself, which greatness of soul would cause him to esteem of little virtue. We do not deny then, that being more ready to do a favor than to ask one, is evidence of a magnanimous man ; but where all others in a republic demand favors he should not be the only one who will not seek them, since such singularities often lead others to suppose that a person wishes to be thought to know or to be more than others, and consequently subject him to odium. Hence, although rarely and with strong claims, he will ask his share of those favors republics are accustomed to bestow ; let him not feel he has done anything inconsistent with greatness of soul. He will guard against the vice of flattery, but he will never withhold his praise from those who have in any manner devoted themselves valorously to their country. *In excitando autem, et ina cuendo* (says Marcus Tully, writing to Trebonius), *plurimum valet, si laudes eum, quem cohortere*(12). It seems to us also highly becoming the character of a magnanimous man never to speak evil even of his enemies.

Plutarch quotes the authority of a great poet to show the magnanimity of Hercoles, who, he says, took no more notice of slanders and reproaches than of the buzzing of flies. Nothing can be more beautiful or magnanimous, he says, too, than to be reviled by an enemy without indulging in passion—a virtue, he tells us, Socrates exercised at home with his wife to enable him to practise it when he went out into the world.

Pericles must have displayed this virtue in an astonishing degree, when after supporting for an entire day undisturbed, the ribaldry of a villain, he made his servant light the torches and accompany him home. He seems to have taken that noble vengeance upon his enemy which Philemon inculcates, when he says, that when one bears patiently the abuse of another, the biter is bitten ; he inflicts the wound, John Chrysostom speaks

of, "if you wish to take vengeance, be silent, and you will give a mortal wound."

Finally, although he should in everything cherish a magnanimous spirit, yet he should endeavor to do so principally in five ways. First, in holding the prosperity of fortune under his feet. Second, in taking no notice of injuries. Third, in cherishing truth dearer than public opinion. Fourth, in being moderate in prosperity. Fifth, in maintaining his spirit and resolution in the midst of misfortunes. History will furnish him noble illustrations of all these virtues; as for example, of the first, in Fabricius, when he spurned the gold of Pyrrhus; of the second, in Fabius Rullianus, when he nominated his enemy, Papirius, Dictator; of the third, in Fabius Maximus, who ran the risk of being esteemed a coward by flying, rather than endanger the Roman empire by giving battle; of the fourth, in Paulus Emilius, when having deserted the house of Alexander the Great, with the ruin of Persius, he spoke with so much sadness of the inconstancy of human fortune; and of the fifth, in the Lacedæmonians and the Romans, who, in spite of the disasters of Leuctra and of Cannæ, still maintained their valor so gloriously.

In conclusion, we will say a word of the extremes of magnanimity, pompousness, and pusillanimity; but having already spoken at length of the medium from which these extremes may be easily inferred, we shall be very brief. The inflated man resembles the magnanimous in many of the foregoing qualities; but he is destitute of the foundation of the other virtues, which can alone endow him with magnanimity of soul. Hence in Marcus Drusus we have an example of the vice of arrogance rather than the virtue of magnanimity. When this Tribune of the people, on being summoned to appear before the Senate of Rome, he not only refused to present himself, but thought it even reasonable for the Senate to come to him, that he might appear superior to them. Nor did Umberto Aldobrandeschi despise the people so much because he was persuaded of his own virtue, as, says Dante, in speaking of his person, because he was proud of the nobility and achievements of his ancestors.

L'antico sangue, e l'opere leggiadre  
 De' miei maggior mi fer si arrogante,  
 Che non pensando alla comune madre  
 Ogni uomo ebbi 'n dispetto tanto avanti,  
 Ch' io ne mori, 'ecc. (13)

And the pusillanimous man on the contrary resembles the magnanimous in the possession of other virtues, but differs from him in the qualities indispensable to greatness of soul. He has no appreciation of his own virtues, and consequently does not judge himself worthy of any honor. Nor is he able to breast himself up against the tide of popular opinion or withstand the inconstancies of fortune. For this reason Timoleon Corinthus seems to us pusillanimous; for although in defence of the liberty of his country he had killed his brother, he could not support the curse of his mother nor the reproaches of the rabble. And had not Epaminondas with sadness of countenance and dress corrected on the following day the mirth that overcame him on the preceding, he would have incurred for another reason the same imputation.

---

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MODERATE IN SEEKING HONORS, AND HOW.

THE acquisition of honors is also to be esteemed praiseworthy. It bears the same relation to magnanimity, as liberality to magnificence. We cannot speak of such a man except by circumlocution, for he had not in the Greek, neither has he in any tongue, any peculiar title.

He who departs from the medium by excess, is called ambitious, and he who is too dilatory and insensible in such matters is said to be wanting in proper regard to his reputation. We esteem the medium between these extremes exceedingly diffi-

cult; and being a virtue so seldom practised, it has not yet acquired a distinct name.

It would be well for each one to leave his merits to be decided entirely by those who have the bestowment of honors, were it not for the blindness and ignorance of mankind. But since very often they neglect their obligations, to the detriment of the public, we will not condemn our Citizen when he esteems himself able to render a noble service to the republic, if in a proper manner he seek to arrive at the point necessary to execute his design; and would suggest as a guide he may follow with safety, the example of Cato the Uticanian, who was induced to ask the Tribuneship of the people for no other reason than to suppress the folly of Metellus; nor did he seek the dignity of the Consulship except to oppose the designs of Cæsar. Such examples show that integrity of purpose renders it commendable to seek for honors.

If therefore he would conduct himself with discretion and avoid exciting among his fellow citizens the suspicion of seeking his own glory, let him take our advice and solicit only those dignities which enable him to render a greater service to the country than emolument to himself. As for example, in the Republic of Venice, he would seek rather to be elected councilor of the Ten to protect the liberty of the state from the pride of some tyrannical Doge, than to be declared Procurator of S. Marco, with a title of honor.

And this noble sentiment does not seem to us very different from that of the generous-minded Brutus. While writing to Marcus Tully of those who refused to honor him, he makes use of these words: *Interpellent me quo minus honoratus sim, dum ne interpellent quo minus respublica a me commode administrari possit.* Our Citizen will act nobly if, on the other hand, he is called to an office ill adapted either to his merit or the importance of his person, he imitate the moderation of Aristides who in reproving the Athenians once who wished to elect him Treasurer of the Public Revenue, said it would not be well to place him at the head of an office where he should be obliged to treat the robbers of the community with too much leniency. And he will also be worthy of great praise, if, when elevated to a dignity, in the exer-

oise of which he may feel himself, through incapacity, in danger of bringing some detriment to the republic, he shall follow the example of Nicias, who, although he had been elected by the people Athenian Captain of the Sicilian enterprise, yet foreseeing he might bring an unhappy result to the country even after it was settled, endeavored to dissuade them from it, without any regard to his own exaltation. We praise him for his perseverance, since he had more regard to his country than to himself; but the good Citizen should not thwart the councils of those who are opposed to him unless he is sustained by the Republic.

---

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE MILD, AND HOW.

Those who control the fortunes of states will bring many evils upon their country, unless they have long learned to discipline and moderate the passion of anger. We say moderate it, in the Peripatetic sense; for to annihilate it entirely, as the Stoics thought, is more easy to talk about than to do; and even were it easy, we are not very certain it would result in any good; on the contrary, we think it may be timely and moderately aroused greatly to the utility of the republic. Aristotle would have it like a stone cut for the foundation of a fortress. Plato says it is unconquerable, and the soul that is not subdued by it is great. Plutarch calls it the helper of virtue, and adds that he who uses it wisely will find it will give no little aid in military and political affairs. In the battle between the Romans and the people of Cisalpine Gaul, says Livy, *sibi quantam vim ad stimulandos animos ira haberet apparuit.*(15) And in the ardor of Lucretius and of Valerius, to follow Brutus the Liberator of his country, *totique ab luctu versi in iram.*(16)

We have observed that Phineas praises this stimulus in Bassilius, in the punishment he administered to the Tambii, and to

the effeminate Madianitides, Samuel to Agag, the king of the Amalekites, and Elijah to the priests of Jezebel, whom he says he killed with reasonable indignation, and this passion too he affirms to be the cause frequently of noble and just deeds.

But since the evils that spring from the excesses of this passion are numerous and grave, our Citizen should take infinite pains to fortify himself against them, into which—says Seneca—he may so easily be hurled; and which—as Giovanni Villani says—were illustrated strikingly in the person of Guido Cavalcanti; whose virtues he praises, but at the same time he says, he was too easily transported with passion. He should equally guard against any approach towards haughtiness, or—says Gregorio Nissenus—he can never be justified in indulging his anger.

In conquering his passion he will acquire the virtue of self-control, which is a habit that sometimes represses it altogether, because it becomes necessary; and sometimes again, gives it vent in that proportion, for those reasons; and at such time, and for such space, and towards those persons, and for such an object as sober reason dictates. As we may suppose for example, in the case of Camillus, who restrained his indignation against his country, although he had been spurned from it with so much ingratitude, and vented it upon the barbarian king; who, in weighing out the gold the besieged had covenanted for the ransom of their country, put his foot in the scale for a weight. Through excessive indulgence our Citizen is liable frequently to fall into grievous errors. The Roman people, in the disgraceful election of Lettorius, done to oppose the Consuls; and in the shameful flight from the Volsci, to show their spite against Appius; with a thousand other examples, illustrate the truth of what we have said; while through a want of this passion, we are not accustomed either to see so many or so dangerous examples. Not to be angry on proper occasions, is rather a negative than a positive fault; and if it be not through cowardice or insensibility of feeling—as it appears to have been in that king of Cyprus, who, Boccaccio says, was of so cowardly a spirit as to bear every manner of insult, it is not only not to be taken as a defect of self-control, but even

to be commended as an evidence of magnanimity. For never to resent injuries, when provoked by others, seems to indicate an effeminate and servile soul, rather than a disciplined and magnanimous spirit. We cannot tell what opinion Aristotle, who said a magnanimous man would never resent an insult, would have passed upon Antigonus, who, with so much mildness, bore the slanders of the courtiers; or what he would have thought of Augustus, who with so little scruple punished the reproaches of Timagenes. Both of whom we esteem greater princes for the empire they swayed over themselves, than for the dominion they held over others. "*Nihil gloriosius principe impune laso,*" says Seneca, in our favor, where he teaches, "*magni animi esse injurias in summa potentia pati.*"(17)

---

## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CONSTANT, AND HOW.

ALTHOUGH the virtue of Constancy may perhaps in some manner be embraced in those of magnanimity and fortitude, yet as it particularly includes a certain perseverance of purpose, which, considered in itself, may be the cause of many advantages to the state, we have thought it necessary to say something of it separately, that our Citizen may have some rule to guide him in investigating it more carefully in works which treat of moral philosophy.

Its field for action, then, is any deed, or disposition, or council, in which he may contemplate steadfastness and instability, and control himself in such a manner, that being guarded from the excess of pertinacity, and the defect of fickleness, he may persevere in his proposed undertakings, with proper regard to circumstances as they arise. For this reason, he is constant who is not swayed either by the violence of citizens or the menaces of tyrants. Says Horace :



"Justum et tenacem propositi virum,  
 Non civium ardor prava jubentium,  
 Non vultus instantis tyranni,  
 Mente quatit solida."(18)

And Socrates seems to have been endowed with this firmness, while against the fury of the Athenian people, who wished to put to death the ten captains who had routed the division of the Lacedæmonian army, he undertook firmly their defence, with the imminent danger of sharing their fate. "I judged," he says (Plato tells us), "it was better for me to endanger myself, with the law and with justice on my side, than through fear of a prison or death to abet the injustice of your counsels." And when he had shown his contempt for the condemnation of the Thirty Tyrants, he would not take Leontes Salaminius with him to be killed by them; he adds, in the same place: "Because that dreadful power did not so much alarm me as to cause me to commit an act of injustice." And Quintus Scævola made a magnanimous display of the same virtue, when in the very face of Sylla, he refused to declare Marius an enemy of his country." "*Quinetiam truculentus,*" Valerius says of him, "*sibi minitanti Syllæ, licet, inquit, mihi agmina militum, quibus curiam circumsedisti, ostentes, licet mortem identidem miniteris, nunquam tamen efficies, ut propter exiguum senilemque sanguinem meum, Marium, a quo urbs et Italia conservata est hostem judicem.*"(19) Constant, too, will any one be called, who having taken good and safe counsel, follows it with a resolution that cannot be shaken, till his work is done. Such was Fulvius Flaccus when he proposed to destroy the entire senate of Capua, and would not open the letters of the messenger from Rome before he had executed his purpose.

The virtue of Constancy shone forth from the course of Fabius Maximus, who steadily adhered to his resolution not to give Hannibal battle, although he felt himself transfixed by the cutting clamors of his soldiers. That, too, was firmness of soul in Phocion, who—notwithstanding the victory which, against his opinion the Athenians reported of Cassander—after giving vent to his joy for their success, persevered in affirming, that still his own counsel would have been better.

And finally, all those have a just claim to be called constant, who, resisting the sway of those passions which assail the hearts of men with the greatest violence, remain unshaken in deliberations they have either publicly or privately established as best. Nor are we wanting in examples in point from history, among which we cannot forget that of *Esulte*, when in passing judgment upon the habits of *Demostratus*, he showed himself a more constant citizen to condemn the vice of the father, than compassionate lover to hear the intercession of the son. The example, too, of *Metellus Numidicus* is memorable. Rather than consent to the seditious laws of *Saturninus* he chose to deprive himself of his dignity and his country.

But let the Citizen take warning that all is not constancy which seems to bear its image, for sometimes a work may seem to be praiseworthy because it is lasting, although otherwise it cannot stand the test. As for example, *Thrasea* was steadfast to liberate *Antistius* from death contrary to the will of *Nero*, in as much as he felt that, says *Tacitus*, *Sueta firmitudine animi et ne gloria intercideret*: nor were they constant who executed the monarch's pleasure; "*pars ne principem objecisse invidiæ viderentur, plures numero tuti.*"(20)

And the excess of obstinacy, in consequence of perseverance, sometimes necessarily results from stability, but the rule of circumstances, as with the other virtues, is that which widely distinguishes one habit from the other. Nor will any one be found who will call *Caius Martius* constant with all the firmness he showed in despising the prayers of the Roman ambassadors, nor will one be found who will apply this epithet to *Cneus Piso* for condemning the innocent soldier to die only because he had decided he was guilty; but the first in persisting to make war against his country, and the second in his bold violation of justice, will be called headstrong by all men. The want of stability is shown in changing deliberations once decided upon without substantial reasons. An example in point seems to be furnished in *Cesennius Petus*, of whom *Tacitus* says: "*et eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, si Pato aut in suis aut in alienis consiliis constantia fuisset; verum ubi a*

*viris militaribus advereus urgentes casus firmatus erat, reversus ne aliena sententia indigens videretur, in diversa ac deteriora transibat."*(21)

Since therefore the passions which oppose the exercise of the noble virtue of constancy are numerous and exceedingly violent, our Citizen must valorously conquer them, and appreciating the infamy of being fickle through fear or cupidity, and the disgrace of being obstinate through ambition or stubbornness, he will conclude that to restrain himself within the limits of moderation, is one of the most important disciplines he can learn for the good of his country.

---

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE JUST, AND HOW.

THE general subject of Justice extends far beyond the scope of our treatise, and we shall therefore confine ourselves to those suggestions likely to throw some light on its necessity to our Citizen, and open the way for its acquisition by those who have only before dwelt upon its theory.

Its general definition is a habit of willing and doing what is right. Socrates defines political justice to be what the laws of the republic impose, and he cannot be a good citizen who does not regard them, nor be morally just whose life is not conformed to the principles of right. Says Eutidemo in Xenophon, no man can be a good citizen unless he be just. And as we said in the beginning, when the laws are observed through regard to the public good, it is called legal and universal justice, and it is that perfect virtue in whose operation Aristotle supposed public happiness principally to consist. When it comes into practice in the matter of honors or of any other desirable thing, it is termed distributive, and when it concerns the correction of contracts or the imposition of penalties, it is termed commutative.

In the practice of legal justice all those virtues are brought into exercise which the occasion may offer in contributing to the prosperity of the state, since actions that proceed from these virtues are enjoined by the laws. Hence they who perform them in obedience to those requisitions are said to be governed by the principle of legal and universal justice. It shuns any violation of ordinances, committing adultery, defrauding the revenue, and outraging citizens; it shows itself firm in battle, temperate in sensual indulgences, liberal in substance, and mild in vengeance.

That was a work of justice in Furius Camillus, who, although proclaimed Captain by the Roman squadrons, who had been levied to rebuke the insolence of the Gauls, would not listen to the word until he had been legitimately confirmed by the besieged in the Campidoglio. Quite another character we see displayed in Caius Flaminius, when, without having offered the sacrifices, or consulted the auguries according to the custom before armies put themselves in movement, rushed madly on to fight against Hannibal.

The principle of distributive justice is brought into operation in conferring dignities and rewards according to the merits of individuals, and in proper proportion, that the recompense may correspond with the pains taken, and be adapted to the person who receives it; as for example, something useful should be given to a person in a low condition—something honorable to the noble, more or less as they may each have merited.

In dividing the spoils and treasures taken from enemies in war, the Roman captains did not give the same portion to officers and to common soldiers; and they did not class the Centurion who performed the duties of Tribune, in the same grade with other officers, or confound the rank of the Tribune with that of a Legate, but both in magnitude and quality, they endeavored to adjust their awards to the merit and the dignity of the individual. The Senate, too, were governed by the same spirit in the triumphs they decreed to the Consuls, making them correspond with the magnificence of their victories. Thus when a triumph was decreed to Scipio, for his achieve-

ments in Africa, and the oration to Sentilus for what he had done in Spain, the Senate were governed by the principle of distributive justice, for they displayed a regard to the proportions of which we have spoken. And yet the same Senate seem to have violated this principle, when, without any just regard to the proportion of the merit to the reward, they decreed a triumph to Cornelius and Bebius, who, without *bearing* arms, had forced their armies among the Ligurian mountains. By equalling their reward with Scipio's, they were guilty of that extreme injustice which Cirillus says consists in giving the same reward to men of widely different merit.

In the operation of commutative justice, the *inequality* of contracts is corrected, and crimes are made to receive a corresponding penalty, not according to the proportion we have established in distributing justice, but so conformed to reason, that it results equally for both the contracting parties. In like manner, too, it adapts the punishment to the crime, with no other distinction than that sometimes the penalty is altered in persons of unequal condition, but never in unfair proportion.

The punishment the Romans inflicted upon Spurius Cassius, who aspired to be a tyrant, seems to have been meted out in harmony with this principle; for, without any regard to the splendor of his three consulates and two triumphs, and the glory they had shed upon his name, they brought him to trial and dealt out to him just punishment for his crime, as they would have sentenced the most ignoble citizen. We find, we think, an illustration of exactly the opposite principle in the judge who was deputed by Charles, King of Naples, to sentence Corradino, nephew of the Emperor Frederick; for, without reflecting that the same youth had been guilty of no other crime against the person of the French King, than fighting valorously with him to recover the state which he held, that rightfully belonged to him, he adjudged him worthy of death; hence, we can excuse Robert of Flanders, son-in-law of the same Charles, who immediately took vengeance for so outrageous a sentence. But the very same Roman Pontiff, although disobeyed by Corradino, could not but commend the propriety of the sentence. Since the law, however, which is made for all, cannot provide

for all in every case that may arise, it is the duty of the judge to provide for such exigencies himself, conforming his sentence to that which, in his opinion, the legislators of the same code would have themselves decided if they were present.

Under this aspect we contemplate equity, not as opposed to justice, but as furnishing rule of interpretation for the law where it seems to apply unjustly to the exigencies in hand, which did not occur to its framers.

Our Citizen will thus, from moral discipline, acquire with diligence the substance and the possession of the habit of justice. The reading of Hesiod will teach him the prosperity it will bring to the republic, and he will perceive the necessity of taking great pains in reducing the principle of justice to practice; for it is not enough that his theories be correct, he must make his life an illustration of them. "*Execute justice*," is the command of God, by which we are to understand that acts of genuine justice are done through love of justice itself; otherwise, although they may appear praiseworthy, they are destitute of the true spirit. And since, in the administration of justice to individuals, the mind of the judge may sometimes be swayed by passions that influence his personal feelings towards the litigants, he must utterly forget himself, and remember that Aristides being once reminded by a party on the trial, that he had often received repeated injuries from the other, replied: "What he may have done to me is not the question now; for I am here to award justice to your person and not to my own."

---

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CLEMENT, AND HOW.

WE may appropriately follow the discussion of Justice, which inflicts punishment, by some remarks upon Clemency which extends pardon. This is a matter full of interest to the Citizen,

and we wish to warn him against falling into the errors which so commonly prevail on this subject in republican states.

Mercy, says Sopatus Stobæus, is excluded from judgment. But let us see. Various definitions may be given of Clemency; but, in substance, it consists in that sentiment which inclines one in punishing crime to the more moderate penalty, and the proper medium cannot be departed from, without falling into the vice of cruelty on the one hand, or weakness on the other. But as we speak of that kind of clemency the Citizen of a republic should practise, let him first of all consider if in punishing a given crime, he must follow the letter of the law, or whether he is left to decide according to his own will; for if he be constituted the executor of the law, he cannot remit the penalty he prescribes without committing an act of injustice, which is inconsistent with clemency itself. "Mercy," Sopatus taught his brother, "which transcends justice, cannot be called mercy;" otherwise, one virtue would come in collision with another, which is directly opposed to all principles of moral philosophy.

Our Citizen then will adjudge the penalty the law prescribes, remembering that the executioner of the law is not master of it (as Gregory Nazianzen tells us in illustrating a similar subject), to decide as he pleases, and he will leave the question of clemency to the power that can exercise it in the state, whether that power be vested in magistrates or conventions of the people, to whom the ultimate appeal is made. It would, for example, have been more becoming in Torquatus to have appealed to the Roman republic to moderate the severity of the sentence he pronounced against his own son, than to have done it himself. But when, on the contrary, our Citizen is constituted arbitrary judge, he may exercise clemency in administering justice, on all proper occasions where it will not conflict with the public welfare.

When he is called to sentence a person who, under the influence of some powerful and honorable stimulus, has committed a capital offence, he will not be bound to exercise the same rigor in his decision as against a transgressor who could offer no shadow of excuse for his crime. The offence may

have been committed hastily, and without malicious intention, as was the case with Carinda, when he went armed into the public council, in violation of the very law he had himself established; and although, through his zeal for justice, he could not pardon this in himself, yet the arbitrary judge could, nevertheless, have commuted the sentence. As Sopatrus justly observes, he may have modified the austere voice of the law by the benign reason of equity. But when the crime has been committed with studied and consummate villany, the Citizen-judge cannot without public detriment, and consequently not without blame, diminish the merited penalty; and if he does do it, he deserves rather to be called cruel than merciful, for by saving one villain he establishes the precedent, that others may follow his example with impunity.

The republic of Rome was aware of the danger of such an example, when, for his complicated tyranny, it sentenced Manlius to be hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. Nor must the Citizen be afraid of incurring the reputation of severity, when he condemns an atrocious criminal; because severity is always a virtue, while compassion is sometimes a crime. The former, therefore, has a stronger league with clemency than the latter. Nor should the republican magistrate be hasty to remit those severities which render the death of the criminal more ignominious and intolerable, for it will not do to say it's enough for the culprit to die, when the manner of his death may have so much to do with the efficacy of the example it is designed to make. We have an illustration in the terrible death Tullus Hostilius executed upon the Dictator of the Albini, whose perfidy and baseness had brought injury upon the state. He ordered his limbs to be torn from his body. And if a prince could in any other way restrain people from committing crime, he certainly would not inflict torture upon one miserable man, but voluntarily absolve many altogether. He who possesses humanity should never punish the malefactor for his own sake, but, as Plato says, to deter others from crime. This is the reason assigned in Deuteronomy why the judge should not let the evil-doer escape, who bears false witness against his neighbor: "And the judges shall make diligent



inquisition, and behold if the witness be a false witness and has testified falsely against his brother, then ye shall dō unto him as he had thought to have done unto his brother."

If those tribunals which are so ready to show compassion to the vile, would remember that in letting one villain escape they are the immediate instruments of bringing evil directly upon many innocent persons, as Pythagoras says, they would confess themselves worthy of any other name in the world rather than merciful. Let the Citizen then beware of being deceived by the similitude of names. Let him not mistake severity for cruelty, or weakness for clemency, but esteem himself clement or severe, when motives of equity or public good call for a light or a heavy punishment. He will esteem that man weak or cruel when, without regard to either, he shall imitate the indulgence of Scipio towards the crimes of Pleminius, or the atrocity of the Carthaginians in the torments they inflicted upon Attilius Regulus. He who gives away the goods of others rather than his own cannot properly be called liberal, neither can he be called clement who takes away from the public its security, by showing compassion to a single individual; and whether he be an executor of the law or clothed with arbitrary power, let him remember he is a dispenser of the goods of others, and let him distribute them on just principles, following, in the one case, the letter of the law, and in the other conforming his will to the public good, waiting for the time to come when he can make a sacrifice himself without detriment to others. Then, with the most exalted praise, without confining himself within any prescribed limits, he may pardon injuries, remit punishments, repay kindnesses twofold, and make those magnificent demonstrations which only friends are wont to show towards each other. And if, in executing punishment for public injuries, he shall feel he is violating any of the principles of Christian charity, it will aid him to remember the declaration of Augustin, that to show mercy when punishment ought to be inflicted, is not *charity* but *infirmity*. If any one would maintain the opposite cause to win the reputation of benignity, let him remember the reply of Carlaus, King of Sparta, to one who praised him. "I should

not be a good man if I were not merciless towards villains." If he would console himself with the flattering idea of pity, let him remember that this sentiment is rather the attribute of a weak mind than proof of a brave heart; for clemency is shown, not because the judge is under the control of compassion, which, although in some respects highly praiseworthy in spite of the Stoics, yet in the judicial trial it should, if possible, be plucked up by the roots, for clemency can be practised and cruelty avoided without indulging pity. Let the Citizen, then, so conduct his tribunal as to remit the punishment which has not in equity been merited, rather than to pardon crime which ought in justice to be punished. He will thus without contradiction acquire the reputation of being a clement man, and win the good will of others without bringing evil upon his country.

---

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD EXERCISE THE VIRTUES HEROICALLY, AND HOW.

Thus far we have dwelt upon those cardinal virtues necessary to every Citizen who would do his best to make his country happy. In one who displays them in their utmost perfection they are called heroic virtues, and he who would render signal service to his country must be ardently inspired with a determination to practise them with a heroic spirit, fixing no limits to his lofty and noble deeds, remembering what Hesiod tells us, that heroes are called a divine race, demi-gods. The intrepidity of Horatius gave more renown to the Roman Republic than the strength of Themistocles to the Athenian State

## CHAPTER XXIX.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING AND PRESERVING  
THESE VIRTUES.

ON the subject of acquiring and preserving the virtues enumerated, I have already spoken of the necessity of first understanding, from the works of moral philosophers, what they are, and then putting them so frequently into practice as to reduce them to habits. The secret of preserving them lies in bringing them into continual requisition.

As the end of life is the beginning of death, so to stop in the path of virtue is to begin a career of vice. And we will also say that what we have written on this matter has not been to explain, either superficially or profoundly, what may be learned from virtue and vice, but for the sake of bringing the Citizen to the fountains to draw for himself; for although we have necessarily dwelt longer upon some of the virtues than upon the rest, yet our intention in all has been rather to persuade the Citizen to practise them, than to show in what their essence consists; for we are aware that this is not the place to indulge in metaphysical subtleties and distinctions, nor would our learning suffice for such a task.

We shall touch lightly upon some other habits and passions which may still be exercised to the advantage or detriment of the republic, when we come to speak of the moral regimen the Citizen must adopt in governing his life.

## CHAPTER XXX.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURAL ADVANTAGES AND THOSE OF  
FORTUNE, AND THEIR NECESSITY TO THE CITIZEN.

THE order in which we proposed to treat this subject requires us now briefly to consider some of those particular

advantages of nature and fortune, which we have mentioned as necessary to the good Citizen in reducing to practice the moral virtues.

To commence then with the first, he must take great pains to preserve his bodily health when it is good, and improve it as far as possible when it has suffered. And as in both these studies the rules of physicians are more in point than the prescriptions of philosophers, we shall only remark in general that it seems to us great temperance should be observed in eating and drinking, and moderation in all the sensual pleasures, for infirmities and diseases are generally caused by violating these simple rules—

“ Ut Venus enervat vires sic copia vini,  
Et tentat gressus debilitatque pedes.”(22)

Hence his food should be ordinary in quality, and moderate in quantity. He should learn to subdue the appetites, and make them subservient only to the purposes of virtue, for no progress in virtue can be made by the man who surrenders himself up to sensual gratifications. He must eat and drink more to supply the necessities of nature than to please the palate, for these necessities can be easily supplied, while the clamors of lust are unlimited and unceasing. Thus we find in ancient times so many monstrous decoctions for the palate, and would to God they were forgotten in our own days. But he who would preserve his physical power must absolutely restrain his lusts and appetites. This is clearly and forcibly illustrated by Gorgia Lontino, who, on being asked what regimen contributed most to long life, answered, “ The rule is never to eat or do anything from the mere impulse of pleasure.” Plutarch says the same thing, “ Guard against stuffing the belly, or wasting the strength in licentiousness.” Socrates too taught the same principle when he warned his disciples against tables which tempt one to eat and to drink when he has neither hunger nor thirst. But in addition to temperance in these things, it is necessary to be moderate in sleep. One of the aphorisms of Hippocrates says: “ *Eating, drinking, sleeping,*

*and the pleasures of Venus, must be indulged in with great moderation."*

In Homer, Nestor comes to Agamemnon in a dream, and finding him sleeping in his tent, tells him that a man to whom great affairs are committed should not sleep all night. Plato, too, in the third book of his *Laws*, speaks on the same subject. Moderate exercise is also indispensable; its bounds seem to have been fixed by Socrates—"Exercise till the mind feels delight in reposing from the fatigue."

As to the acquisition of health, which has either been infirm by nature or impaired by accident, we remember only the saying of Xenophon, preserved by Socrates, that he who has a weak constitution becomes stronger by manual exercise than a robust man without it, and for the rest we refer to those remedies which, according to the nature of the malady, shall be prescribed by the professors of the healing art. But he will take care to expose to his physician all his physical tendencies and peculiarities, that he may administer to the particular nature of the case.

In regard to physicians themselves we cannot refrain from saying that we are infinitely more inclined towards those who are disposed to aid nature, than those who use violent means to overcome her own offices; and when we can seek for health by adopting for a long space of time the remedies of a guarded diet, we should never have recourse to violent medicines.

---

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD POSSESS A ROBUST PERSON.

A BODY free from disease is not enough, for often delicacy of health unfits the Citizen for all public service. He should therefore not only preserve his health, but promote his vigor, robustness, agility, dexterity, and velocity, with all those

qualities that may render him better able to sustain every sort of corporeal fatigue in the service of the republic.

These qualities can be acquired by different modes of exercise, as running, leaping, wrestling, riding, hunting, heaving the bar, fencing, walking, exposure to the sun and to frosts, winds, and rains, the perils of navigation, the fatigues of excursions, and, in a word, every labor and exposure which can harden and invigorate the limbs and render them flexible. He will gain a perfect knowledge of these matters from the professors of the gymnastic art, and he will learn the use of such accomplishments in the history of many illustrious men among the Greeks and Romans, who devoted their persons gloriously to their country in times of public emergency.

We ought to warn the Citizen, however, on this point not to pass the limits of just moderation, otherwise the very exercise designed to invigorate the body may utterly destroy it. And we protest that under the name of leaping we have not designed to embrace *dancing*, which serves rather to render the mind weak and effeminate than to make the body active and sprightly, as those dances seem to have been which Aristotle tells us were reproved in Callipides, and others, who in going through them minced like prostitutes in the streets. Gregory Nazianzen, in a canzone, calls them the trippings of effeminate boys, who never had a manly movement. But if he would practise some sort of dance to render himself more active of limb, let him adopt that of which the philosopher speaks in the same place with approval, which perhaps was the same Socrates adopted (as Xenophon tells us), as a useful exercise; and we believe these dances consisted principally in a manly exercise, which, by bringing all the physical powers into requisition, promoted agility and sprightliness. And we doubt not they were similar to those of the Tuscans, of which Livy says, "*haud indecoros motus more Tusco dabant.*"(23)

## CHAPTER XXXII.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD PROMOTE AND PRESERVE PHYSICAL BEAUTY.

PHYSICAL beauty, which we class among the desirable endowments of nature, consists principally in an imposing dignity of form, and a fine proportion of parts, and it lays its possessor under obligation to perform deeds of valor, as Virgil says : "*Hunc decus ægregium forma movet.*"(24)

Such an endowment cannot but be useful to the republican Citizen ; and those who possess it should study to preserve it with the preservation of their health, while those who have it not may in some measure acquire it by the proper use of other corporeal gifts, with which, says Aristotle, it sustains a necessary relation. By youthful beauty, he seems to understand a body trained to the fatigues of running and violent exercise : in full grown men, it consists in being disciplined to sustain the fatigues of war and battles : and in old men, an ability to support unavoidable burdens, and remain free from the defects which disfigure old age.

If, too, in addition to these personal beauties, the virtues of the soul shine out, the eyes of all beholders are charmed ; for such is the enchanting power of virtue. Men, indeed, bestow little thought upon harmony or beauty of person. The limping of Agesilaus, King of Sparta, and the deformity of Philopemines, Captain of the Achaian league, offended very little those who contemplated their noble characters. It is not impossible even, that such defects in great men, like shadows in painting, serve to bring the beauties of the mind into more perfect relief. It is still true, however, that the valor of Euryalus pleased the more for the contrary reason.

*Tutatur favor Euryalum, lachrymæque decoræ,  
Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus.*(25)

We may therefore conclude that words spoken with eloquence, and works performed with virtue, by one who is endowed with personal beauty, inasmuch as the first fall more sweetly

upon the ear of the hearer, and the second more gratefully touch the feelings, may, under many circumstances, afford opportunities of rendering signal services to the republic. And could we make the body of our Citizen as beautiful as we would have his mind splendid, we should feel we had rendered him no slight aid in the noble design of advancing the prosperity of the country.

---

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE NOBLE.

BESIDES these endowments of nature, it is often necessary to bring into exercise those virtues which are supposed to depend in some measure upon fortune; and as Nobility may be reckoned among the number, we shall briefly illustrate it, that the reader may understand how it can be made to contribute to the good of the republic.

We make its definition to consist in some peculiar sign or mark of honor, by which one citizen is distinguished from the mass, either through the splendor of his ancestry or his own virtue. Men of an illustrious family, or those who have distinguished themselves, are called noble; by which we mean, publicly distinguished: those who are such for both these reasons are called undegenerate men. That nobility is properly called a gift of fortune, which comes from any other cause than one's own virtue; and accidentally, that which proceeds from good qualities of mind, since science is in some measure dependent upon the will of him on whom the splendor of nobility is conferred. Nobility which shines either in its own light, or in union also with that of one's ancestors, can, without doubt, render the Citizen great facilities in serving the republic; but when he has no other nobility than that of his ancestors, it will be of very little use to him.



Electors of magistrates should never give their suffrages to a man because he comes of noble blood, in preference to others whose virtue has raised them above the obscurity of their origin, for this would be a violation of the principles of distributive justice and the spirit that should reign in every well ordered republic. This spirit ought not to allow any other inequality to exist between citizens in the bestowment of honors, but that which comes either from their being more courageous, or having rendered greater service to their country.

We would not, however, deny, that on certain occasions it is well to show great esteem to citizens who are descended from those who have done some notable good to the republic, when, without having incurred any positive dishonor, they have yet never distinguished themselves. But all this should be regulated by those principles of distributive justice upon which we have already dwelt, which will award the palm to one who has performed illustrious deeds, in preference to any nobility of blood under heaven; and particularly, when the ancestors of such a citizen distinguished themselves equally for heroic service to the republic.

He who is not descended from an illustrious family ought to shine by the light of his own virtue; and he who springs from an honored race should guard against degenerating: for in this manner both may be directly elevated to those civil dignities, by which, when they are bestowed upon great men, the state receives its greatest advantage. But since being born of *very* aristocratic blood sometimes begets a spirit of vanity and pride, which cannot but prove baneful to the republic, the man who would be a good Citizen must crush such a spirit by frequent inculcations of high moral virtue; and when he feels tempted to pride himself upon his descent from certain ancestors, what they said and what they did, let him remember the reply of Isocrates to the descendant of Armodius, when he reproached him for his ignoble race: "You," said he, "are nearer related to that magnanimous man by imitating his virtue, than another could be who was nearer of kin." Let him remember, too, that no nobility can be so pure, nor plebeianism so simple, as not to be subjected, in some manner, to the saying of Plato,

viz : " There is no king who has not sprung from a servant, nor a servant who has not sprung from a king."

We conclude by quoting the words of Seneca: *Non fecit nobilem artium plenum fumosis imaginibus: nemo in nostram gloriam vixit: nec quod ante nos fuit nostrum est: animus facit nobilem; cui ex quacunque conditione supra fortunam licet surgere*(26)—that through these considerations he may learn to escape the common contagion of the nobility, which Sallust calls *contemptor animus et superbia*.(27) Let him regard the glory of illustrious ancestors as a lamp for their descendants, which only embellishes their virtues, or hides their defects; emulating zealously the one, and as carefully avoiding the other. This light which shines from the noble lives of his ancestors, will reveal in him the same pure image reflected from them—a character worthy of their fame.

---

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE RICH.

A PRINCIPAL place among the gifts of fortune must be assigned to Wealth, for the Citizen must be rich if he would practise liberality and magnificence, and sustain his public character with becoming dignity.

Although Aristides and Phocion, in the Athenian state, and Fabricius and Curius, in Rome, performed illustrious deeds without it, yet the diversity of times and opinions gives less place to heroic poverty in modern than ancient republics. For the men of those times, with no other rule than moral philosophy, often passed far purer and nobler judgments in these matters than we do ourselves, with all the light of a true religion, under whose guidance, if the fault were not ours, we should have surpassed them immeasurably in opinions and in deeds. But while we have a purer religion, they had a purer

philosophy. Poverty, says Plato, besides making men vagrant, often renders them depraved. Greater virtues, says Seneca, can be exercised with wealth than with poverty. The Citizen should endeavor to acquire wealth, if he has it not; and if he inherits it, he should preserve it for the public service: for if he seek only his own glory, poverty, magnanimously sustained, being more difficult to practise, would, without question, display a higher character. This, we suppose, Aristides wished to inculcate, when tempted by Callia to accept a large sum of money: in refusing it, he said, "It is very easy to find many who use their riches well, but difficult to find one who can support poverty with greatness of soul."

His wealth should consist in a supply of money, magnificence of houses, and abundance of possessions. His resources should be derived from estates within the bounds of his own republic, if the nature of the country will allow; if not, they should, at least, be under the jurisdiction of one who cannot, by injuring him, plot against the liberty of his country.

Pursuits for acquiring wealth must be just; otherwise obtained, even the Pagans taught, they could not endure. "He who has acquired his wealth unjustly," says Hesiod, "cannot enjoy it long." These are the conditions God has joined to ill-gotten wealth. The means employed should be perfectly honorable, and above all others we place the cultivation of the earth; next commerce, and those exchanges of money which are generally in free cities in the hands of the nobles, and which may be exercised without any unworthy means. The end contemplated should not only be to enrich oneself, but to have the means of affording aid to others. And finally the limits of all monetary speculations should be more or less extended, as one may be disposed to scatter wealth with greater or less largeness of mind. Let him seek those investments which give the largest circulation to his capital; his wealth will thus make him a benefactor of his fellow men—while the miser is justly regarded as a robber of the state. All he gains is not only in most instances tainted with crime, but kept out of the hands of those who would make it instrumental of general good.

But let not the Citizen become so absorbed in the pursuit of

wealth, as to leave no time for the administration of important civil affairs; for he cannot be prepared to discharge his duty to his country, without bestowing patient reflection upon the wants of the government of the republic. It will hardly be necessary to enumerate the vicious passions to which the favorites of fortune are so generally exposed. Those who become very rich are generally proud and overbearing, and act as though they were masters of everything; in as much as they can purchase everything with their own money. They are delicate in their mode of living, to make a display of their felicity—arrogant in opinions, because they see many have need of them—like one who is better supplied with money than brains—impatient of the rule of others, and if their riches are newly acquired, says Aristotle, they are the worst of the whole class. Dante perhaps had them in his eye when in replying to Jacopo Rusticucci, he exclaims against his city:

La gente nuova, e i subiti guadagni,  
Orgoglio e dismisura han generata,  
Fiorenza, in te, sicché tu già ten piagni.(28)

In Aristophanes, Cremilus tells us, these people are insatiable above all, and complete cowards, and another poet adds, that they forget that they touch the earth with their feet, and are begotten of mortal sires—they would thunder with Jove and even sit at his table. But the greatest misery of all is, that they stand in greater need of luxuries than beggars of bread.—Horace says of them: *Exilis domus est, ubi non et plura supersunt*;(29) and the solitudes and anxieties they sustain in continually heaping and hoarding up, show very clearly, that after all they are even in their own opinions anything but rich, for Aristotle declares, that being rich, consists more in using than in having money. The admonitions of the poet ought to have convinced Apolophanes, that he was not rich. *Every one says, thou art rich, but I say thou art poor; for the use, O Apolophanes, is the evidence of wealth.*

Let the Citizen then arm himself invulnerably against all these passions, with the shield of universal justice which harmonizes so perfectly with all the virtues, that it disdains not the aid of

anything necessary to guard it from temptation. Wealth is valuable chiefly as an instrument for the development of the moral virtues, which frequently without its aid are hindered from being put into practice. Aside from this great advantage he will put no higher estimate upon money than Beltramone del Balzo, when refusing the balance presented to him by Charles of Anjou, for dividing the treasure of Manfred of Suavia, he made the distribution required, by putting his foot instead of the weights into the scales.

We have not space to speak of the host of generous men who have felt the same maguanimous contempt for money. It will be remembered that Pindar, who was quite as much enticed by riches as Simonides, never praises them in his verses, nor esteems them great or powerful, except when they are controlled by virtue, or accompanied with wisdom. And finally, since the possessor cannot hoard up a large treasure without subjecting the mind to its domiunion, he will do wisely, who remembering the name the Greeks applied to money (*viz. use*), shall from time to time devote his wealth to those purposes for which it was acquired. He will thus be delivered from the burden which almost always weighs upon those who are not unusually fortified by habits of virtue. But let him not do this with prodigality or blindness, but give and spend on all proper occasions; which at almost every step occur to the man who does not seek to shun them. The advice we give in this matter is the same Pindar himself followed, who after saying in one ode, that the same wisdom presupposes gain, adds in another, that he did not wish to keep a large treasure hidden in his house, but to enjoy his wealth and acquire a good name by using it to aid the necessities of his friends. In these two odes, if we are not deceived, the poet shows the danger that even wise men incur, of becoming too fond of money, and the proper remedy for securing themselves against it. But, since he who is adorned with the virtue of liberality does not stand in so much need of those and other remedies, we do not insist upon our Citizen being rich. Plato seems to have desired in his Republic neither the rich nor the poor; for with the safeguard of moral virtue we have always presupposed in the Citizen, it seems

to us that little is to be apprehended from the dangers of wealth or poverty ; although their dangers ought to be known by those who are not provided with those habits and principles necessary to overcome such temptations. And for the rest which we have left unsaid, we refer to the fourth book of Plato's Republic.

---

## CHAPTER XXXV.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD HAVE A GOOD NAME AMONG THE PEOPLE.

THE enjoyment of a *fair name* among one's fellow-citizens we also class among the good things of fortune. It consists in being thought endowed with that virtue, and possessed of those good things which all men, or at least the best men, desire to possess. This is the good name which, says the wise man in the Proverbs, is worth more than riches, and the Citizen should endeavor to acquire it by all honorable means whenever an opportunity arises. The opinions of men, says Thucydides, are founded upon the reports they hear. And this is so true that even enemies themselves do not attempt to assail their adversaries when they hear their virtues proclaimed by the voice of the people.

Cato the Younger had such power over the minds of his enemies, through his reputation for truth, that the advocates of Murena were forced to believe him, when demanded by them if for that day he would prosecute the accusation, he answered he would not. Our Citizen should then, not for himself but to serve his country, endeavor to gain the reputation of possessing all those virtues which can contribute to render the republic prosperous, that he may be exalted to that eminence which will afford him occasion for their display in the public service whenever the necessity may arise.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

## HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD SEEK TO BE HONORED.

THE Citizen who would render his republic happy should also be honored by his fellow-men, and as this depends more on the will of those who hold the honor to be conferred than him who receives it, we may reckon it, too, among the blessings of fortune. But each one, however, may in some measure decide this matter himself, by displaying those qualities which are almost as certain to insure it as the shadow is to follow the body. I speak, it will be understood of course, of those moral and intellectual virtues in our power to acquire by moral discipline and practice, the chief of which consists in conferring good upon others. It rarely happens that one who is known to possess such a character is not greeted with marks of honor, although he may not court it; and these tokens of respect once conferred by those upon whose minds his noble qualities have been impressed, not only diffuse light over the republic, but are more easily brought into requisition for the public service when important crises arise.

Honors conferred by the ancients upon their good men were of a great variety; verses of poets, and eulogiums of orators, gifts of the republic, public maintenance, public presidencies, exemptions from taxes, statues and tombs, and above all, those national demonstrations of veneration and regard, which were extended beyond the condition of men, as seem to have been the sacrifices instituted by all Greece in return for the liberty they had regained through Titus Flaminius, and the annual victims immolated by the Amphipolitans to the memory of Brasidas, leader of the Lacedemonians. But there are few in our times who reach such honors, and it is not desirable that any should attain them, for those who are honored by public magnificence bear the character rather of having served the state than of being called to serve it again. Those marks of respect the Citizen should now seek for, are demonstrations

from private persons who represent the public sentiment, and bear their testimony to his qualifications, which may serve to his advantage when public events demand his aid.

These tokens of respect more frequently consist in those acts of reverence in the countenances and words which are almost necessarily shown towards those, who by their virtues or their judgment are advanced above their fellow-men; hence, says Theophrastus, they are not to be sought for by means of favors or friendships, but they must be won because they have been merited by integrity of life. The honor shown privately to our Citizen will inspire him to devote himself to the republic, and that which is decreed to him by the commonwealth will exalt him while it illustrates the state. The aid and the light he gives will contribute to render the republic happy, which was the final end we proposed the good Citizen should have in view in the exercise of virtue, and the use of his gifts of fortune.

---

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD HAVE CHILDREN.

A NUMEROUS and a virtuous offspring, which we also class among the blessings of fortune we have enumerated, was judged by ancient legislators of such essential advantage to the state, that they went so far as to reward fruitfulness and punish barrenness for the general good. And although for less worthy reasons this policy is generally abandoned in our times, yet the Citizen who is a true lover of his country, should study to sustain it by those props which will be esteemed the strongest he can furnish, and as these are his own children, he should endeavor to rear a large family.

The priest (says Geroeles in Stobæus) is bound to give a priest to the state, the magistrate a magistrate, the orator an



orator; so the Citizen is bound to give to the state citizens who shall successively come to the administration of its public affairs. The code of Lycurgus branded with the stamp of infamy those who entered not into the married state. And Cato the Elder, on being asked by his son why he had introduced a step-mother into his house, replied, "that I may leave more citizens to the republic." Epaminondas was content to leave for his child the victory of Leuctra, but he seems to have proposed for his object his own personal honor, rather than the public utility. Those who are not deterred from matrimony by some peculiar reason, ought to marry out of regard to the public good. In choosing a wife, after consulting her respectability and virtuous habits, he should take care that she be not too young, that her offspring may be robust. She should have fair features, a proper proportion of form, and a strong constitution. In regard to the arrangements of his married life he should consult circumstances, and so adapt himself to her condition that she may become the mother of a numerous and robust family.

In making a good choice in a wife, and in regulating his intercourse with her, he should be governed more by the principles of morals and philosophy, rather than by appetite and sense. Hesiod thinks one should not marry till the age of thirty, or thereabouts, and Plato agrees with him, fixing the time at thirty or thirty-five. But without fixing any exact limit, we would say that so much regard should be paid to the age, that the father may not only live to see his sons become men, but in some measure companions and aids in his public life. The prayer of Tibullus in favor of Messala seems *à-propos* to this subject—

" At tibi succrescat proles, quæ facta parentis,  
Augeat et circa stet veneranda senem."(30)

Although he takes cover under the pretence of the reasons we have mentioned, we suspect it was under the stimulus of incontinence that Cato married himself (the second time) to an ignoble woman, of almost a decrepid age; for granted that he might hope still to beget children, he ought to have known

that he could not have had time to educate them as he should have done, that they might have become useful citizens of the republic. Our suspicion is greatly confirmed too by the desire he had of destroying the scandal brought upon his son and his daughter-in-law, by his bringing into his house a woman of the world. We wish, however, to say this without prejudice to that noble Citizen. For although he could sustain probably no parallel in moral virtue with Cato the Younger, yet he was otherwise a great luminary of modesty, and a brilliant ornament to the Roman state.

Mothers themselves ought to be the nurses of their own children.\* But since this custom has given way in our times with many others to a different usage, at least great diligence should be observed in procuring healthy, young, and

---

\* I cannot, in my admiration of this noble sentiment, forbear quoting a portion of that beautiful picture Bancroft has drawn of the primitive life of the American Indians :

“How helpless the Indian infant, born without shelter, amidst storms and ice! But fear nothing for him! God has placed near him a guardian angel, that can trample over the severities of nature; the sentiment of maternity is by his side, and so long as his mother breathes, he is safe. The squaw loves her child with instinctive passion; and if she does not manifest it by lively caresses, her tenderness is real, wakeful, and constant *No savage mother ever trusted her babe to a hireling nurse.* No savage mother ever put away her own child, to suckle that of another. To the cradle, consisting of thin pieces of light wood, and gaily ornamented with quills of the porcupine, and beads, and rattles, the nursling is firmly attached, and carefully wrapped in furs; and the infant thus swathed, its back to the mother's back, is borne as the topmost burden—its dark eyes now cheerfully flashing light, now accompanying with tears the wailings which the plaintive melodies of the carrier cannot hush. Or, while the squaw toils in the field, she hangs her child, as spring does its blossoms, on the boughs of a tree, that it may be rocked by the breezes from the land of souls, and soothed to sleep by the lullaby of the birds. Does the mother die, the nursling—such is Indian compassion—shares her grave.”

virtuous nurses, for there is no question their physical and moral qualities, be they good or bad, are easily communicated to infants through the milk they suck.

Particular attention should be paid to the *exercise* of children, that their limbs may become strong, to prepare them to sustain those fatigues they will be called to endure in the service of the state. With this design we would recommend parents not to accustom children to have the head covered, nor to be particularly careful to shun exposure to the extremes of heat and cold, since such exposure renders them infinitely more robust to endure the fatigues of war than they can ever become if they are brought up delicately, and taught to shun the sun and the winds with as much care as if they were made of paste. Herodotus tells us that he observed the effects of the two different modes of bringing up children practised by the Egyptians and the Persians, for among the bodies he examined left dead on the field after a battle between these two nations, the Persians' heads were more easily cut open. And Lycurgus, who was a grand master in this art, among many beautiful precepts he lays down for the education of children, adjures expressly all those delicacies which enfeeble the body and effeminate the mind.

But in educating the minds of their children, fathers are to take great pains in the tender season of youth, when impressions the most permanent and powerful are excited, to instil pure moral principles, which are so essential to prepare their children for the duties of civil life. After establishing their minds in the principles of religion, without which no foundation can exist for the edifice we would raise, the good Citizen will do well to bring up his children according to the rules we have laid down in this work. Adapting them to their age and capacity by the practice of the virtues and civil sciences, they will gradually be fitted for conducting the affairs of the republic when the proper time arrives for them to be called to their administration.

Above all, he must follow the instructions of the Spartan Legislator, and teach them the art of obeying and of governing,

so highly esteemed by the Lacedemonians, that Agesilaus besought Cenophon to send his sons to Sparta to learn it, as the most beautiful acquisition that could be made in the world.

But since the teachings of example are more powerful than anything else, the father must always illustrate in his own life, those things he would teach his son. The education of youth, says Plato, is not what they are taught in theory, but what they learn from the example and life of their teachers. He who sets a bad example before one he wishes to instruct, cannot expect any other result than that of which the Roman orator speaks in the son of Cneius Verres:—“*Quid ex eo boni sperari, atque effici potest, qui in patris luxurie sic vixerit, ut nullum unquam pudicum, neque sobrium convivium viderit?*” (31)

And that he may be able to educate his son with the greatest diligence, he should bring him up to practise some one of the professions most useful to the republic; for all those who have given laws for the government of youth, Plato among others, when consulted in person by Lysimachus, declared this to be above all things the most important. Lycurgus himself judged it of so much consequence to the state, that to secure its being done with the greatest rigor in the city of Sparta, he took away the children from the indulgence of their fathers, and committed them to the severer discipline of the republic. And this was without doubt the principal reason why the Lacedemonians flourished longer and more gloriously in all the arts of peace and war, than any other free people in the entire history of the world.

---

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD POSSESS CIVIL POWER.

CIVIL power, which we also class among the blessings of fortune, may be of great help to the Citizen in aggrandizing the

republic; but in him who is not armed with extraordinary virtue, it generally produces a very different effect.

By civil power we understand all those accidents of parentage, friendship, estates, public services, offices or privileges, which render men powerful in the state. If the will of a man thus favored by fortune, is controlled by the restraints of modesty and the dictates of reason, it is impossible to tell how many advantages, both by the persuasion of words and the efficacy of example, may redound to the state.

Pompey would have given a striking example of this, since he did not lack followers to sustain the republic, had he had firmness of purpose to refuse giving an untimely battle to Cæsar; for although he was perhaps at heart no better man than his enemy, yet the colors he showed and the people who followed him, had the *appearance* at least of the Citizens of a Republic; and he would have wielded a strong arm in battle, although we know not how he would have used his victory. But aside from such examples, which will not be considered applicable to modern republics, it will sufficiently answer our design to remind the Citizen that, if in an honorable way, he can attach to himself persons of all ranks, subject to his inclinations in political affairs, he will be able, when feuds arise between tyrant and tyrant, to sustain more powerfully the interests of the republic than even Cato himself could do with all his intrepidity. For when he heard one part of the citizens swear in the name of Cæsar, and the rest in the name of Pompey, he stood almost alone, and summoned in vain the beastly rabble to fly to the standards of Roman liberty.

We wish, however, to warn the reader that under the term "civil power," we do not comprehend an influence over those gangs of desperate fellows, who, in a city or its suburbs, foment difficulty through base motives, for they are to be abominated above all other classes; and those who maintain them ought to be considered enemies of the republic, and held responsible for all their evil deeds, although they may be done without the knowledge of their patrons. Nor do we even comprehend those combinations of men, who, in consequence either of being obliged to favor the designs of their companions against

the public good, or a desire not to oppose their will, join in any conspiracy or movement of disunion. Such men, says Plutarch, were shunned by Aristides in the Athenian republic. But we embrace those and those only from whom in consequence of their being established in virtue, or known to be estimable people, neither danger may be feared. And as the civil power of the Citizen may sometimes, even without his fault, become the object of suspicion to his fellow men, he will take noble and friendly counsel, and by prudence and mild measures so dispel it that the people may have their confidence in him restored, and his readiness to give up his control over the public will at the same time show that, in the midst of his power, his motives were pure. Such was the spirit of Publius Valerius, who was concerned with Junius Brutus in expelling the Tarquins from Rome. The height of the palace he erected on Mount Velia, caused him to become the object of suspicion to the people of Rome; he transported the edifice from the top to the bottom of the hill with those noble words: "*Non obstabunt P. Valerii; aedes libertati vestrae, Quirites; tuta erit vobis Velia; deferam non in planum modo aedes, sed colli etiam subjiciam, ut vos supra suspectum me civem habitatis; in Velia aedificent, quibus melius quam P. Valerio, creditur libertas.*"(32) Scipio Africanus was inspired by the same spirit in the exile he voluntarily made from his country when the excess of his political power began to weigh heavily upon Rome. Seneca tells us that he said:—" *Nihil volo derogare legibus, nihil institutis; æquum inter omnes cives jus sit; utere sine me beneficio meo patria; causa tibi libertatis fui, ero et argumentum. Ezeo si, plus quam tibi expedit, crevi.*"(33) In this manner, without doubt, he made a more illustrious display of his modesty and his piety, when he abandoned his country, than when he defended it. Things had reached such an extreme, that by staying in Rome, either liberty must injure Scipio, or Scipio liberty; the magnanimous man wished neither the one nor the other, but banishing himself from his country, he succeeded in making the republic ashamed of their suspicion, at the same time he escaped the severity of its judges.

But since the means by which Political power is acquired very frequently generate suspicion of tyranny in the minds of

citizens, he should exercise it with great discretion, and all he can do in this matter without making public, he should endeavor to keep from general observation. Nor should he allow himself to be deceived about this matter by the course Cimon took in the Athenian Republic—since the public conviction in his integrity, his open profession of taking the part of the nobility clearly proved, as Plutarch says, that if he spread a table for all who visited him, and dressed poor old men in the garments of his servants, if he distributed money to all who were in want, and broke down the hedges of his farm, that every one might come and gather its fruits, yet this was with no design of corrupting the people, nor of paving the way to tyranny, but the effect of natural benignity of soul, under whose stimulus he could not have done otherwise.

Since this same benignity is, ordinarily speaking, neither sufficiently known nor confided in, our Citizen, as long as he does not enjoy the reputation of Cimon, will take greater care and caution than he was compelled to observe. And if among other strokes of policy he practises that recommended, says Plutarch, by Polybius to Scipio Africanus, never to leave the Public Square without acquiring some new friendship, it will perhaps greatly contribute to his design and he will gain by his amiable conversation what the Athenian purchased with the variety of his magnificence.

But since on the other hand, powerful men are accustomed, as we hinted in the beginning, to be guilty of many extravagances (*Opibus nimis ad injuriam minorum elati*(34), says Tacitus, in speaking of this class), and besides resembling rich men in this respect, sometimes incur the additional quality of injuring those who oppose them, and become even still more overbearing, so, just in proportion as our Citizen increases in adherents and followers, should he be solicitous to fortify himself against those temptations, by the exercise of the moral virtues and the love of political equality; for they are directly at war with immoderate power. Hence, Thucydides says, that the outlaws of Samos who abhorred the popular state the Athenians had established in their Island, leagued themselves with the most powerful persons in it for the overthrow of the government.

If his public services shall elevate him above his fellow men, in his amenability to the laws, he will remember that even Timoleon himself, who with so much glory gave liberty to the Syracusans, wished however with brave moderation to reply before the Tribunals according to the form of the laws, to the calumnies pronounced against him by two vile fellows; nor could the acclamations of the better part of the people prevent him from making this noble display of generous modesty. And it seems to us that in this affair he was more solicitous by far for the liberty of Syracuse and his own honor, than when, with the valor of a free hand, he delivered that people from the violence of tyranny.

Finally, as seditions in the State take their origin, as Aristotle says, from ambition for honors, in which strife only the great mingle, our Citizen, to ward off those dangers, must, in proportion as his fame and influence increase, diminish his effort to equal or surpass those in dignity whom he seems to equal or excel in influence. Such an one, said Socrates to Demonicus, is influenced by a love for the equal distribution of justice, not through weakness, but virtue of character. And such magnanimity being a virtue, cannot repudiate from itself any action which proceeds from virtue, as without a question it must be to maintain union among the citizens of a republic.

---

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD HAVE FRIENDS.

Among all the blessings of fortune, the greatest and the dearest is that of Friendship. And although this is pre-supposed to exist, perhaps, in the number of qualities which constitute political influence, yet the greatness of its dignity and the importance of its exercise demand that we still say something of it more particularly.

We here speak only of that friendship which subsists



between good men, and takes its origin from virtue, which is that mutual and candid benevolence that is founded on esteem and sustained by affection. Considering, too, how beautiful and honorable it is, he will labor for the good of his country whenever he perceives an opportunity in the administration of civil affairs. We believe Cleon of Athens practised no hypocrisy when, in entering upon his administration, he protested to all his friends that, for the time, he renounced their friendship, that he might be able to follow a just course in his government of the republic.\* We remember Isocrates advises

---

\* There is a sublimity in many of the principles of this work, which must command the admiration of all public men of all parties, however little regard they may pay to them. In our country the enormous struggle for power can be accounted for better by the struggle for place and the love of office, than in any other way. Those who contribute most powerfully to the triumph of a party, feel they have the strongest claims for the highest and best offices; and instances almost innumerable exist, in which such men have changed their party when they failed in their demands. No surer or quicker road to national ruin could be invented, than the encouragement of such a spirit. We have already reached such a pass, that a whole State file off under their leaders, and attempt to effect the downfall of an administration which will not receive their dictation in regard to the man the President chooses for some high trust—although that President and that administration may faithfully adhere to all the great principles whose triumph carried them into power. We once heard a beautiful anecdote of Jefferson, touching this point: A gentleman applied to him for an appointment as minister to a foreign Court—"I do not esteem you qualified for that post," was the President's reply. "But," said the applicant, not a little indignant that this point should be raised; "But, Mr. President, you know you never could have been elected but for me." "All this may be true, sir," rejoined Mr. Jefferson, "but I could not preserve even *your* respect one moment if I should do an act which showed I loved you better than the country." To the praise of Jefferson be it said, he immediately conferred the office in question upon one who had taken no active part in his election, and he chose the best man

one not to choose friends amongst "those with whom thou hast sweetly conversed, but those with whom thou canst best govern the state." Aristotle complains that legislators, in securing concord in the state, seem to understand better how to make men friends, than to make them just. Diomede (in Homer) seems to have alluded to the utility of friendship, when, in offering to penetrate the camp of the enemy to spy out their counsels, he asked to have Ulysses given him for a companion, saying that with him he could pass unharmed even through the flames. We have another example of this thought in Epaminondas and Pelopidas, who, in the bonds of friendship, leagued themselves together for the benefit of the republic of Thebes.

Since, then, in his public life the Citizen can derive so great an advantage from friendship, he should feel no little solicitude to gain those friends who will render their aid in times of necessity. And, above all, he should beware in this matter and consult his judgment and not his impulses; "*cum judicaveris,*" says the same Roman, "*diligere oportet, non cum dilexeris judicare.*" (35) For if he begin to form attachments before his judgment is matured, he may easily be deceived in his choice, which should be made without passion, that his friendship may be lasting and useful to the state. He should by all means select persons who are pure in every sense, otherwise he will incur the danger, by long associations, particularly if he be not already firmly established in virtuous habits, of gradually and insensibly imbibing their defects. "*Serpunt enim vitia,*" says Seneca, "*et*

---

in the nation for the post. It is said Sir Robert Peel makes it a rule never to give an office to any connexion of his family. He has appointed many of his political enemies to the highest stations—and never recalled a man from abroad, or superseded one at home on party grounds. I am assured by intelligent Englishmen, that this policy is universally approved in Great Britain, and has done no little in the consolidation of the power of that great minister. The sovereigns of Europe have frequently appointed men who were known to be most hostile to their policy, to the highest stations to which their subjects can be elevated.

*in proximum quemque transiunt, et contactu nocent.*"(36) And Talentes, in assigning a reason why vice is the most dangerous of all things, says, it contaminates even good men, when they approach it.

He should seek those, too, whose habits and tastes are similar to his own. Thucydides declares that no other friendship can be lasting, either public or private. Harmony, says Plutarch, may exist in music with a great dissimilarity of voices; but it is impossible for harmony to exist in friendship when there is no similarity of habits; like a single soul which animates two bodies, the same will, opinion, counsel, study, and affection must exist in both, to constitute true friendship. It is no easy matter to know thoroughly the characters of men; a long time is consequently necessary for this purpose, and as the good are few in number, the Citizen should begin by showing benevolence to all, and end by extending friendship to a few—to those only, in fact, whose excellence and similarity of inclinations offer some satisfactory security of a good result. For it is not so much the multitude as the excellence of friends which can be relied on in executing great designs. A similitude of habits too, annihilates many difficulties which arise.

Finally, the Citizen must guard against selecting those friends who seem ready to second his less praiseworthy designs. Let him abhor the example of Blossius Cumanus, who was even disposed, through his love for Tiberius Gracchus, to set fire to the Capitol; for such dispositions clearly do not spring from true friendship, which is founded upon virtue, and cannot consent that anything be given or received among friends that is not purely honest. Agesilaus seems to have forgotten this when he defended the crimes of Thebida and Sphodria. To Themistocles, who declared no magistrate could be just who was not impartial, he replied: God grant I may never sit in the tribunal when my friend shall not have an advantage over his antagonist. Phocion never would have said this, for he refused to sit any longer on the trial with Carillus, his son-in-law, after he had been corrupted by the money of Arpalus; telling him he had become his connexion to defend him only in what was just and reasonable

## CHAPTER XL.

## MEANS NECESSARY TO ACQUIRE THE FAVOR OF OTHERS, AND WITH WHOM THE CITIZEN SHOULD CULTIVATE INTIMACY.

SINCE a talent for elegant conversation, and the favor of the multitude, contribute essentially to the acquisition of that influence and standing which enable the Citizen to render great service to his country, we have thought it would not be going out of our way, briefly to touch upon those rules which should regulate his intercourse with others. Plato esteemed them of so much importance in political life, that in writing to Dionysius, of Syracuse, who seemed to be destitute of them, he stimulated him to remember the facility derived in civil affairs from the power of agreeable conversation.

Although he is not obliged to be upon the same terms of intimacy with every one, he should, nevertheless, take great pains to treat no one with neglect or reserve, but salute, converse with, and please every one, as far, at least, as good breeding requires, and in proportion as the quality and merit of each one may seem to demand. We except, of course, the enemies of the republic, whom Evagoras esteems unworthy of any kind recognition. No marked difference should be made amongst those who participate equally in the government of the republic, although they differ in their essential merit; otherwise the Citizen will be likely to beget envy amongst them, and bring odium upon himself, which will directly defeat the end he has in view. He should also endeavor to salute each one by name, for it will not be supposed one cannot retain in his memory the names of his fellow-citizens generally, without holding them in more or less esteem; and we remember that Themistocles, by adopting this course, won no small share of popularity among the Athenian population.\*

---

\* We have three very striking instances of this in our own country, among our contemporaries. General Jackson never forgot a

But as, in the courtesies due from one citizen to another, he should not incur the imputation of being too restrained, neither should he abound too much in that kind of display which may excite suspicion of his ambition, rather than give evidence of his affability. We wish him to guard equally against both extremes. The entertainments he will often have occasion to give to his fellow-citizens ought not to be composed of those who assemble for play or to treat of improper affairs, but those who meet either to pass an hour in innocent diversion or devise some salutary measures. But assemblies frequented by men contaminated by some particular vices, the good Citizen should not avoid altogether, for by opposing their opinions and setting them a better example, he may exert a good moral influence. Nor should he be too ready to exclude from the government of the republic, those individuals who, although exceptionable in some respects, may still be serviceable to the state; for we do not approve of the counsel of Lycurgus, King of Thrace, who (says Plutarch) cut up the vineyards because some people drank too much wine. We applaud rather the discretion of the Athenians, who, in spite of the cowardice Demosthenes showed in a battle against Philip, King of Macedonia, assigned him the province of pronouncing a public eulogy over those who had fallen bravely in fighting for the republic; for although they could get no advantage from his hands, in warding off the blows of the foreign invader, they could not afford to lose his eloquence in the deliberations of their citizens.

Let him then select those who can aid the public, and either correct the rest with mildness, in order to reform them, or reject them entirely, under some plausible excuse.

---

man or his name Mr. Clay has been known to recognize persons and call them by name after a separation of many years; and John Quincy Adams, who knows every *thing*, knows everybody; and never forgot a thing or a man in all his life.

## CHAPTER XLI.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD CULTIVATE THE ART OF PLEASING.

THE first virtue of conversation is the art of Pleasing. And since (says Aristotle), it resembles the quality we find in a good friend, it might be termed friendliness, for it differs from friendship, properly so called, as that differs from passion: being cherished without the passion of love.

Let him learn, then, to embellish his entertainments with the graces of a pleasing conversation, and endeavor to make every one satisfied with himself, as far as he can without supporting persons in false opinions, or being guilty of the vileness of flattery. He should guard particularly against annoying the company by turning every little matter into dispute, and opposing everything which is said by others. Those who are guilty of this vice in conversation are called disturbers, and make themselves odious to everybody in the world. It follows, as a natural consequence, that he who would endeavor, for the public good, to win the love of his fellow-citizens, should studiously avoid any such thing. And when he really ought to oppose the opinion of any one, he should do it in so mild a way, the person may be as little offended as possible; remembering that a war of words, and the barbarities of dispute should have no place in those companies of citizens assembled to administer mutual pleasure, and indulge in the delights of refined conversation.

## CHAPTER XLII.

## THE CITIZEN MUST BE VERACIOUS IN HIS CONVERSATION.

If he would win public favor, he must in his words and deeds be a man of truth. He who is not esteemed virtuous

will not often be held dear, and being esteemed virtuous depends in a great measure upon being esteemed truthful. The Lydian stone, says Bachtides, tells where the gold is, and omnipotent truth brings out the virtue of men.

The veracity of which we now speak, whether in speaking or acting, consists in never attributing to oneself more or less than he has, and he who crosses these limits gains for his excess the reputation of an arrogant man; he who falls short is called a deceiver, as Socrates seems to have been, who endeavored to conceal his virtues more than frankness would allow. And although this ought not to be considered either in him or others a great failing, particularly when the virtue he conceals is lofty and little known, yet they who hide things little are not only unworthy of praise, says Aristotle, but often guilty of arrogance; for by self-detraction such persons try to impress others very deeply with their modesty, as the Lacedemonians seem to have done in their dresses, which were beyond measure miserable and coarse.

He will, therefore, abjure the very idea of dissimulating in the least degree through the desire of honor or glory, for without reaping the smallest advantage he will lose the very same good opinion he wishes to win; if he does it through an inclination to prevaricate, as sometimes happens, he will be brauded as a liar, and neither vice will gain him the confidence or the favor of his fellow-men.

But he who would be clothed with the robe of genuine truth, which even liars themselves venerate, will always, not only in great but also in little things, pay a sacred regard to it in what concerns others as well as in what relates to himself. For although, as Pindar has said, it is not well to bring every fact before the public gaze, since prudence oftentimes enjoins silence, yet it is never justifiable to fabricate a lie, however often this may be practised under the pretext of discretion by those who can convert it to their advantage in furthering their private or public negotiations.

To conclude—while we cannot encourage dissimulation in any form, a lie we will excuse in no man. Although Pompey bore an illustrious name in the Republic of Rome, yet it was

rather in spite of a known habit of his, of which Cælius in writing to Cicero says:—" *Solet enim aliud sentire et aliud loqui*;"(37) a habit it seems impossible to practise without lying and falsehood, which can never be reconciled with magnanimity. Achilles, who was distinguished for this virtue, says (in Homer) that he hated a man who said one thing and felt another, worse than the sight of the infernal doors. Plato makes a distinction, condemning a lie in a private man, while he allows it in a magistrate if it can conduce to the public good. We think, however, States may be saved from public danger without covering them with the shield of falsehood.

---

## CHAPTER XLIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CHEERFUL IN SOCIETY.

NEXT to the virtue of truth the greatest charm in conversation is what is more properly in Latin than Tuscan nomenclature, termed *urbanity*. It consists in relating and listening to those agreeable and amusing incidents which are not unbecoming in a free and well-bred man when they have proper regard to place, time, and persons.

In consequence of the difficulty of controlling sarcasm and wit in their proper bounds, and giving thrusts with discretion, Aristotle terms it disciplined raillery. Such seems to have been the character of the valorous Argonautic youth, who, says Apollonius, used cutting wit without giving offence. But those who are given to this kind of conversation are not always so discreet. If they raise a laugh, they care very little who feels the thrust, or whose ears are offended; they consequently lose the reputation of being facetious and gallant, and are justly called buffoons and jesters. In this light ancient comedians were considered, who stung and annoyed the people with such wantonness and licentiousness, so different from the moderns, who hurl no thrusts at private individuals, and who never



will not often be held dear, and being esteemed virtuous depends in a great measure upon being esteemed truthful. The Lydian stone, says Bachtides, tells where the gold is, and omnipotent truth brings out the virtue of men.

The veracity of which we now speak, whether in speaking or acting, consists in never attributing to oneself more or less than he has, and he who crosses these limits gains for his excess the reputation of an arrogant man; he who falls short is called a deceiver, as Socrates seems to have been, who endeavored to conceal his virtues more than frankness would allow. And although this ought not to be considered either in him or others a great failing, particularly when the virtue he conceals is lofty and little known, yet they who hide things little are not only unworthy of praise, says Aristotle, but often guilty of arrogance; for by self-detraction such persons try to impress others very deeply with their modesty, as the Lacedemonians seem to have done in their dresses, which were beyond measure miserable and coarse.

He will, therefore, abjure the very idea of dissimulating in the least degree through the desire of honor or glory, for without reaping the smallest advantage he will lose the very same good opinion he wishes to win; if he does it through an inclination to prevaricate, as sometimes happens, he will be brauded as a liar, and neither vice will gain him the confidence or the favor of his fellow-men.

But he who would be clothed with the robe of genuine truth, which even liars themselves venerate, will always, not only in great but also in little things, pay a sacred regard to it in what concerns others as well as in what relates to himself. For although, as Pindar has said, it is not well to bring every fact before the public gaze, since prudence oftentimes enjoins silence, yet it is never justifiable to fabricate a lie, however often this may be practised under the pretext of discretion by those who can convert it to their advantage in furthering their private or public negotiations.

To conclude—while we cannot encourage dissimulation in any form, a lie we will excuse in no man. Although Pompey bore an illustrious name in the Republic of Rome, yet it was

rather in spite of a known habit of his, of which Cælius in writing to Cicero says:—" *Solet enim aliud sentire et aliud loqui*;"(37) a habit it seems impossible to practise without lying and falsehood, which can never be reconciled with magnanimity. Achilles, who was distinguished for this virtue, says (in Homer) that he hated a man who said one thing and felt another, worse than the sight of the infernal doors. Plato makes a distinction, condemning a lie in a private man, while he allows it in a magistrate if it can conduce to the public good. We think, however, States may be saved from public danger without covering them with the shield of falsehood.

---

## CHAPTER XLIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CHEERFUL IN SOCIETY.

NEXT to the virtue of truth the greatest charm in conversation is what is more properly in Latin than Tuscan nomenclature, termed *urbanity*. It consists in relating and listening to those agreeable and amusing incidents which are not unbecoming in a free and well-bred man when they have proper regard to place, time, and persons.

In consequence of the difficulty of controlling sarcasm and wit in their proper bounds, and giving thrusts with discretion, Aristotle terms it disciplined raillery. Such seems to have been the character of the valorous Argonautic youth, who, says Appollonius, used cutting wit without giving offence. But those who are given to this kind of conversation are not always so discreet. If they raise a laugh, they care very little who feels the thrust, or whose ears are offended; they consequently lose the reputation of being facetious and gallant, and are justly called buffoons and jesters. In this light ancient comedians were considered, who stung and annoyed the people with such wantonness and licentiousness, so different from the moderns, who hurl no thrusts at private individuals, and who never

will not often be held dear, and being esteemed virtuous depends in a great measure upon being esteemed truthful. The Lydian stone, says Bachtides, tells where the gold is, and omnipotent truth brings out the virtue of men.

The veracity of which we now speak, whether in speaking or acting, consists in never attributing to oneself more or less than he has, and he who crosses these limits gains for his excess the reputation of an arrogant man; he who falls short is called a deceiver, as Socrates seems to have been, who endeavored to conceal his virtues more than frankness would allow. And although this ought not to be considered either in him or others a great failing, particularly when the virtue he conceals is lofty and little known, yet they who hide things little are not only unworthy of praise, says Aristotle, but often guilty of arrogance; for by self-detraction such persons try to impress others very deeply with their modesty, as the Lacedemonians seem to have done in their dresses, which were beyond measure miserable and coarse.

He will, therefore, abjure the very idea of dissimulating in the least degree through the desire of honor or glory, for without reaping the smallest advantage he will lose the very same good opinion he wishes to win; if he does it through an inclination to prevaricate, as sometimes happens, he will be brauded as a liar, and neither vice will gain him the confidence or the favor of his fellow-men.

But he who would be clothed with the robe of genuine truth, which even liars themselves venerate, will always, not only in great but also in little things, pay a sacred regard to it in what concerns others as well as in what relates to himself. For although, as Pindar has said, it is not well to bring every fact before the public gaze, since prudence oftentimes enjoins silence, yet it is never justifiable to fabricate a lie, however often this may be practised under the pretext of discretion by those who can convert it to their advantage in furthering their private or public negotiations.

To conclude—while we cannot encourage dissimulation in any form, a lie we will excuse in no man. Although Pompey bore an illustrious name in the Republic of Rome, yet it was

rather in spite of a known habit of his, of which Cælius in writing to Cicero says:—" *Solet enim aliud sentire et aliud loqui*;"(37) a habit it seems impossible to practise without lying and falsehood, which can never be reconciled with magnanimity. Achilles, who was distinguished for this virtue, says (in Homer) that he hated a man who said one thing and felt another, worse than the sight of the infernal doors. Plato makes a distinction, condemning a lie in a private man, while he allows it in a magistrate if it can conduce to the public good. We think, however, States may be saved from public danger without covering them with the shield of falsehood.

---

## CHAPTER XLIII.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE CHEERFUL IN SOCIETY.

NEXT to the virtue of truth the greatest charm in conversation is what is more properly in Latin than Tuscan nomenclature, termed *urbanity*. It consists in relating and listening to those agreeable and amusing incidents which are not unbecoming in a free and well-bred man when they have proper regard to place, time, and persons.

In consequence of the difficulty of controlling sarcasm and wit in their proper bounds, and giving thrusts with discretion, Aristotle terms it disciplined raillery. Such seems to have been the character of the valorous Argonautic youth, who, says Appollonius, used cutting wit without giving offence. But those who are given to this kind of conversation are not always so discreet. If they raise a laugh, they care very little who feels the thrust, or whose ears are offended; they consequently lose the reputation of being facetious and gallant, and are justly called buffoons and jesters. In this light ancient comedians were considered, who stung and annoyed the people with such wantonness and licentiousness, so different from the moderns, who hurl no thrusts at private individuals, and who never

speak obscenities except under allegorical forms. But they who are destitute of this virtue are so rude and forbidding in their dispositions, they will neither utter nor listen to a genuine witticism, and are therefore called clownish, and frequently banished from the society of sociable men.

Our Citizen, then, must guard against falling into these vices, or he will not be cherished in polite society. Let him indulge moderately in jesting, even when it seems proper; give thrusts with discretion, and take them in good humor. Nor need he fear in this manner to lessen his personal dignity or worth; for Lycurgus himself, with all his austerity of manners, we are told by Sosibius, dedicated among the Lacedemonians a small statue to Laughter.

This art of jesting with discretion, and retorting with gentleness, was not prohibited by the laws of Plato's Republic. And it would appear from Plutarch that he sanctioned it by saying, "To know how to practise it with grace is the prerogative only of a well bred man."\*

---

## CHAPTER XLIV.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD APPEAR, CONVERSE, AND CONDUCT HIMSELF IN PRIVATE COMPANIES.

He should always endeavor to carry into society a cheerful countenance. If a gloomy thought weighs upon him, let it never sour his face, and if this be impossible, let him keep out of the company of others, until his burden is thrown off. And above all, let him so regulate his conversations that neither their subject nor their length may become tedious to others.

The subject of his conversation should be adapted to the persons, and the object for which he speaks, which is the

---

\* This chapter must have formed the basis of one of the most charming letters of Chesterfield.

secret of always making himself agreeable; but let him maintain that degree of gravity which the age or the rank of his listeners demand. He should be always more ready to receive than to give out the topic of conversation, and to follow up a subject already commenced, than to introduce a new one. If he be constrained to speak of himself, he should pass over it lightly and modestly; above all things, never enter upon the arts and professions in which he greatly surpasses others. If he has seen more of the world, or is more of a courtier, or had more experience in battle than his listeners, and shall mention such matters for any other reason than to communicate information, he will reap his reward—he will get the reputation of an importunate and vain man. If, indeed, he can observe the rules Plutarch gives in his treatise on the question: "*How one may praise himself without exciting envy,*" he will not incur, by so doing, the imputation of vain-glory, nor lose the good opinion of those who listen to him; but we refer him to what the same philosopher says upon not speaking without reason. And finally, we warn him against asking too many questions, and telling too much news, for ten to one, he will hit somebody by his random talk. Theophrastus speaks of those whose tongues are too long, in his little work upon Moral Characters, which ought to be in the hands of every one who desires to be cherished in the society of his fellow men.

The length of his conversation will depend upon the nature of his subject, and the pleasure of his hearer, taking care that by indulging too long, he does not stop the current of general conversation. We do not say that an Italian should speak as laconically as a Lacedemonian, but he should not talk so long as to leave no time for others; nor let him interrupt the conversation of others to say something better, or to bring it to an end, or to show that he has understood what the speaker wished to say, by cutting off the thread of discourse, and taking the words out of his mouth. If sometimes he be not pleased with the speaker, or does not approve what he says, let him make no sign of it by tossing the head or indicating anything contumelious.

He should be careful to avoid everything that disgusts well-

body except those who were devoid both of condition and good sense. He should admonish other guests by his example to observe also in this respect that modesty which becomes republican citizens.

Let him observe the same modesty also in his dress, for while it should be conformed in a great degree to the common fashion of his country, it should never exceed it, and above all let him never introduce new fashions of dressing, for they are characteristic of subjugated rather than free cities. The Venetians are worthy of great praise in this respect; if they wish to show their friendship for the French or the Spanish nations, they know how to give some more substantial sign of it than by copying after their tailors.

But, since there are those who in consequence of being more opulent than others, feel ashamed to live and to dress like other citizens, let them first of all reflect that in free states inequality of fortune should for the public good be concealed by the discretion of modesty. Periander, with all his wealth, sought (says Plutarch) in the dishes he set before the Seven Sages, and in the ornaments with which his house and his wife were adorned, the singular glory of appearing perfectly simple in his habits. This appearance, says Marcus Cato, helps to dull the tooth of envy, which, when it strikes the Citizen, paralyzes in a measure his power to serve his country.

We would still remark, in addition to what we have already said about banquets, that in order to acquire the favor of his companions our Citizen should not disdain to learn those pleasing arts, as singing or playing, which are practised by well-bred people at their entertainments. If Themistocles had possessed these accomplishments, we doubt not he would have been more courted in society. Being once rallied on this point he replied rather haughtily to the one who teased him, that he really did not know how to chord a lyre or strike a harp, but whoever would put into his hand a small and a feeble State, he knew how to make it great and powerful.

When the character of the theatres, plays, and amusements, have a tendency rather to corrupt than reform the morals of society, our Citizen will avoid them altogether; remembering

hears you slander his neighbor, will expect to be slandered by you in return; for everybody knows that a dog that will fetch a bone will carry one.

---

## CHAPTER XLV.

HOW A CITIZEN IS TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN REFERENCE TO PUBLIC SQUARES, BANQUETS, DRESS, THEATRES, AND ENTERTAINMENTS.

He should neither frequent too often, nor utterly shun public squares, terraces, and other places where citizens generally congregate, but be seen among them occasionally that he may not appear to condemn what they approve, nor be thought to waste too much of his time in such places.

He may also adopt the same rule in frequenting banquets, or to frequent them too often lessens one's dignity, and undermines that temperance necessary to a good republican Citizen, while at the same time to despise such assemblages altogether, lessens the regard and sympathy his countrymen would otherwise feel for him. Nor can we praise in this respect the austerity of Pericles, for he thought he might, by shunning all banquets, contribute to the gravity of his appearance, yet we doubt if he won by it more regard from his fellow citizens.

He will, therefore, occasionally accept invitations of this description, and eat moderately of some dish set before him, although they may sometimes be more delicate than he would like.

Epaminondas, it is true, in another person's house once called for vinegar, his domestic beverage, instead of wine; yet his virtue was so illustrious he could depart from the customs of others not only without danger of odium, but with the certainty of being applauded. Our Citizen, however, should avoid every superfluity on such occasions, and while he shuns the vice of sordidness let him remember that the magnificence of the Lucullian banquets did not astonish (says Plutarch) any-



body except those who were devoid both of condition and good sense. He should admonish other guests by his example to observe also in this respect that modesty which becomes republican citizens.

Let him observe the same modesty also in his dress, for while it should be conformed in a great degree to the common fashion of his country, it should never exceed it, and above all let him never introduce new fashions of dressing, for they are characteristic of subjugated rather than free cities. The Venetians are worthy of great praise in this respect; if they wish to show their friendship for the French or the Spanish nations, they know how to give some more substantial sign of it than by copying after their tailors.

But, since there are those who in consequence of being more opulent than others, feel ashamed to live and to dress like other citizens, let them first of all reflect that in free states inequality of fortune should for the public good be concealed by the discretion of modesty. Periander, with all his wealth, sought (says Plutarch) in the disties he set before the Seven Sages, and in the ornaments with which his house and his wife were adorned, the singular glory of appearing perfectly simple in his habits. This appearance, says Marcus Cato, helps to dull the tooth of envy, which, when it strikes the Citizen, paralyzes in a measure his power to serve his country.

We would still remark, in addition to what we have already said about banquets, that in order to acquire the favor of his companions our Citizen should not disdain to learn those pleasing arts, as singing or playing, which are practised by well-bred people at their entertainments. If Themistocles had possessed these accomplishments, we doubt not he would have been more courted in society. Being once rallied on this point he replied rather haughtily to the one who teased him, that he really did not know how to chord a lyre or strike a harp, but whoever would put into his hand a small and a feeble State, he knew how to make it great and powerful.

When the character of the theatres, plays, and amusements, have a tendency rather to corrupt than reform the morals of society, our Citizen will avoid them altogether; remembering

that Tertullian said, this was the course with the censors and the laws of the Roman Republic :—" *Sæpe censores renascentia theatra destruebant, moribus consulentes, quorum scilicet periculum ingens de lascivia providebant.*"(38) And again, "*Quonam illæ leges abierunt quæ theatra stuprandis moribus orientia statim destruebant ?*"(39) But when public spectacles are conformed to the conditions, Tacitus says were observed by the Censors of the quinquennialian games :—" *Lætitiæ magis quam lasciviæ dari paucas quinquennii noctes,*"(40) and some honest recreation may be hoped from them, and they seem worthy of being represented in a free city, he will do well sometimes to frequent them, for besides finding in them a recreation from fatigue, he will embrace them as occasions of becoming familiar with the character and feelings of the multitude. We apprehend that the same thing was done by some of the ancient republics of Greece by means of their public banquets.

---

## CHAPTER XLVI.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD SHUN ALL GAMING-HOUSES—WHAT SHOULD BE HIS PLAYS ?

MEETINGS, places of resort, and all secret assemblages, where, in evasion of the law, and to the corruption of good habits, large sums of money are lost and won, ought not only to be utterly shunned by our Citizen as absolutely destructive to those who frequent them, and their families, but they should be abhorred as the most dangerous schools of every species of vice.

Very seldom can playing go on without being attended with anger, blasphemy, and fraud ; and although low fellows pretend that playing is an evidence of loftiness of mind, the truth is it always originates in the vice of avarice, and is frequently inflamed by the vice of prodigality, while to win the means of

extravagance they stake the last necessary of life. In defiance of the laws of Christian charity, and the public good, and frequently the claims of blood and friendship, the gambler plots the ruin of his companion by play with more avidity than if he had received from him a lasting injury. This shows they are not always friends who pretend to be, for they hesitate not to rob their fellows when furnished with an opportunity.

Moral virtue will prove a stronger barrier against the gaming table than any persuasion we can give, yet it may not be utterly useless to specify some of the chief dangers against which the Citizen must arm himself by firmness of principle, and a virtuous life. We, however, advise the reader that in condemning gambling, we do not reprove a proper and well-regulated play for honest recreation for a short space of time with well-bred persons, provided in no case he incurs the danger of the excitement of the hope of gain by playing for money. In this light, we even recommend it as one of those amusements which give a charm to polite society, but we again repeat that he must not stake either goods or money. For this reason (says Plutarch) Alexander condemned some of his courtiers, who played more for ruining than diverting each other.

---

## CHAPTER XLVII.

### THE ENTICEMENTS OF WOMEN.

THE enticement the Citizen of a republic should fly from as it were with wings of an eagle, is that of women. When we say women, we do not refer to those who are ready for a small consideration to bestow their favors upon the first applicant, for they are too abominable to merit our attention; but we allude to those who, the nobler and better bred they are, the more they endeavor in their conversation with men to con-

quer them with the weapons of beauty, and who succeed too often by the flatteries of their favor.

As this is the rock of danger on which the young man most often strikes and goes down, we ought perhaps to be pardoned if we treat of it somewhat more at length than we have other matters; for while we would warn him of every error, and make him ashamed of every vice, we would have him feel, too, that there is nothing more worthy of honor and praise than the pure love of a beautiful and a noble woman. Yet the corruption of the world, and the authority of more than one licentious author, help the young man on to ruin; and if by pouring light around his path we can save him from the abyss of darkness, we shall have done no little service to him and his country.

And if it can facilitate our design, we shall not be unwilling to confess that we have formerly had occasion to extirpate from our own soul the vile principle against which we contend, and since truth often gains a power from one who proclaims it from experience, we who have, to our misfortune, countenanced formerly this very error, as the public well know, may consequently merit more confidence in exposing it than if we spoke only of something of which we had no practical knowledge.

First of all, then, we are not obliged to suppose that young men can frequent the society of women without being flattered and loved, nor that they can listen to these flatteries without being won, nor that their love can be moderated according to the dreams of the Platonists. Beauty of form, grace of manner, sweetness of voice, the fervor of youth, the frailty of virtue, and the impetus of desire, with a hundred other stimulants, lay such powerful siege to the weak virtue of men, that few and perhaps none exist who do not finally acknowledge their power. For this reason Cyrus, King of Persia, was wise in refusing a sight of the beautiful young Panthea, although she was perfectly chaste; and Araspes was rash in cultivating her society, for, after all his boasting, he could not resist falling miserably in love.

He, then, who cultivates the society of young females, must

not only guard against yielding to the seducements of love, but against confounding the affection of virtue with the love of mere passion. If we define it in the beginning, and then speak of its effects, we shall consequently show that there is no passion which can prove so fatal to all the virtues necessary to the Citizen in rendering his republic happy as sensual love, which consists in nothing more nor less than an inordinate desire to enjoy an apparent beauty. Those who paint it in different colors either do not know enough to speak on the subject, or they wish to mask passion under another robe. He who loves immoderately has reason to suspect the purity of his affection; for such love, if it does not begin, will end in lust. And as such lovers cannot think, or speak, or hear, or write of anything but the objects of their passion, it follows, of necessity, that they cannot give prudent counsel to the republic, nor win by courtesy the favor of others, nor even take care of themselves. But it is to be seen what are the works lovers accompany with their thoughts and words, that it may be known what light they shed upon the splendor of their profession. This opens an endless field, but we shall confine ourselves to those points which seem more particularly to defeat the design of becoming a good Citizen of a republic, and this is the reason why we shall discuss this passion a little more at length.

Since all the actions of men are colored by their habits and dispositions of mind, and these habits and dispositions depend upon the will that controls them, we shall contemplate the nature of the endowment with which such persons are provided; for in this manner we shall perceive what sort of habits they have contracted, and what control they have over their life. As to the intellect, whose office it is to discern truth in all speculative matters, we cannot understand how it can exercise its office in such lovers, while they have enveloped themselves in the darkness of passion. Love, says Theocritus, with a hundred others, makes those things appear beautiful which are vile. And Propertius, who represented love in the form of a child, proves that lovers are fools.

" Quicunque ille fuit, puerum qui pinxit Amorem  
 Nonne putas miras hunc habuisse manus ?  
 Is primus invidit, sine sensu vivere amantes." (41)

Being then destitute of light and wariness of intellect, they are necessarily ignorant and imprudent, and ignorance and imprudence qualify a Citizen much better for destroying than for building up the republic. Ignorance deprives him of those sciences we have mentioned as necessary to the good Citizen, and imprudence unfits him from following that policy he should adopt in giving a wise direction to civil affairs. Nor are we obliged, because lovers read many books, and often show a cunning and subtle genius in carrying out their plans, to suppose they are wise or prudent, for they only read to plot and accomplish their desires. They may be sometimes called curious and shrewd in such matters, but learned or discreet they can be called never.

Tarquin Sextus, who ravished Lucretia, was a malicious slave of his passions, and not a wise man, and the whole tribe of lovers, to pamper their passions, torture what the poets write to eradicate, instead of learning the lessons of wisdom they inculcate. And while they make no use of the faculties and the arts for public or private good, it is reasonable to affirm they are ignorant of them, and while they are thus ignorant it necessarily follows that they cannot be good citizens of the republic; for to govern wisely we have, from the beginning, proved that the intellect should be illumined with the speculative and practical lights of science. In a single word, we cannot understand what counsel their country can look for from those who, Propertius says, are taught by love to do *nothing*.

The will of the lover, rebelling against the empire of reason, and lending its voice to the clamors of lust, becomes so feeble and corrupt, as not only to leave no place for the virtues necessary to form the good Citizen, but it can hardly save him from plunging into vice. For we could show that lovers cannot perform works honorable to themselves or useful to the republic. They sin against the virtue of *fortitude*, for the fear of losing the persons they love overcomes the feeling of obligation

to stand firm in the midst of formidable dangers. And we have the clearest testimony that a similar baseness, as we said in treating of temperance, overcame Anthony in that wonderful conflict, when he followed Cleopatra in her flight. We well know that in the intrigues of love, multitudes of dissolute young men, through jealousy or excess of passion, often expose themselves to manifest dangers, in violation of the dictates of sober reason, which never countenances a contempt for death unless some noble object is to be gained. Horace's love for a female singer, it is true, disposed him to adopt a different course : *Pro qua non metuam mori, si parcent anime fata superstiti.* (42) But the bad example of a great man is even less worthy of imitation than the vices of a fool.

The licentious man pays no regard to the authority of the laws which countenance no union but in married life, and when they succeed in their designs they violate all the precepts of temperance, for they place no limits to the indulgence of their desires ; then follows every superfluity of luxury for the palate, without which they say life has no pleasures. *Nam pransus jaceo et satur supinus,*(43) says Catullus when he sighs with such importunity to be with Issatilla. If they cannot accomplish their purpose they either indulge in excessive melancholy or more frequently plunge into all the excesses of gluttony and intemperance, till they enfeeble and destroy themselves. In one way or another their base lusts are so completely gratified by indulgence, that they get beyond the enjoyment of even lawful pleasures, *Quando uxore ab Octavia* (says Tacitus in speaking of Nero), *nobili quidem, et probitatis spectata, fato quodam, an quia prevalent illicita, abborrebat.*(44)

These are the necessary fruits in a greater or less degree of illicit love. Nor do they know the conditions, nor understand the limits of *liberality*, while on the other hand they understand avarice and prodigality better than anybody in the world ; for since they are able to exercise the latter in procuring the gratification of their love, they practise the former (avarice) so faithfully in everything else, that there is no public or private necessity so pressing as to be able to draw from them a farthing, while there is no gain too filthy or culpable for them to

seize upon. Says Xenophon (in the person of Cyrus), they spend in prodigality without any regard to the danger of impoverishing themselves, while avarice urges them on to steal from others. In a word, banquets the most sumptuous, and fêtes the most magnificent given in the city, plays the most ruinous, and fashions the most extravagant, which the vilest classes adopt, are all splendors, all triumphs, all fruits of the prodigality of the licentious.

To please the objects of their passion, or to have the means of winning their love, or to revenge themselves upon rivals, they count no expense, and spare no cruelty which can be perpetrated by the most desperate villain under heaven. Although in their enormous extravagance they counterfeit the virtue of magnificence, which we have said gains the good will of men, yet, examine their lives and you will find they have not a quality or a condition which can coexist with that virtue; for the magnificent man, as Aristotle teaches us, indulges in no expenses he cannot afford, and which do not harmonize with the work he does, nor for his own adornment, but for the public good. But these fellows cast away their own money, and that of others, and consume in little things what they could have done great things with, and seek their own glory at the cost of the honor of the republic. But these disorders they never take much pains to understand. As far as our experience goes, we have never known of their adjusting their expenses to their income; but we do know very well that many of them have been seized for their debts, and that some of them have consumed more in a single dash than would have sufficed for the dowry of a bride, and that no slave of lust has ever founded a public edifice, nor equipped a war galley, to add to the convenience of the city or the security of the republic.

But what shall we say of *magnanimity* of soul, when it has received the praises and acclamations of the whole world. There is no virtue, in our judgment, from which they are so far removed. The only foundation of the virtue of magnanimity is pure moral principle, of which, according to what we have said before and intend to say hereafter, we do not



imagine lovers have any reason to pride themselves, being tolerably certain they ought to be despised for exactly the opposite character. The magnanimous man never judges anything really great but virtue, and they think so much more of winning the favor of a woman, that to gain it, they are often willing to cover themselves with the deepest shame.

“ Non pudet Alcide victricem mille laborum  
 Rasilibus calathis imposuisse manum ?  
 Crassaque robusto deducis pollice fila,  
 Æquaque formosæ pensa rependis horæ.  
 Diceris infelix scuticæ tremefactus habenis  
 Ante pedes dominæ pertimuisse minas.”(45)

Thus Ovid exclaims against Hercules, who dressed himself like a woman through love of Omphale, and sat down to spin in the company of her maids. Of Vitellius, lost in the love of a dissolute woman, says Suetonius, “ *Etiam salivis ejus melle commistis, coctisque palam arterias et fauces pro remedio fovebat.*”(46) The magnanimous man does not exalt himself in the time of prosperity, nor does he allow himself to be cast down in adversity, while the libertine falls into both extremes.

The virtue of magnanimity will not allow men to live according to the dictation of others, but the passion of love, says Cyrus (in Xenophon), makes the lover a slave to his mistress. Horace, too, holds the same sentiment :—

“ Me nunc Thressa Cloe regit.”(47)

Whoever is endowed with loftiness of mind, will never admire or praise a vile person, for such an one is unworthy of his praise ; but he who is lorded over by the tyranny of love, has a character fit for nothing else :

“ Amor, ed io si pien di maraviglia,”(48)

Says Plutarch, in speaking of one :

“ Come chi mai cosa incredibil vide,  
 Miriam costei, quand 'ella parla oride.”(49)

And Propertius gives his testimony :

“ Noster amor tales tribuit tibi Cynthia laudes.”(50)

For this reason Aristotle reckons lovers among the number of flatterers, when he speaks of those who degrade themselves. Tacitus classes them among fawners when he describes Ottone's praises of the beauties of Pappæa.

But the subject branches out too far, and we shall omit many other particulars in which the libertine's character is at war with that of the magnanimous man. What we have said serves our design; for in this treatise we aim rather at utility than array of learning. Such has been our scope hitherto, and shall be till we have done. We do not suppose we have confirmed all our opinions with the most apposite examples that could have been found, but with those only the weakness of our memory recalled.

In regard to seeking for honors, we do not believe the libertine can content himself within the bounds of moderation; but he must be inclined to the vice of too much or too little ambition, according to circumstances, either by acquiring titles and power to win the favor of the person he loves, or to cut a short road of infamy to the object of his desire. Petrarch seems to have leaned too much to the first excess, when he voluntarily spurned from him the name of a learned man, in his studies at Avignon. "*Sperando*, he says, *agli occhi, suoi piacer si adorno.*"(51) And Tibullus seemed to have approached the second excess, when he said, he would joyfully have become a peasant and valorously dug the ground, if he could have gazed on his mistress till he was satisfied:

" O ego cum dominam aspicerem, quam fortiter illic  
Versarem valido pingue bidente solum!"(52)

And he was confirmed in this desire by the example of Apollo, whose love made him become a herdsman, and dwell in a cottage—

" Pavit et Admeti tauros formosus Apollo.  
Ipse Deus solitus stabulis expellere vaccas.  
Et potum pastas ducere fluminibus.  
Delos ubi nunc Phæbe tua est, ubi Delphica Pytho?  
Nempe Amor in parva te jubet esse casa."(53)

In the same way, lovers violate the limits of mildness by

giving way to the passion of anger, which, says Aristotle, easily kindles when their pleasures are despised or interrupted; and when they are derided by the objects of their passion, they lack the sensibility to resent it. Says Ovid, in the person of Medea, in speaking of the excess of anger :

“*Quo feret ira sequar*”(54)

And the wounds, and the deaths, which for this reason are seen every day, give their loud testimony.

Tibullus himself, in speaking of the latter vice, says :

“*Perfida, nec merito nobis inimica. merenti  
Perfida, sed quamvis perfida cara tamen.*”(55)

Our opinion is fortified, also, from the innumerable evils men suffer in their reputation, by subjecting themselves to the ignominious sway of women. And they can never be constant while they consent to follow the will of women, who are, by nature, supremely fickle. Says the poet last quoted :

“*Asper eram et bene dissidium me ferre loquebar ;  
At mihi nunc longe gloria fortis abest.*”(56)

And the Florentine Lyric :

“*Insomma so, com'è incostante e vaga  
Timida ardita vita degli amanti.*”(57)

We should guard against placing the public faith in the keeping of any one who is tyrannized over by an amorous passion. We have many examples to warn us in history. How many great men in the Greek Republics were won over by the love of Tariglia to become partisans of the designs of the King of Persia ! The captain of the Erythreans gave up the place he guarded into the hands of the enemy, to win the favor of Policrita ; and Pericles himself, with all his virtue, could not resist the prayer of Aspasia, to make war upon the island of Samos, with much greater cruelty than their disobedience, which was the pretext he assigned, could justify.

But such men more generally fall into the vice of pertinacity, and prosecute their suit with obstinacy the more they are rejected, persevering even after they have been insulted and

despised. Hecuba, in Euripides, affords us an example, when she counselled Menelaus, who had been dishonored by Helen, to desert her. In Boccaccio, Ghismonda, although deprived of Guiscardo, and ready to die, says to her father: I have loved Guiscardo, it is true, and I love him still, and I shall continue to love him while I live, which will be but a little while; and if we love after death, I will love him for ever.

In regard to *universal justice*, which commands virtue and prohibits vice by the laws of the republic, such persons care very little about it, for their actions, we have already shown, are at war with its first principles; and of *particular, or distributive, or commutative justice*, they generally do not understand even the meaning of the words, much less the practice. Thus, through ignorance and the sway of passion, they become blind to reason, and unfitted utterly to adjudge a penalty to the nature of a crime, or to confer dignities according to the merit of persons. Chance must be the rule of their judgments, and their great arbiter, the woman they love. Wo then to all that fall under their judgments; for if the sentence is to be pronounced, either in accordance with the exact letter of the law, as the statutes provide, or according to equity, where only the spirit of the law is to be consulted, as in the Athenian tribunals, pray how can he give a just decision, who follows no law but the impulse of passion, or the dictates of the mistress of his soul? Such an one, says Aristotle, consults only the pleasure of his mistress, and it becomes one of his habits to be unjust to others. Marcus Tully seems to confirm the same idea, in the person of Caius Verres, who administered the pretorship according to the pleasure of his mistress: "*A qua, quum erat ad eum veratum, et in aurem ejus insusurratum, alias revocabat eos, inter quos jam decreverat, decretumque mutabat: alias inter alios contrarium sine ulla religione decernebat, ac proximis paulo ante decreverat.*"(58) And the outrages which Gualtieri, Duke of Athens, perpetrated in the city of Florence, as related by Giovan Villani,\* proceeded

---

\* One of the most esteemed of the early historians of Florence. The character, however, of this infamous tyrant is still better drawn by Machiavelli, in his *Florentine Histories*.—See 3 vol. of the Medici Series.

from the same reason. The Duke of Crete, Boccaccio tells us, for the love of Maddalena, in violation of his faith, liberated her sister, who was worthy of death. Gerbino, the same author assures us, broke the treaty made by his grandfather with the King of Tunis, and captured the ship which bore his daughter to her husband. They equally violate all the claims of friendship. Says Propertius :

“ Cur quisquam faciem dominæ jam credat amico ?  
Sic erepta mihi pene puella mea est.” (59)

The claims of hospitality, says the same author of Paride :

“ Hospes in hospitium Menelao venit adulter.” (60)

They violate the ties of kindred. Tacitus tells us that Nero murdered his wife at the instigation of his mistress. The sacred obligations of religion. Even Petrarch confesses his love for Laura took away his love for God. Licentiousness extinguishes, too, even love for oneself. Antony committed suicide through love of Cleopatra. And sometimes also, love for the one who is beloved. Tacitus says that Ponzia was killed by Octavius.

Since, then, in these crimes we see clearly manifested transgressions of universal and private justice, the conclusion is very natural that libertines cannot be just men.

What we have said of justice will apply equally to *clemency* ; for, as cruelty is its defect and weakness, its excess we discover of the first abundant proofs in the examples we have adduced ; and of the second, we should have a sufficient demonstration in the course the lover would take in the administration of commutative justice ; for it cannot be supposed he would pronounce sentence upon one for whom his mistress had interceded.

So far as these virtues are concerned which are so essential to the Citizen in his intercourse with general society, we cannot comprehend how the libertine can possess them ; for he can neither speak nor listen to anything except his amours—he lives to flatter and to lie—his mind is stupid and his face melancholy, of course he cannot contribute to the gaiety of con-

versation, nor delight a company with his wit; nor amuse them with his vivacity; nor make them cheerful with his smiles; and if he endeavors to show a cheerful countenance, or say pleasing things, he is almost sure to make a failure. Says Tibullus:—

“ Hei mihi difficile imitari gaudia falsa;  
Difficile est tristi fingere mente jocum.”(61)

And with all the triumphs their victories bring, either the vexation of not enjoying their fruit every hour they wish, or the fear that some accident will deprive them of it altogether, or the jealousy that even others may at the very moment be enjoying it, or the same inquietude which always attends sensual pleasures, are sure to keep their souls in a turmoil. And this, perhaps, was the reason why this passion was, by Orpheus, called *the sweet-bitter*. And Guido Cavalcanti, without paying any regard to the delight which the lover may feel for a moment, says of him:

“ Mercè di quel Signore.  
Che gira la fortuna del dolore.”(62)

which is the same as to say, that whatever may be the success of his intrigues, their fruits are always bitter. And as this bitterness absolutely prohibits that serenity of countenance, and that charm of conversation indispensable to render one agreeable in society, it follows that they are destitute of those qualities which win regard in their intercourse with their fellow-citizens.

Such, then, are the actions that morally flow from the depraved will of licentious men. And being morally depraved, all they do is contaminated, whether it relates to the acquirement or the preservation of the good things of the body or of fortune. For they who cannot accomplish their desires, first of all, give a shock to the health, and undermine their beauty of person by fasting, by want of sleep, and by preying thoughts; and they who succeed, ruin their health by enfeebling the body by gluttony and intemperance. These kinds of indulgences (says Plutarch) so absorb and diminish the natural heat of the body, that the power of digestion gives way, and the system is

filled up with superfluous and malignant humors. Petrarch alludes to the diet, the sleep, and the thoughts of the first sort of lovers :

*"Puscomi di dolor."*(63)

Again :—

*"E le mie notti il sonno sbandiro."*(64)

And where he begins thus :—

*"Se'l pensier che mi strugge."*(65)

And of the second kind, Tibullus gives his testimony to their indulgences and intemperance, when he speaks of the cold and the rains he endured with pleasure, that he might be with Delia. Catullus, too, gives his evidence where he discourses with Isilitta upon sensual excesses, a little more licentious than we can with modesty explain.

Neither are licentious men apt to adopt those excesses, which preserve the health and contribute to all good physical qualities, unless by chance they do it to aid them in winning the favor of the objects of their passion ; as for example, tilting, or jousting, or dancing. But aside from some such trifles, they are incapable of any other exertion than to drag themselves to some church, or get under some window, where they hoped to see their mistress,—

*"Nè i più sann' altra via."*(66)

Nor can they either acquire or preserve nobility ; for, if they have inherited it from their ancestors, they lose it by the debasing actions we have recounted—if they are born without it, they are certain to die meaner than they were born.

Libertines cannot be solicitous to beget or bring up children for the benefit of the republic, while their sensual amours divert their minds from all rational pursuits ; and for this reason, we sometimes find those of this class who never marry, or who marry out of season, and those who, although they may marry at a proper time, cannot confine themselves to the pleasures of their own marriage bed, but neglect their wives altogether. Besides, immoderate indulgence of the passions, naturalists tell us, is not very favorable to the generation of children ; and those who abandon themselves to sensual passions, as has

already been said, are not accustomed to regard propriety or moderation in its gratification. But even concede that the libertine has children, we do not believe he will ever bestow enough thought upon them ; or that he knows enough to educate them properly, to become republican citizens.

“ Per una donna ho messo,  
Equalmente in non cole ogni pensiero,”(67)

says Petrarch of the first obstacle, and we shall illustrate the second hereafter when we speak of the intellectual blindness of the libertine. That noble lady of Giropolis, who, although born of a barbarian nation and stricken in years, wished, as Plutarch hints, to go through the fatigue of learning letters to be able to teach her children, shows very clearly what ignorant fathers might do for the same purpose. And if we should find a libertine father in easy circumstances, who could give his attention to the education of his sons, we do not see how he could get along with the saying of Democritus : “ *that the temperance of the father is the best precept for his children.*” We firmly hold that a lascivious example would destroy all the power of chaste doctrines, which to strike root in youthful minds Plutarch affirms above all things, it is indispensable for them to be impressed by the virtuous habits of their sires ; otherwise, instead of being masters to instruct them in the way of virtue, they become the agents of precipitating them into all manner of vice.

Libertines are never accustomed to fortify themselves with that power which is instrumental in sustaining the republic, or acquire those friendly relations which aid all political enterprises to advance its prosperity, for the former is generally acquired only by mingling in public life,—the latter is founded upon virtues they do not possess. If any one answer that libertines are countenanced by many followers, we reply they are only brokers of women, shedders of blood, who can do no good to the republic, but frequently inflict upon it infinite evil. Plutarch counsels fathers to take great care to guard their sons from such men, who with the baits of pleasures seduce unhappy youths away, and too often plunge them into the deep abyss of



depravity. Nor should we esteem them true friends of libertines who are of the same character, and often appear in their company, for whoever is tyrannized over by this passion can never bear reproof, and one of the offices of friendship is :

“ Il non secondar con le parole.”(68)

Euripides says it is the great office of friendship.

It is therefore reasonable to suppose that these friends are touched with the same plague-spot, or that by nature they do not know how to reprove, or that they flatter with malicious designs ; and be it one or all of these defects, we conclude that they can render them no aid nor counsel to exercise the civil virtues for the benefit of the state. But, although the obstacles which prevent the libertine from being a good Citizen already mentioned are very great, there might be perhaps some hope that, like men contaminated with other vices, they should reach the end of their career in such a state as to leave them time to deliberate and retrieve themselves, and make the necessary provisions for discharging their debt to their country. But if we are not deceived, this sort of infirmity is in its own nature and through the vice of him who is its subject so difficult to heal, that he who does not apply the medicine in the beginning can have little hope of a cure ; for the difficulty does not consist in turning the man from disease to health, as in other cases, but in restoring him from death to life.

To reclaim the soul from a prison where it is so firmly bound, is not a work to be done without infinite difficulty, and by an almost interminable process—so much the more since it must emancipate itself by its own aid, and this cannot be done while it is held under the jurisdiction of another. It cannot avail itself even of its own powers without the consent of the tyrant herself, and this is not to be achieved without a tremendous exertion. But leaving all speculation aside, experience proves clearly, that he who has contracted sensual habits will not only find he must in liberating himself cross an almost impassable barrier, but he carries fatal companions with him to the grave.

“Curæ non ipsa in morte relinquunt,  
Quos durus amor crudeli tabe peredit.”(69)

So says Virgil. And says Theocritus of Daphne, who died enamored:—“*She still drags out in the nether world the pains of her love.*” This is more apt to take place when the lover is made up of a melancholy constitution, for it renders every affection whatever infinitely more difficult to eradicate from the soul, than with those who are of a more sanguine disposition. Melancholy men, too, bring more fatal consequences upon the public interests by their vice, for they are naturally endowed with greater genius, and could render greater service to the state than their fellow-men, if they were not miserably enslaved by the tyranny of passion.

The plain conclusion then we must draw from all we have said, and what might still be said on the subject, is, that amorous passion not only disqualifies one from exercising the political virtues, but strikes too deep roots to be often eradicated. Let, therefore, every good citizen who has thus far escaped the snare, beware of the first step which may lead to this fatal plunge. But we do not say that he should not render towards women the honors which are them due, nor contribute that aid which the weakness of their sex demands. Plato advised Xenocrates to yield to the graces of women, to soften the asperity of his nature. But the Citizen should not be led either from motives of diversion, or under the guise of gallantry, to hold constant intercourse, or be *particularly* familiar with the female sex, otherwise he will infallibly incur the miseries we have recounted, and thus fail to render himself useful to himself and his country. And since women who are born in free states are also bound to do what they can for the public good, it would not be bad counsel that they should restrain their conversations more to their own sex, that they may not hinder the youth from learning the art of administering wisely the affairs of state. Let them not think that by depriving them in some degree of the conversations of men, we lessen their real pleasure. Let them know, too, that any one except their own husbands who declares love for them,

and by offerings and gifts wishes to insinuate and win their affection, not only does not tell the truth, but is giving by his actions the lie to his words, for such men love only themselves. They wish to gratify their appetite by lascivious indulgence, but they really hate the persons whom they protest they adore, and seek only to extinguish the flame of their desires in the infamy of those they flatter. And this we know from the triumphs they boast of having accomplished in the gratification of their unlawful pleasures. Says Catullus :

“ Si linguam clauso tenes in ore  
Fructus proicias amoris omnis ;  
Verbosa gaudet Fenus loquela. (70)

And says the scholar in Boccaccio : “ *They have no greater glory than boasting of the triumphs they have won.*” So that in addition to depriving females of the noblest treasure they have in the world, and staining the houses of their husbands with a strange generation, they add the shame of making the disgrace public among the rabble. Let, then, females know what they may hope to gain from the love of those who swear they are ready to die for them.

But these very passions cannot mask themselves so perfectly that those that flatter, may not detect their vile motives at certain times, and make them blush with shame. The noble Greek Poetess, observing this confusion in the words of Alceus, told him that if he had been influenced by an honest desire, he would not have been ashamed to confess it. And if these same females put so high a price upon modesty, as one would suppose to hear them talk, they could not turn their eyes with any favor upon those who openly confess themselves to be its greatest foes :—

“ Donec me docuit castas odisse puellas.” (71)

So speaks Propertius of love. And if the whole sex were less ardent admirers of their own charms, they would clearly see what glory they may expect from the declarations their lovers are accustomed with such expressive flatteries to make in their praise. The same poet confesses :—

“Mistam te varia laudavi sæpe figura,  
 Ut, quod non esses, esse putaret amor,  
 Et color est toties roseo collatus Eoos,  
 Cum tibi quæsitus candor in ore foret.”(72)

Says Phedrus (in Plato), one of the reasons why the mistress has such a dread of offending her lover, is the flattering praises he bestows. For example, if his mistress has a flat nose, he will tell her he likes such noses—if it's aquiline, that she has a regal face—if her skin is dark, that she is noble—if light, her complexion is divine; with a hundred other stupid things, which show the reason (as Archilochus says) why love throws a mist before the eyes. For this cause, Quintus Catullus, not perceiving the notable defect of Roscius' face, Marcus Tully tells us that he went so far as to say:—

“Constiteram, exorientem auroram forte salutans  
 Quum subito a lævo Roscius exoritur.  
 Pace mihi liceat Cælestes dicere vestra,  
 Mortalis visus pulchrior esse Dea.”(73)

But since it will be said that not all the sex who seek the society of men, would stoop to any dishonor, we reply that it amounts to little, if they preserve themselves sound, if those who associate with them have the plague. And when once fallen into such snares, they can never become good citizens, or win the glories which they vainly presume upon. Let them, therefore, restrain themselves with great care, from rushing into the arms of temptation. We assure them, too, that in spite of themselves, their disgrace will sooner or later be known.

We ought perhaps to have been more brief in this chapter, yet the vice of licentiousness, besides being more fatal than the rest, in our judgment, more effectually hinders the education of the republican Citizen, which must be given at the very period when he is most exposed to its malign power; and, therefore, we thought it best to fortify him against its assaults by all the moral weapons we could gather. If those who are free from this vice, think we have indulged in its discussion too long, they may skip over it after reading its contents, and leave it for those who are already defiled, for whom we have said more, perhaps, than was necessary.

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF IN REFERENCE TO THE COMPANY OF HIS COUNTRYMEN, AND OF FOREIGNERS, AND PARTICULARLY IN SPEAKING OF THE REPUBLIC—HOW HE SHOULD BEAR HIMSELF IN THE SENATE OR IN COUNCIL—HE SHOULD NOT BE RELUCTANT TO TREAT WITH THE GREAT AND THE LITTLE, FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD.

In every kind of society in which the Citizen shall mingle, except that mentioned in the last chapter, let him so measure his words that if they be not equally pleasing to all, they may at least be offensive to none. He will most easily violate this rule, unless he take particular pains to adapt his conversations to the capacity and the taste of his hearers. If he be obliged, as we have elsewhere said, to debate or reprimand, let him do it in so mild a way that the other party may esteem his reproof a favor. But he will avoid both dispute and reproof, unless constrained by the impulse of charity or zeal for the public weal, as he should avoid all those actions in which he will be more likely to be esteemed flattering or obsequious, than civil and well-bred.

Besides this, he should beware against talking with foreigners of the weakness of the republic; and with citizens he should so discourse, that without bestowing unmerited praise, he may be more ready to excuse the bad administration of magistrates, than to condemn them. But when he sits in the Senate or the Council of State, he should reprove with noble and generous liberty, whatever he may judge inimical to the commonwealth. He will thus teach a salutary lesson to those who, in private meetings, make a great noise, and become mute in public assemblies, that true liberty of speech, properly defined, does not consist in attacking one's neighbor, except where his errors can be corrected by free discussion, and the republic saved from unsalutary measures.

When such occasions of open debate arise in throwing down

the gauntlet, he must not only divest himself of every prejudice of parent or friend, but condemn them when guilty, in the severest terms. Cicero leads us to suppose that Lucius Cæsar was at fault here in exculpating the wickedness of Antony, his nephew. *Lucius Cæsar optime sentit, sed quod avunculus est, non acerrimas dicit sententias.* (74) When the interests of the commonwealth are at stake, every good citizen is bound to lend his voice and his hand to its defence without regard to ties of blood or friendship, and he who thinks he can, by mere talking, discharge his debt to his country, lives, in our judgment, under a very grievous mistake.

He who does not oppose any measure adopted by presidents, senates, or councils, calculated to injure the commonwealth, is worthy of severe animadversion. On pain, therefore, of being pronounced guilty before the tribunal of God and man, our Citizen will beware of lending his countenance to those who, through ignorance or passion, propose measures at war with the constitution of a free state. Let him call to mind the intrepidity of Cato, the Uticanian, who, unawed by the attacks of the magistrates, and the outrages of men in power, made war against the tyrannical propositions of Metellus and Tribunius.

He will magnanimously contend even against the supreme magistrates themselves for the defence of liberty, and when he comes in collision with demagogues, who, through baseness of motives or ambition, never give any counsel but such as will please the author of the proposition, he will freely upbraid their fickleness, and expose and cry down the fallacies of their opinions, nor will he be intimidated from lifting up the bold voice of a free man against all rash or perilous public measures, no matter how much odium he may incur, nor how many outrages he may be obliged to face. He should be benign and accommodating to every one except when he must be otherwise, to serve his country.

Asperity and bitterness of language should never be resorted to unless by experience he has found benignity and mildness unavailing. This was the course of Cato, who first expostulated mildly with Mitellus against his tyrannical decree before he upbraided him with harshness. Using a proper

liberty of speech, he will conform his language to circumstances, consulting only its salutary effect upon the public good. And although he may feel a repugnance to do it, the same motive may even require him, sometimes not to avoid private discussions with those who, through being either too elated or too depressed, are desirous of some change, for if he be endowed with the political virtues, he may temper the levity of the one, and console the affliction of the other, that each may know how noble it is to be a man great or obscure, to live in a city where neither wealth is worshipped, nor poverty dishonored—that justice regards not the rich nor the poor in its administration, and that the powerful and the weak recognize no lord or tyrant in the republic, besides the authority of the laws.

And briefly, although the good Citizen, as we have elsewhere said, ought to limit his friendship to few, yet he should be familiar with all those classes of persons whom he would inspire by his conversations with *zeal* for the public welfare. In this matter we should imitate Aristone of whom Plutarch speaks, who was contemned by the sophists of his time for communicating his doctrines to all who desired to listen to him, saying he wished even the wild beasts were able to understand the reasons which persuade to the love of virtue. Let it not be thought, however, we would have our Citizen go round begging for opportunities of preaching to the people, for he would thus excite suspicion of his vanity or his ambition; but we do say that when occasions arise without seeking for them, he should not refuse to enter into communion with any one, who, by being illuminated, may act a better and a nobler part in the commonwealth. If these occasions do not present themselves, he should endeavor to bring them about in such a manner that what he says may appear rather to have fallen from him casually than by design.

This we may suppose to have been the case with Epaminondas, who contrived to be present at the wrestling-games of the Theban and the Lacedemonian youth. Seeing the victories the former gained over the latter, he took occasion to reprove his citizens for the shame they brought upon themselves by hold-

ing the foot upon the neck of the Spartans, who, neither in strength nor valor, could be compared with them. Cato went openly through the streets scattering among the Roman people his suspicions of the tyrannical designs of Cæsar, till he even brought upon himself outrages too great to be borne by a dignified and magnanimous citizen. We remember that Solon not only once assumed the dress of a jester and went round moving by his verses the multitude to the revocation of the decree against the Athenians in regard to the island of Salamina, but on another occasion, without any dissimulation at all, he went into the public squares to reproach his fellow-citizens for their cowardice, and to stimulate them to defend the liberty of their country against the open machination of Pisistratus.

---

## CHAPTER XLIX.

### THE CITIZEN SHOULD NOT HOLD MUCH COMMUNICATION WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF FOREIGN PRINCES.

WITH ambassadors of foreign princes we think the Citizen will be wise not to cultivate much intimacy. With the exception of certain visits he may esteem desirable sometimes to make, he should leave the responsibility of treating with them on public affairs to those whose duty it is to attend to such matters. When he happens to meet them he should certainly show them all honor by signs of respect and reverence, but this should suffice; nor should he hold any other language with them than courtesy or necessity may require. But at the same time if accident bring them together, or he be in any manner provoked by them, let him with noble resentment give such gentlemen to understand that his republic loves liberty, and that he is ready to offer his property and his life to preserve it.



## CHAPTER L.

## THE CITIZEN MUST PRACTISE WHAT HE PREACHES.

BUT the fair words the good Citizen should speak, on all proper occasions, will have little power over his hearers unless his example conform to his precepts. He will not only labor in vain, but lose the confidence of the people, and may be compared to the bird which carries in its beak all it can bear to feed her young, while she herself dies of hunger. Let him imitate the example of Socrates, whose life was a living illustration of the doctrines he inculcated, and he cannot estimate the extent of his power. Men of this stamp in the ancient republics rarely spoke in vain.

## CHAPTER LI.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD ALSO KNOW HOW TO KEEP SILENCE.

NEXT to the rules of speaking, the good Citizen ought to consider the necessity of sometimes keeping silence; for silence cannot always be broken with wisdom or impunity. Simone Tirenzianus, therefore, wisely joined the two together:

“ Nihil istac opus est arte ad hanc rem, quam paro,  
Sed his, quas semper in te intellexi sitas,  
Fide, et taciturnitate.” (76)

He will make no reply to those who ask questions about public negotiations which ought to be kept secret. His wife may be one of those women who (says Simonides) wish to know everything, and she may importune him to tell *her* at least. But he will recollect the fiction Plutarch tells us was resorted to, by a certain wise Roman, to satisfy the curiosity of his wife.

When she teased him to tell her what the Senate was deliberating about with so much secrecy, he replied, that a lark had been seen flying, armed with a helmet and a spear, and the Senate were in counsel with the Augurs to know if the prodigy were a good or a bad omen for the republic. Brutus would not speak to Portia of the conspiracy against Cæsar, although she was one of the wisest matrons in Rome, and he loved her better than himself. When we speak of things which should be kept secret, we include not only matters upon which secrecy is enjoined by those who have a right to impose it, but of everything which is of such a nature that no good can come to the republic from its being divulged.

---

## CHAPTER LII.

THE CITIZEN SHOULD CONTRACT NO OBLIGATION TO THE POWERFUL, ALTHOUGH HE OUGHT TO TREAT THEM COURTEOUSLY, AND WITH PARTICULAR RESPECT.

THE Citizen who would be really free, must never borrow money or receive favors from great men. If he stand in need of necessaries, let him provide himself in some other way, remembering that Cleanthes chose rather to earn his living by turning a hand-mill and be a free philosopher, than to accept the royal gifts of Antigonus, and become a servile courtier. Let him at all hazards shun any league or alliance with the great and the powerful.

Cato had the magnanimity to refuse the favors of Pompey, when he was in the height of his fame, and the virtue to refuse him his daughter in marriage, for no other reason than regard to the public good. He may treat powerful citizens with amenity, and while they bear themselves with becoming modesty, he should honor them with those dignities which are most highly esteemed in the republic, nor withhold that reverence and external respect with which every one is treated

who is held in high regard—not because he is any better than his fellows, but in public emergencies he is able to render a greater service to the commonwealth. In this manner they will not be puffed up with pride, nor others inflamed with envy. It is true, if, when an opportunity arises, they do not cause the republic to reap some advantage from their power, it will be the duty of no one to show them any more honor than is shown to a man of the lowest class. And if, to obtain the gratification of their wishes, they sometimes try to intimidate him by their threats, the Citizen may reply to them as Brutus and Cassius did to Antony, who had threatened them by letters, and let him render the same reason they did :—  
*Nulla enim minantis auctoritas apud liberos est.*(76)

---

## CHAPTER LIII.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD REGARD THE FRIENDSHIP OF FOREIGN PRINCES.

WHILE we would not recommend him to seek the friendship of foreign princes, he may accept it if it be spontaneously offered, for it may be a resource of infinite public good in the calamitous days of the republic. The great masters to teach the Citizen how to use the friendship of foreign princes are Cato, in the Republic of Rome, and Phocion, in the Commonwealth of Athens; one of whom not only refused the presents of Deiotarus, King of Galatia, but requested his friends to do the same—the other refused the cities offered him by Alexander the Great, and made use of the royal favor to save some of their citizens—to turn back the Macedonian arms lifted against the liberty of the Greeks, and to humble the haughtiness of the barbarians.

But we advise him not to cultivate such friendships enough to give an occasion for suspecting his fidelity to the republic, remembering that Themistocles, by his too frequent corres-

pondence with the Pausanians, could not, with all his innocence, escape the imputation of having designs against the liberty of Greece, in favor of the King of Persia. If he be asked by any friendly prince to secure for him, by his personal authority, some advantage from the republic, he should meet him with a frank but firm refusal, and give him such a direction in making his demand, that if it be finally granted, he may understand he is indebted not to himself personally, but to the citizens who hold the administration. This was the spirit of the Roman Consuls, who refused to grant the requests of foreign kings, which they had power to grant, and directed them to make their supplication to the Senate of Rome. Such requests are seldom made of free citizens, by powerful princes, without some tyrannical designs, and we advise the Citizen to lay every such request, made personally to himself, before the republic, and to whatever gift sent by them to himself he should return the same answer Epaminondas gave to the ambassador of Artaxerxes, that if his king was friendly to the power of the republic of Thebes, he was quick to serve him without reward, but if he had other thoughts, he could not send treasures enough to buy his aid, for he would not barter away his patriotism for all the gold in the world. If a foreign prince makes of him any unreasonable request, he ought to call to mind the reply of the above mentioned Athenian, in a similar case, to Antipater, that Phocion could not be his friend and his flatterer at the same time.

To preserve then his own liberty every good Citizen will not only beware of contracting the alliances and obligations we have mentioned, but he will abjure all other connexions which even without the bonds of kindred or benefits, may in any manner whatever bring him under the sway of any government but that of his own country.

## CHAPTER LIV.

THE CITIZEN SHOULD HONOR EVERY ONE WHO HAS ADVANCED THE  
DIGNITY OR THE VIRTUE OF THE REPUBLIC.

To the magistrates, then, of his own country only, will the Citizen while he is a private man submit himself, without any exception, remembering the words of Plutarch, that to show honor to others is often more praiseworthy than to be honored oneself. The virtue of Fabius Maximus was far more worthy of honor than that of his son, who had been elected Consul. But when his son passed by the father he alighted from his horse, for he was at the time a private Roman Citizen, and we doubt not, in the sight of all wise men, he appeared in an attitude of infinitely greater dignity than the magistrate he honored.

So far from withholding obedience to his superiors, he will esteem it an honor. Obedience, says Solon, prepares men for empire, and while he should not emulate the obsequious veneration of a Persian, let him cheerfully render the magistrates merited honors, as those whom the laws of a free state have in their turn placed in dominion. Nor would we wish to have this reverence paid purely from regard to the dignity of the station the magistrate holds, but also through love of showing esteem for the excellence of personal virtue, when this virtue has elevated him to power. We admire the reply of Sophocles, the poet, when he was invited by Nicias, in Athens, to deliver his opinion first, because he was the eldest person in the council. "*I well know,*" he said, "*that I am the oldest person here, but he who invited me to speak first is the most venerable.*"

## CHAPTER LV.

## THE CITIZEN SHOULD NOT PRESUME TOO MUCH OF HIMSELF.

ALTHOUGH the good Citizen ought, by counsel and example, to direct others in the science of government, yet he must feel deeply his own need of continually instructing himself, that he may become an able and accomplished statesman. He will thus escape the rock of which Heraclitus gives warning, viz., that a too favorable opinion of oneself is one of the most powerful obstacles to future improvement. We would, therefore, have him ready to take advice not only in matters with which others are more familiar, but also in things which appertain immediately to his own profession.

Who does not abhor the obstinacy of Embriaco, the Genoese admiral, who, although he was admonished by the Cardinals he carried to the ecclesiastical council, to shun the island of Corsica, that he might not fall in with the Pisan fleet, scorned to take advice of priests who set themselves up for warriors, and obstinately rushed upon the enemy's squadron. That terrible defeat followed, with which we are all familiar, and the two apostolical legates were ignominiously incarcerated in the prisons of Frederick of Swabia, and a host of other prelates and illustrious persons were, like so many sheep, swallowed up in the sea. This never would have happened had that great captain united to his intrepidity in battle, the virtue so highly cherished by Artabanus, that he considered it a greater accomplishment than even good judgment to be willing to take advice.

We remember that this kind of discretion had such complete control over the candid mind of Aristides, that on being once called upon to take command of the Athenian army, which, under the chieftainship of ten captains, had been defeated by a marshal of Darius, King of Persia, he generously renounced the command to Miltiades, teaching, says Plutarch, the rest of his companions, that to submit to obey a wiser man, so far

from being an unworthy action, merits of the loftiest praise. The same distinguished Grecian having, on another occasion, submitted a proposition to his fellow-citizens and convinced them of its practicability, after much opposition, was, however, so well convinced by their arguments that it threatened some danger to the republic, he immediately withdrew his proposal, without even following the ordinary custom of appealing to the voice of the people.

---

## CHAPTER LVI.

THE CITIZEN MUST HAVE NO PARTY BUT COUNTRY, AND STRIVE TO RECONCILE ALL ENMITIES.

He should beware of all those measures which beget divisions in free states, and endanger their peace and prosperity. While he treats foreign princes and his colleagues in the republic with courtesy, he must never *become a foreigner*. He will always remember he is a freeman, and in the midst of factions among powerful individuals, he will regard the authority of Cato rather than that of Solon, and scorn to take part with any, unless from patriotism he join those who are the firm friends of the Republic, and stand for its Constitution. He should, it is true, yield as much as possible in all minor points, at such times, and not refuse his aid to the party who are clearly in the right, because everything is not conformed to his own peculiar opinions. Such was the course pursued by those Roman Senators who, although they were partial to Pompey, were, nevertheless, firmly resolved to sustain the republic, if after having overcome Cæsar, he should have played the tyrant himself.

But as the perpetuity of the republic depends upon the concord of those who administer it, the Citizen would do better still if when some quarrel has sprung up among them, he can immediately effect a reconciliation. For such feuds among

citizens give place for hostile designs on the part of foreigners. This he will accomplish more easily if, in addition to showing them the peril which overhangs the state when civil discords prevail, he also has a happy faculty of allaying dispute. But let him be careful, in such cases, not to espouse either side, remembering that had not Solon managed affairs with great prudence, when the city of Athens was split into three parties, he never would have been constituted Founder of those Laws which, to his lasting honor, gave peace to the state.

---

## CHAPTER LVII.

### THE CITIZEN MUST BE UNWAVERING IN HIS SUPPORT OF JUSTICE.

WHEN the Citizen has taken mature counsel, and deliberately settled on a wise course, he should inflexibly persevere, un-intimidated by the opposition of public opinion. For although this should be regarded in doubtful matters, he must pay no more attention to it in things that are certain, than Alexander did to the army of Darius, when he surrendered up the spy taken in his camp, and told him to go back to his master and tell him, "Your army outnumbered mine fourfold, but more than one flock of sheep has been destroyed by one or two wolves." He must be persuaded of the truth of Plato's saying, that a just judgment comes from wisdom, and not from a multitude.

Seneca teaches the like philosophy: *Ut malis tibi placere quam populo, ut aestimes judicium, non ut numeres.* (77) And although he may be accused of the vice of obstinacy, and perhaps lose office and popularity, he will, nevertheless, find his reward in the consciousness he has done his duty, and he will choose rather to incur the danger of falling in public esteem, by exercising the virtue of firmness, than to win the acclamation of the rabble by flattering the fickleness of popular will. Let him not forget the example of Paulus Emilius, who never made



one office a stepping-stone to gain another. But yet, if the matters in which he is at variance with the opinion of others concern rather private feelings than public interests, let him give up his own personal objections, for he will in this manner acquire a greater influence for carrying into action any plan he may cherish for the exaltation of the republic.

---

## CHAPTER LVIII.

HOW THE CITIZEN SHOULD BEAR HIMSELF IN THE MAGISTRACY WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, HOW HE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF WHEN HIS OPINION PREVAILS AND HOW WHEN IT IS OVERTHROWN.

ABOVE all things, never let the Citizen trifle with his colleagues, however inferior they may be in prudence or talent. On the contrary, he should rather endeavor to compensate them for their want of these qualities by a modest opinion of himself, and create such an impression by attributing whatever luminous opinion he may have formed to the light they have shed upon the matter.

Pyrrhus, King of the Epirians, seems to have understood this, for when he received the title of Aquila from his followers, he replied, "*If I am an eagle, I owe it to you, for my wings have been your own brave arms.*" And if it happens that others yield to his opinion, he will act as though they had just as much to do in the matter as himself. Such appears to have been the course pursued by Quintius Capitolinus towards Agrippa Turius, his colleague, in command of the Roman army. "*Et prælatuſ ille,*" says Livy in speaking of him, "*facilitate ſummittentis ſe comiter reſpondebat, communicando conſilia, laudesque, et aquando imparẽ ſibi.*"(78)

If the opinion he may have advocated in the magistracy or council of state be opposed by the majority, and if, in addition, he himſelf be obliged to become the executor of what he does

---

not wish, he ought to obey immediately. And while he contents himself to follow the example of Nicias, who dissuaded the Athenians from the Sicilian enterprise, because it seemed dangerous to the republic, he should not imitate him in the repugnance he showed to execute the sentence that had already been passed by the people: for although he might have persevered in the same opinion still, he should, without further words, have lent his hand to the execution of their will. In Plato, Socrates says: "*The citizen should endeavor to persuade his countrymen of the views he cherishes himself if he can, but if this be impossible, let him follow their commands.*"

But if, on the contrary, he has seen or learned less than his companions in the matter under deliberation, he will not only bear them no envy, but confess he has learned from them; and commending them freely, he will in some manner come to have that part in the affair, by the virtue of good will, which he could not obtain by the light of his intellect.

He will use the greater diligence, at the same time, to make those acquirements necessary to be able to give wise counsel in political matters, avoiding the folly of those poets who (says Horace) have such a stupid shame of not being thought learned that they chose to remain ignorant.

Cur nescire pudens prave, quam discere malo ?(79)

Socrates, too, we remember, condemns this false shame, and sustains his remark by the authority of Homer: *that is not a salutary shame which keeps a man from making a useful acquisition.*

---

## CHAPTER LIX.

WHEN THE CITIZEN SHOULD FEEL ASHAMED, AND WHEN HE SHOULD NOT.

HOWEVER salutary, until a certain age, may be the blush which comes upon the cheek when others think we have

made a mistake, since, in the language of Aristotle, it seems as a check against falling into error, yet the Citizen should never feel ashamed until he has done something dishonorable, otherwise it will frequently result in prejudice to the republic. For the state ought not to require him to ask favor as a condemned man while he is innocent, nor make of his citizens a humiliating demand.

But if this ever occur through false delicacy, he may sometimes consent to what he should not; but the state does require him to be ashamed of defending his friends in works of injustice. Plutarch tells us that although in other respects Agesilaus was a good citizen, yet he preferred to do wrong with his friends rather than abandon them. The republic commands him to punish and reward his friends and his foes according to the principles of justice, and if he desire to use liberality towards those whom he feels he cannot deny it, let him use it in those cases in which he is free to punish or forgive, and not where his duty to be inflexible is clearly marked out by the law. It is true he should, as far as possible, compensate for his defects by displaying winning traits of character, but in such a manner that without violating the wishes of others, he may take proper advantage of circumstances. Simonides could not have been greatly displeased in being refused his request by Themistocles, who told him: "*You, Simonides, would have been a bad poet if you had sung out of measure, and I should be a bad magistrate if I broke the laws.*"

Let him beware, too, on the other hand, of exciting hope of pardon when he is determined to condemn; for this mode of acting, so frequently adopted to avoid the pain of offending, is no sooner discovered than it offends infinitely more than the truth would have done in the beginning. Archilochus seems to have despised the woman he brands as marked with this vice; for she held, says he, water in one hand, but fire in the other.

But such persons frequently incur this vice, by indulging in praise and flattery; and, after exciting hopes, they feel they must gratify them even at the expense of the public good. But let our Citizen pursue a steady course, and remember that Antisthenes, to avoid this danger, commanded his sons never

to tell him who had praised him. Shame, says Hesiod, may both aid and injure men, and the Citizen will endeavor to overcome the untimely blush, and never be ashamed of anything which is conformed to those virtues which are necessary to prepare him to serve his country. He will remember that Cleones and Democles were caricatured in the theatres, and ridiculed in history, for the infamy of the opposite vice of sucking up the substance of the Athenian republic, like horse-leeches; and he will unhesitatingly embrace, among those to whom Homer declares shame to be salutary, every one into whose cheek the very thought of such sordidness calls the blush of shame.

---

## CHAPTER LX.

### SHOULD THE CITIZEN TAKE OR REFUSE PRESENTS?

SINCE we have again touched upon the subject of avarice, it may be well to inquire what course the Citizen should take in receiving or refusing presents; referring to those gifts privately made by one Citizen to another. So far as those presents are concerned, which it is the custom to make to public persons, each one should conform to the orders expressly established for the control of magistrates in the exercise of their office: and where no decree or precedent exists, authorized by the republic, we think the safer way is to refuse presents altogether; or if the Citizen desire to accept them, let him carefully follow the lawyers' rule: "*Not everything, nor always, nor from everybody.*" But as to private gifts made by citizens to each other, it would seem a violation of friendship to refuse what one really stands in need of, and an evidence of rudeness not to accept what is given from courtesy; so, it would be the vice of sordidness to receive gifts to save one from spending his own money, and the characteristic of avarice to accept them to make one's self rich.

But at the same time great discretion is to be observed in accepting what administers more to pleasure than necessity, and particularly from powerful men, be they citizens or foreigners, for they not unfrequently have no idea of making a present from an impulse of generosity, but of selling their gifts for the liberty of those who receive them. He who would be a good republican citizen, must, above all things, beware of any such plot laid against his liberty. We are very certain that if the virtue and political integrity of Dion and Pelopidas, who swayed great power in their cities, had not been fully proved, Plato never would have accepted money from a foreigner to provide the spectacle of the children's dance to the Athenians; nor would Epaminondas have received presents from citizens for amusing the Thebans with the game of the flute-players.

---

## CHAPTER LXI.

### WHAT THE CITIZEN SHOULD BE IN HIS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CAPACITY.

In his private character, the Citizen should follow the precepts we have inculcated. In his public capacity, let him, first of all, beware against exceeding the limits of his constitutional authority; for this is the point where tyranny always begins. This is clearly proved by the example of the Decemvirs in the republic of Rome.

To escape this danger, the Lacedemonians instituted the magistracy of the Ephori, whose duty it was to see that the authority of their kings extended no further than the liberty of the republic would allow. The good Citizen cannot be too scrupulous in his administration, when he is elevated to the highest dignity in the state, and he will always be ready to participate and deliberate affairs, with the councils and assemblies constitutionally ordained for this purpose. But if sometimes he shall, either by mistake or zeal, pass the limits established

by the laws, he should not only not feel ashamed to submit himself to the censure of the power which may legally call him to account, but if he is allowed still to hold his station, he will so conduct himself as to convince all that he has more at heart the observance of the general laws which preserve the liberty of the state, than his own private feelings which might urge him into tyrannical measures. And to defend his country from tyranny, as far as his influence goes, he must boldly repose in others the very same excess for which he was willing to be rebuked himself; and however supreme may be the magistrate he is to censure, or overwhelming the passions he is to eradicate, he will fix his eye only upon the good of the commonwealth, and make no count of the personal injury he may suffer. Nor let him esteem the transgression of the laws in little things too small an error to be removed. On the contrary, act on the opinion of Paulus Emilius, that revolutions in free states have their beginning almost always in small and not in violent infractions of the constitution. Nor let him fall into the error of Jason, King of Thessaly, who (says Aristotle) wished to perpetrate some injustices, to have occasion to do many things just; for, the right which has its origin in injustice must be wrong, and whoever is disposed to perform many acts of justice, can never have need of an occasion to originate them without violating justice itself.

Besides, he should always regard the decorum which his own condition and that of others demand. And since in this matter he may err by extremes to the prejudice of the commonwealth, he will take care in the station, for example, of a Senator, to maintain that kind of gravity which is removed from lordly pride, and so nearly approaches Citizen equality, that his severity may not intimidate any one from approaching him, nor his excessive affability embolden any one to become too familiar. With such a happy manner, they will not only all reverence and love him, but no one, after seeing his face, or hearing him speak, will dare to make of him an improper request.

The blending in the character of two qualities so dissimilar as sternness and affability, is not easily done, yet in the opinion of

Marcus Tully, it may, with the aid of prudence, be accomplished with facility: "*Quid tam distans,*" he says in speaking of Brutus, "*quam a severitate comitas? Quis tamen unquam te aut sanctor est habitus, aut dulcior?*" (80)

The union of the same qualities, this author notices in the persons of Cato, and Cornelius Nepos, and Pomponius Atticus. Sopater seems to have given his brother to understand, that without such a temperament he could not merit the name of magistrate, but by appearing benign and dignified towards the subjects he faithfully governed. The same sage writer gives, also, many other wise admonitions which to avoid long quotations we shall pass over. We shall also omit what has been written on this subject by Architas Tarentinus, who lays it down as an indispensable qualification in a true prince, not only to know how to govern well but humanely. This is the humanity, said Iamblichus to Agrippa, that annihilates the envy and odium that so often poison the people against the Citizen they have elevated to power, and this mode of tempering the austerity of empire with benignity of manners, is more loved by subjects than anything else.

If, then, in administering the government of the Republic he cannot avoid sometimes falling into the error we speak of, in his intercourse with his own citizens, at least in his relations with foreigners and more than all with princes, he must never do it either in his language or his address. Towards such persons haughtiness and severity can never be shown but at the expense of the republic. Therefore the Lacedemonians once severely rebuked one of their ambassadors, who addressed Antigonus, son of Demetrius, with the title of King, for by doing it he forgot the dignity of his republic. For the good citizen should cherish so high an estimate of the utility and the dignity of his republic, as to be able to sustain in his own person any ignominy whatever with the highest praise. Thus Catullus was willing to take upon his own shoulders the shame of the army which fled before the Cimbri. He placed himself at the head of their ranks, leaving the enemy to suppose that his soldiers were not flying, but prevented their leader from flying himself. In the like manner in the govern-

ment of subjects abroad, he should display the same spirit, or if he must lean more towards one than the other of these above mentioned virtues, let him incline to mildness, especially as Stenidas the Pythagorean advises a prince to make his administration resemble rather that of a father than that of a lord, that the governed may appear to be citizens, and not vassals. He should also in our judgment enter into no commercial speculations with those he governs, remembering that with good reason this was prohibited in the Roman Republic, as Marcus Tully seems to indicate this in his speech against Caius Verres: "*Si mehercule te tuam pecuniam, non populi Romani in provincia feneratum docerem, tamen effugere non posses. Principalibus constitutionibus cavetur, ne ii qui provinciam regunt, quive circa eos sunt, negotientur, mutuum pecuniam dent, fenusve exerceant.*"(81)

Above all, reflecting that no stimulant is so powerful in exciting rebellions as the fickleness and rapacity of officers, let him so control his administration that his subjects may have no such reasons for agitation. He will not forget the reply of the chief of the Dalmatians to Tiberius, when he demanded why he had raised another rebellion after so many defeats. He frankly answered: "*You Romans have caused it all, for instead of sending shepherds to guard the flock, you have given them wolves to destroy it.*"

In commanding an army he should adhere to the same policy. Lucullus, although a brave captain, was to blame that his arms had not been more victorious, for he had not treated his soldiers or officers with due benignity and regard. Emulating the example of great Captains, he will not only be the first to give his hand to the work and sustain the fatigues, which either through necessity or choice they are accustomed to command, and to suffer in the hardships of war, but even as Cambyses taught Cyrus to bear the hardest share himself. That warrior, too, will be judged at last to have had the most glorious career, who shall rather in consequence of his ability in managing his campaigns than the chances of battle have finally come off victorious over his enemy. Hence Plutarch shrewdly observes, that although the Lacedemonians were a warlike and brave people, they made



a greater count of the first victory than the second, for after gaining the one they sacrificed a cock, and after the other an ox.

Finally, in the embassies he may be entrusted with to the courts of foreign princes, he will conduct himself according to their rank and the dignity of his republic. And while he should shun the vice of arrogance, let him beware of showing any servile veneration in imitation of the example of Conones, the Athenian ambassador, who would not condescend to flatter the pride of Artaxerxes, although he was Emperor of Persia, showing such integrity of life and such a manner of proceeding, that out of regard to his person the lords of that magnificent court freely conceded to him all he had to ask for his republic. It is impossible to limit the benign influence of such an ambassador upon the fortunes of his country. A man who expels playing, mistresses, and revelry from his house, and adorns it with temperance, modesty, and Christian piety, who seeks at royal courts no other influence, nor demands any other justice or favor than what appertain to the state, and to the exaltation of the court he represents.

But since we are speaking of the Citizen in his official character, it will not be inappropriate to add a word in regard to moderation in desire for honors, although we may hazard repetition.

Offices ought not to be sought for by the good Citizen, except under the circumstances we have mentioned when discussing the subject, nor ought they to be bought, *but frankly asked for*, nor should they be refused although they be small, nor accepted when they exceed the Citizen's merit; nor must he disdain companionship, and counsel in them, nor forget that they are created for business, nor must he fall into the mistake that his duty to his country is discharged when his office expires, for even in private life the good Citizen will still live for the republic. Plutarch states that Epaminondas, although a simple soldier, did not hesitate to marshal again the Theban squadrons in Thessaly, that had been nearly destroyed by the enemy through the disadvantage of the place where they had been conducted by the bad generalship of their leader. Nor

was that ancient Spartan slow to encourage Agis, the conductor of the army, to remedy the mistakes he had committed in not embarking in the enterprise of Argo, and in making an untimely attack upon the enemy in the country of Arcadia.

While he should be careful never to infringe in his private capacity upon the prerogatives of the magistrate, he ought to spare neither words nor deeds in every possible way he feels himself able to render aid to the republic, and no one should be deprived of an opportunity to do his best if he wishes to try, provided he bears upon his face the mark of an honest man. "*Nunquam inutilis est opera civis boni,*" says Seneca, "*auditu enim, visu, vultu, nutu, obstinatione tacita, incessuque ipso prodest.*"(82)

Such, we think, must have appeared the countenances of Aristides and Cato, who, although rarely elevated to official dignity, as Plutarch observes, were, however, continually occupied in the service of the republic. It is not unlikely, too, they were more useful in a private capacity than Timesias Clazomenius as a magistrate, for although he had been in office from his youth, yet with all his zeal he had reduced himself to odium, even among the boys of the streets.

---

## CHAPTER LXII.

### THE CITIZEN OUGHT TO TRAVEL SIX YEARS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN CIVIL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS.

It seems unwise for our Citizen to assume the responsibilities of the republic, until he has become somewhat familiar with the practical workings as well as the theories of different governments. Let him be occupied till about his twenty-fourth year in these studies we have shown to be necessary to his profession, and then leave his country, and for five or six years roam the world, and study life, and mankind, and governments. He will thus confirm and illustrate theories gathered

a greater count of the first victory than the second, for after gaining the one they sacrificed a cock, and after the other an ox.

Finally, in the embassies he may be entrusted with to the courts of foreign princes, he will conduct himself according to their rank and the dignity of his republic. And while he should shun the vice of arrogance, let him beware of showing any servile veneration in imitation of the example of Conones, the Athenian ambassador, who would not condescend to flatter the pride of Artaxerxes, although he was Emperor of Persia, showing such integrity of life and such a manner of proceeding, that out of regard to his person the lords of that magnificent court freely conceded to him all he had to ask for his republic. It is impossible to limit the benign influence of such an ambassador upon the fortunes of his country. A man who expels playing, mistresses, and revelry from his house, and adorns it with temperance, modesty, and Christian piety, who seeks at royal courts no other influence, nor demands any other justice or favor than what appertain to the state, and to the exaltation of the court he represents.

But since we are speaking of the Citizen in his official character, it will not be inappropriate to add a word in regard to moderation in desire for honors, although we may hazard repetition.

Offices ought not to be sought for by the good Citizen, except under the circumstances we have mentioned when discussing the subject, nor ought they to be bought, *but frankly asked for*, nor should they be refused although they be small, nor accepted when they exceed the Citizen's merit; nor must he disdain companionship, and counsel in them, nor forget that they are created for business, nor must he fall into the mistake that his duty to his country is discharged when his office expires, for even in private life the good Citizen will still live for the republic. Plutarch states that Epaminondas, although a simple soldier, did not hesitate to marshal again the Theban squadrons in Thessaly, that had been nearly destroyed by the enemy through the disadvantage of the place where they had been conducted by the bad generalship of their leader. Nor

was that ancient Spartan slow to encourage Agis, the conductor of the army, to remedy the mistakes he had committed in not embarking in the enterprise of Argo, and in making an untimely attack upon the enemy in the country of Arcadia.

While he should be careful never to infringe in his private capacity upon the prerogatives of the magistrate, he ought to spare neither words nor deeds in every possible way he feels himself able to render aid to the republic, and no one should be deprived of an opportunity to do his best if he wishes to try, provided he bears upon his face the mark of an honest man. "*Nunquam inutilis est opera civis boni,*" says Seneca, "*auditu enim, visu, vultu, nutu, obstinatione tacita, incessuque ipso prodest.*"(82)

Such, we think, must have appeared the countenances of Aristides and Cato, who, although rarely elevated to official dignity, as Plutarch observes, were, however, continually occupied in the service of the republic. It is not unlikely, too, they were more useful in a private capacity than Timesias Clazomenius as a magistrate, for although he had been in office from his youth, yet with all his zeal he had reduced himself to odium, even among the boys of the streets.

---

## CHAPTER LXII.

### THE CITIZEN OUGHT TO TRAVEL SIX YEARS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN CIVIL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS.

It seems unwise for our Citizen to assume the responsibilities of the republic, until he has become somewhat familiar with the practical workings as well as the theories of different governments. Let him be occupied till about his twenty-fourth year in these studies we have shown to be necessary to his profession, and then leave his country, and for five or six years roam the world, and study life, and mankind, and governments. He will thus confirm and illustrate theories gathered

from books, by impressive lessons of experience, and return home to reduce them to practice under the guidance of mature wisdom. The Pythagorean school taught not only the necessity of the knowledge of general principles comprehended by the intellect, but the knowledge of facts from personal observation.

But let him beware on returning to his country against bringing with him any of those foreign customs which corrupt national institutions, remembering that for this reason Lycurgus forbid his citizens from leaving the territory of Sparta. The first two years we advise him to pass among troops and disciplined armies, fighting on land, and the next two among fleets and galleys in naval engagements. In the midst of such dangers let him aim to see and to feel all that is necessary to make him a good combatant on the land and on sea. The two remaining years he can pass at the courts of princes, and in the Councils of republics, from whose manners and customs, be they good or bad, he may learn the acquisitions he should make and the opinions he should establish to shun the vices which disgrace, and cultivate the virtues which adorn a magistrate of a free state. He may not only accomplish all this in the allotted period, but have some time left to complete his studies, which he could only have commenced when he left home. And thus, even while he is separated a great distance from his birth-place, he will love that home still, and be laboring most effectually for the good of his country.

---

## CHAPTER LXIII.

**SOME OPINIONS, CONSIDERATIONS, AND EXAMPLES THE CITIZEN SHOULD FASTEN IN HIS MIND IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC, AND WHAT HE SHOULD DO WHEN HE RETIRES TO PRIVATE LIFE.**

Our Citizen will now return to his country in his thirtieth year, inspired with that zeal for its glory which none but vir-

tinuous men feel, and mingle actively in political life. He will become so firmly established in those opinions he has already gathered from observation and experience, that no shock will cause him to vacillate.

The *first* principle he should settle is, that *he* is the good Citizen of a republic, who knows how to acquire and execute all that is necessary for its prosperity.

The *second*, that country, in the language of Socrates, is to be cherished dearer than everything in the world. Hence, Virgil's hero, in the hope of aiding his native land, abandons the care of his father, his wife, and his child.

The *third*, that a well governed republic is the best political state in the world, and consequently the condition of a good Republican Citizen is better than that of a good Prince. Cyrus, brother of Artaxerxes, although surrounded by the splendors of the throne of Persia, could not refrain from confessing to the Greek soldiers who fought under his standard, that he considered them happy because they were free, and that he would sooner have chosen their liberty than his own greatness and fortune. Such, too, appears to have been the opinion of Sertorius, when he sent to Pompey, saying he would gladly have laid aside his arms if he could only have returned to Rome, where he would rather be the humblest citizen, than separated from her to hear himself called Emperor of the rest of the world. Cato, too, the Censor, on being once asked why he did not court the Prince of Pergamos, as all the rest had done, replied, there was no king worthy of being compared with an Epaminondas, a Pericles, a Curius, or an Hamilcar.

The *fourth* point is, that no glory ever acquired on earth can exceed that which the Citizen wins in serving faithfully his country. Says Marcus Tully, in writing to a captain of the Roman squadrons: "*Nec quidquam ex omnibus rebus humanis est præclarior, aut præstantius, quam de republica bene mereri.*"(83)

The *fifth*, that he should recognize no lord in the Republic but the constitution, whose severity, however, he should not regard, says Biante, as that of a tyrant, but of a father who restrains the will of his children for their own good.

And *finally*, that his colleagues in the administration of the government, be they of obscure or illustrious origin, all bear the same stamp of nobility, unless some have become more illustrious than their fellows; and when this is the case, it is reasonable to be persuaded, that in advancing the glory of the commonwealth, "*Fortissimum quemque*," as says Marius in Sallust, "*generosissimum esse*;"(84) and to consent with good will that those citizens who have thus distinguished themselves be preferred to others. We remember that this was the only condition upon which Anacharsis allowed any inequality to exist among the citizens of a free state, and Plato in speaking on this point says, that the citizens of Athens would concede no superiority to any man above his compatriots unless he had distinguished himself for virtue.

These principles will be guiding stars to our Citizen in administering the office he holds, so that there never will be a person he will prefer to his country; nor a condition which can be compared with that of liberty; nor a splendor which can equal the valor of patriotism; nor a greatness so lofty as the fame of serving one's country confers; nor passion which will urge him into a violation of the laws; nor pride which will overcome his love of political union.

It will be useful, too, if in everything he is called on to devise, say and do for the state, he shall set clearly before his eyes the blessings of Liberty and the miseries of Servitude. On the one side he will see security for privileges, perpetuity for honor, and safety for life: on the other, rapine of substance, violations of female virtue, and shedding of blood; and he will follow those counsels and take those deliberations which seem best calculated to perpetuate the blessings of the one, and avert the horrors of the other.

And finally, to contribute to his firm establishment in all the civil virtues, let him ever be mindful that in *virtue* alone consists the security and perpetuity of the Republic. A Lacedæmonian once properly said, that the virtue of its inhabitants constituted the wall of Sparta, and Philon called the excellence of the citizens the column of the people. In every crisis that arises let him call to mind the history of those men who have

won the highest glory in similar circumstances; and considering how, for example, Marcellus would have displayed the virtue of fortitude; Aristides excelled in justice; or Scipio in temperance, he will be inspired by the lofty ambition of acting the same noble part. !

He will follow wise counsel, too, if he remembers the boast Pericles so properly made, that he would concede his inferiority to no one, not only in foreseeing, knowing, and persuading what was useful to the republic,—but in holding dear its best interests, and in caring little for himself. Under these general qualities we might embrace, it seems to us, all the principles we have given in this work for the formation of our Citizen; and he should adopt them and reduce them to practice, until he feels confident they have become the controlling and unwavering principles of his character. ,

And when the infirmities of age, or the accidents of life, take away his physical strength, let him retire from the fatigues and labors of active life, and still serve the republic with his admonitions and counsels, leaving their execution to arms more robust and spirits more vigorous. We have said admonitions and counsels, for from these the Citizen cannot be excused by physical infirmity. Hence the rumor of the dishonorable peace the Republic was about to negotiate with Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, had no sooner reached the ears of Appius Claudius than he caused himself, notwithstanding his blindness and decrepitude, to be borne into the Roman Senate, and there, supported on his feet, he lifted his voice for his country when he could no longer carry a sword to the field. And if the Citizen will bear in mind when necessary, this noble example, and remember, too, that in extreme age they placed the Vestal Virgins to teach to others what they had executed in vigorous life, he never—while his power of recollection remains—can give over his public services to the Republic. And he will regard the admonition of Plutarch, who—alluding to the example of the bee which never was seen to become a drone even in its old age—says, that he who has devoted the vigor of his manhood to the commonwealth should not sit down in inactive sloth in the decline of life.



And when he comes to die he will not forget his obligation to his country, but leave in his last dispositions some portion of his substance for the state. He will thus win a more lasting glory to his name, and enrich his posterity with a more genuine nobility than he ever could do by leaving them a great abundance of gold and silver to be devoured, as it too often happens, in dissipation, and wasted by hands which have never lifted a finger in its accumulation.

This, we learn from Plutarch, was the lesson taught by the most noble example of Lycurgus, that the death, too, of its citizens might be of some advantage to the state, for having obtained an oath from the Lacedaemonians that they would observe his laws till he returned to them again, he submitted to die far from his country, that they might observe his laws for ever. This is the spirit of the words of Musonius, who declared that he who had done good to many while he lived, could not be said to die gloriously unless his death even was of some service. In this respect the good Citizen would resemble the brave warrior who is taught by Callimachus to hurl the spear even in the moment of death.

---

## CHAPTER LXIV.

### HOW THE CITIZEN SHALL RECOVER HIMSELF WHEN PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY ASSAILED BY ENVY AND ODIUM.

ALTHOUGH we suppose our Citizen to live in a good republic and perform his duty with fidelity, yet since it is very much easier to talk about perfection in a state than to find it, every Commonwealth nourishes, so to speak, some vermin which may bring on corruption and political depravity; and this should teach the Citizen not to be disappointed if he be sometimes assailed publicly or privately by those attacks and persecutions which will obstruct his course.

But before he is finally obliged to confront them, he should

fully prepare for them, and scrutinizing them one by one, let him study the manner in which they will be likely to take place; remembering, that if he does not do this fully, he may be called to experience what Homer tells us occurred to Ulysses, who—although he resisted the tears of his wife, against which he had fully nerved himself—could not, however, refrain from weeping at the sight of his dog, against which he had made no preparation.

But since persecutions are sure to come, he must strengthen his fortitude and convert his ordinary into heroic virtues. He will thus overcome them so perfectly they shall not be able to defeat his benevolent designs for the republic. The odium and the envy of those, for example, whom he shall yield up to the claims of justice; or who shall occupy an inferior station in political life, will waylay his path with snares and treachery, to embarrass his administration. Against the first class he may often preserve himself by showing manifest signs of repugnance and regret against the severity of the law's penalty, as Biante, who wept while he delivered the sentence of condemnation. On being once asked the reason, he replied, "I can neither resist the feelings of my nature nor the demands of justice." Nero, too, before he was contaminated with the vice of cruelty, we are told by Suetonius, in signing the death-warrant of some criminals, exclaimed,—"*Quam vellem nescire litteras.*"(85) And when these signs of repugnance to condemn the criminal are clearly manifested in the judge, and his firmness is known to arise rather from zeal for public morals than a desire to punish it, it is almost impossible he should ever experience the odium of any man of common sense.

From the stings of envy he can recover by the heroism of virtue; and when this heroism prevails (says Plutarch) in the character, envy may scatter her poison, but it will stop his career no more than the shadows which are cast by the mountains stop the journey of the sun when he sinks behind them. But although illustrious virtues in citizens charm people, yet they soon get tired of hearing honorable names applied to them; the Citizen should use every endeavor to prevent any such name being applied to him;—and if he cannot succeed in

this, let him refuse to recognize such titles with that kind of modesty which cuts up envy by the roots.—Remembering, that if Aristides could have refused the title of the *just*, conferred upon him by good men in the Athenian Republic, he might have escaped the pain of ostracism; for they had no other reason for condemning him, than being tired of hearing him always called the *Just*.

Nicias, without taking pains to diminish his own glory in order to escape envy, was accustomed to attribute either to God or to fortune all that resulted fortunately in his wars through his own valor.

But if odium and envy have been already excited against him, he should study to overcome them by conferring benefits upon his calumniators, *forgetting*, says Philon, *injuries received, and showing how much nobler it is to overcome one's enemies by heaping coals upon their heads, than to return wrong for wrong.*

Lycurgus (says Plutarch) was master of this art as he showed in his intercourse with Alcandrus, who, although he had once given him a blow upon the head with a cane, became afterwards his greatest disciple, and even the most extravagant celebrator of his praise. And in fact such greatness of mind usually commands such power in calming the passions of envenomed hearts, that Stesicoius says, the face of Helen had the power to make the stones fall from the hands of those who had lifted them against her.

But still he should conciliate his enemies no further than he may do so consistently with the good of the commonwealth. For if remitting the injury set a bad example, he will not even pardon a crime committed against himself, and if defending the criminal contravene the justice of the laws or the well-being of society, he must refrain from doing it. We condemn in this respect the example of Agesilaus who, to reconcile his enemies, did not hesitate (says Plutarch) to appear for them before the tribunals and defend their crimes. But however just or reasonable may be his disdain conceived against the depravity of others, he will nobly endeavor to suppress all desire for personal revenge, remembering that Fabius Maximus was not hindered by any such motive from aiding the necessity of his enemy

**Minucius.** And although his enemy may without reason either in language or inaction have been the first to give offence, he ought not to remember it or follow the counsel of Hesiod of making him pay double, for this would be a violation of the virtue of magnanimity; for however great or just a man that poet may have been, he seems to have inculcated a false sentiment on this subject.

The Citizen should understand the secret of disarming the malice of his enemies, and this does not consist in rendering evil for evil; for Chyrsostom has shrewdly said, "*the physician could never heal the disease by giving evil for evil : but good for evil.*" And however praiseworthy may be the action for which he is maligned, let him feel no more uneasiness about it than did Alexander, who, on hearing of the malice of one who vituperated him, replied, that to hear one's self calumniated for a noble action and to bear it patiently, was a virtue worthy of a king. And however sweet it may be to a man of spirit to vindicate himself, let him not forget that magnanimous minds will not justify any revenge except for public injuries. The two women who (writes Phalaria to Peristenes) had been sent to him as concealed traitors of his life, on being interrogated why they had conspired against him, replied, not for a private, but a public injury;—since to enslave a free state was judged by them an injury to all.

In a word (as Plutarch says), he will make use of the malignity of his enemies and the benevolence of his friends, to preserve himself from every sort of vice and perfect himself in every species of virtue; and he will so conduct himself, that odium and envy, which are almost always destructive passions to those who cherish them, shall be made to bring salutary and benign results to him, although he be the object upon whom they are vented.

But if he be not so completely master of himself as not to cherish some spite, and even sometimes come to open rupture with his foes, he ought at least, after the example of the league which the Candiotti made when they laid aside for the time their domestic quarrels, and rallied against foreign invaders, to be willing to forget his spite against his enemy, and unite

with him instantly whenever foreign invaders, the enemies of their common liberty, would step on their shores. Such appears to have been the spirit of Plancus, the leader of the Romans, towards Lepidus, for in writing to Marcus Tully, he generously protests, "*non me impediunt privatae offensiones quo minus pro republica salute etiam cum inimicissimo consentiam.*"(86)

Plutarch relates a similar circumstance of Cretinus and Ermias Magnisiaus, who, with all the hatred they bore towards each other, made ready for the common danger with the utmost magnanimity, each one renouncing the control of the army to oppose themselves to the violence of the attacks of Mithridates.

In reference to the injuries he may happen sometimes to receive from the republic itself, he must bear them with great moderation, and not only abhor the ravings of Coriolanus, who lifted his arms against his country, but imitate the generosity of Camillus who, although maltreated in the last degree, did not refuse to fly to his country's aid in the hour of her danger; for if he become revengeful and violent under such an injury, and turn to be an enemy of his country, he shows very clearly that all the service he had rendered before only arose from the vile motive of ambition; and if this be not the case, he could never exert much influence again after so fatal a step, although he might be called to mingle in the deliberations of the State; for the passions of vindictive men and not his country are the source of the malicious attacks made upon the good Citizen. This accounts for the exile of Aristides, the death of Phocion, and the persecution of thousands of others in the ancient republics.

If through contempt of his person he shall sometimes be called to the exercise of petty offices, he will not only not refuse, but endeavor to honor his charge by the excellence of his administration. In this he will follow the example of Epaminondas and of Cato, one of whom, Plutarch says, made even the office of a collector of taxes a post of honor; the other was raised from the quæstorship to the consulship. These examples seem to us to confirm what Seneca says of the resemblance between the dwarf and the colossus: "*Non est magnus*

*pumilio, licet in monte constiterit : colossus magnitudinem suam servabit etiam si steterit in puteo.*"(87)

And even if he be lightly esteemed by those who hold the highest offices, and yet is confident he can aid the commonwealth by prudent counsel, he ought not to be deterred from bringing his facts in some way to their knowledge, and preferring, as says Æschylus of Amphiaraus, to *be* rather than to *appear* good ;—he may at least console his own conscience that he has rendered some service to his country, although the glory of it may go to his enemies ; for if he could not endure to do this, he would still show that he placed his own honor above the public good, and would oppose the noble counsel of Plato, when he says, " whoever would be a great man must not love his own things, but the things that are just, that is to say : *just deeds, performed by himself or others.*"

Thus Aristides was not hindered by the contradictions of his enemy Themistocles, from proposing by means of other persons many times to the Athenians, measures he judged salutary to the republic. And when Pedasetus, the Spartan, was banished from the council of the three hundred, he not only made no complaint, but even rejoiced with the republic, that there could be found three hundred men better qualified than himself to govern the republic.

The good republican Citizen ought to show a similar modesty not only when he is despised without reason, but most particularly when he feels he has merited the contempt with which he has been visited ; nor should he attempt to escape the just punishment of his fault, but let his country profit by his example. Marcus Cato seems to have been endowed with such a disposition, when he declared he had rather the state should utterly forget the services he rendered, than not to punish him when he failed in his public duty. And it is not improbable he imbibed the same doctrine from the school of Socrates, who taught Plato that the criminal ought to submit himself as willingly to the penalties and inflictions of the judge, as the patient to the instruments and fires of his physician.

## CONCLUSION.

WE conclude the whole treatise, by saying that be the good Citizen poor or rich, honored or outraged, great or obscure, he must be in some degree enamored of the liberty of his country—always faithful in the administration of office—upright in the execution of law, and both in the prosperous as well as the dark days of the republic, equal in the exercise of the political virtues.

In counsel and in action, he will regard the glory of God; for without the steady guiding-star of Christian principle, he will never accomplish any work that can have an efficacious power to confer lasting prosperity upon the republic; and this is the end we have endeavored, as far as God has given us light, he should keep in view.

We think, too, he will follow the guidance of this same light, if to the exercise of the virtues we have enumerated, he will join the noble intention we recommend, of reducing them to practice in a life devoted to God and his country. But since God, in the language of Homer, does not endow man with every virtue,—and human capacity rarely admits a man to be found in whom all these qualities we have enumerated perfectly concur—let no one be disheartened, who, in some of them, is found wanting. The archer often praises the bowman, although he misses the target; nor will we exclude from the pale of good citizens, any one who does the best his circumstances allow, to acquire those virtues which secure the prosperity of the republic. If he cannot direct public affairs with all that intellectual ability we have desired, he can at least aid in the noble work with good will and out of respect to others; yielding confidence to those who are more perfectly endowed, he will be sure never to be registered among the number of those who, knowing nothing of themselves, nor putting faith in their superiors, are, by the well-known sentence of Hesiod, pronounced to be *useless men*.

And that we ourselves may not fall under the same condem-

nation, we frankly declare that we will gladly accept any correction it may please any one to make in this treatise, who shall be endowed with riper learning than we possess; and if the general design we have proposed in the work be concurred in, we will voluntarily receive any criticism whatever. If, however, among these restrictions, any one shall judge that we have inculcated false principles in regard to the political virtues, because he neither knows them by theory nor practice, we beg him to remember the words of Isocrates, when he was asked how he, who never had courage to speak in public, could teach the art of oratory. He replied, that although the whetstone has not the edge for cutting, it has, however, the virtue of sharpening knives. And if this occurs in the system we have established, even in some degree, it will not seem to us to have been entirely useless to have offered, at this time, our humble service to the republic.

THE END.





## NOTES.



(1) Page 55. Ut vel omnem impetum belli in me convertere non recusem; si modo meo casu aut confirmare patriæ salutem, aut periculum morari possim.

I am willing the whole fury of the conflict should fall upon me, if I may but establish, in my fall, the safety of my country, or postpone her hour of danger.

(2) Page 58. Quos hominum ex facie Dea sæva potentibus herbis Induerat Circe in vultus ac terga ferarum.

Whom the cruel Goddess Circe, by her mighty incantations, transformed from the appearance of men to the features and form of wild beasts.

(3) Page 60. Hoc autem tempore eum Cæsar in senatum legit; quem ordinem illa possessione amissa tueri vix potest.

At this time Cæsar chooses him senator—which rank he can hardly maintain if deprived of that property.

(4) Page 60. Libentique animo annonnæ subsidia tribuebantur. Subsidies of their annual products were willingly given.

(5) Page 61. Benignitatem per se gratam comitate adjuvabat.

He aided, by his suavity of manner, the generosity which was of itself sufficiently agreeable.

(6) Page 63. Alieni appetus, sui profusus.

Covetous of another's wealth, lavish of his own.

(7) Page 63. Cujus abditis adhuc vitiiis per avaritiam ac prodigantiam mire congruebat.

With whose vices, hitherto hidden by avarice and prodigality, he wonderfully accorded.

(8) Page 64. Allor m'accorsi, che troppo apri l'ali  
 Potean le mani a spender, e pentí'mi  
 Così di quel come degli altri mali,  
 Quanti risurgeran coi crini scemi  
 Per l'ignoranza che di questa pecca  
 Foglie il penter vivendo, e negli stremi !

(9) Page 65. Falluntur quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit.  
 They are deceived to whom luxury wears the aspect of liberality.

(10) Page 66. Namque avaritia fidem, probitatem, cæterasque artes  
 bonas subvertit.

Avarice subverts confidence, honesty, and other virtues.

(11) Page 66. Ubi vos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis ;  
 ubi domi voluptatibus, his pecuniæ, aut gratiæ servitis, eo fit ut impe-  
 tus fiat in vacuum rempublicam.

When you take counsel each for his own selfish purposes ; when  
*at home* you are subservient to pleasure, and *here* to money or to favor ;  
 then shall destruction come upon the enfeebled republic.

(12) Page 73. In excitando autem, et in acuendo plurimum valet,  
 si laudes eum, quem cohortere.

You will avail more in arousing and exciting, if you praise him  
 whom you encourage.

—(13) Page 75. L'antico sangue, e l'opere leggiadre  
 De' miei maggior mi fer si arrogante,  
 Che non pensando alla comune madre  
 Ogni uomo ebbi 'n dispetto tanto avante,  
 Ch' io ne mori, 'ecc.

(14) Page 76. Interpellent me quo minus honoratus sim, dum ne  
 interpellent quo minus respublica a me commode administrari possit.

They may hinder me so that I be less honored, only let them not  
 disturb me in the just administration of the state.

(15) Page 77. Ibi quantam vim ad stimulandos animos ira haberet  
 apparuit.

Then it appeared how great influence anger had in stimulating their  
 courage.

(16) Page 77. *Totique ab luctu versi in iram.*  
They are wholly changed from grief to wrath.

(17) Page 79. *Nihil gloriosius principe impune læso. Magni animi esse injurias in summa potentia pati.*

Nothing is more noble in a prince than to pass over trivial offences. It is the part of a magnanimous mind to forgive injury, when in the plenitude of power.

(18) Page 80. *Justum et tenacem propositi virum,  
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,  
Non vultus instantis tyranni,  
Mente quatit solida.*

Neither the depraved fury of a threatening populace nor the frown of an angry tyrant can move the firm purpose of a just man, who is established in his opinions.

(19) Page 80. *Quinetiam truculentus, sibi minitanti Syllæ, licet, inquit, mihi agmina militum, quibus curiam circumsedesti, ostentes, licet mortem identidem miniteris, nunquam tamen efficies, ut propter exiguum senilemque sanguinem meum, Marium, a quo urbs et Italia conservata est hostem judicem.*

Moreover, he sternly replied to Sylla threatening him, "Though you point me to bands of soldiers, whom you have established around the judgment hall—though you ever and anon menace me with death, you shall never, through my weakness and enfeebling age, cause me to pronounce Marius, by whom this city and Italy were preserved, an enemy to his country.

(20) Page 81. *Sueta firmitudine animi et ne gloria intercideret. Pars ne principem objecisse invidiæ viderentur, plures numero tuti.*

With his accustomed firmness of purpose, that his reputation must not suffer. Some that they might not seem to expose their chief to his anger, but the greater part from confidence in their numbers.

(21) Page 81. *Et eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, si Pæto aut in suis aut in alienis consiliis constantia fuisset; verum ubi a viris militaribus adversus urgentes casus firmatus erat, rursus ne aliene sententiæ indigens videretur, in diversa ac deteriora transibat.*

If there had existed in Pætus any firmness in his own opinions, or

in the advice of others, the Parthian could have been out-generalled in the management of the war; but when with his own military force he was able to contend against the pressing adversities, he changed his mind to another and more difficult course, lest he should appear wanting in more than one alternative.

- (22) Page 91. Ut Venus enervat vires sic copia vini,  
Et tentat gressus debilitatque pedes.

As Love enervates our physical powers, so a free use of wine disturbs our motions and enfeebles our limbs.

- (23) Page 93. Haud indecoros motus more Tusco dabant.  
They taught becoming exercises after the Tuscan manner.

- (24) Page 94. Hunc decus egregium formæ movet.  
This one is incited by the surpassing beauty of his person.

- (25) Page 94. Tutatur favor Euryalum, lachrymæque decoræ,  
Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus.

Popularity shielded Euryalus and his becoming trust, and his valor the more agreeable, that it appeared in his comely form.

- (26) Page 97. Non fecit nobilem atrium plenum formosis imaginibus:  
nemo in nostram gloriam vixit: nec quod ante nos fuit nostrum est:  
animus facit nobilem; cui ex quacunque conditione supra fortunam licet surgere.

A court-yard full of beautiful statues does not ennoble the possessor. No one has flourished in our renown, neither is anything our own that was before our time; the mind makes noble, by which fortune can elevate itself from any position whatever.

- (27) Page 97. Contemptor animus et superbia.  
A contemptuous mind and haughtiness.

- (28) Page 99. La gente nuova, e i subiti guadagni,  
Orgoglio e dismisura han generata,  
Fiorenza, in te, sicché tu già ten piagni.

A new-born race has risen up in Florence, and their sudden wealth and overbearing pride make her weep.

- (29) Page 99. Exilis domus est, ubi non et plura supersunt.  
That is a wretched home to them, where there is only an abundance.

(30) Page 104. At tibi succrescat proles, quæ facta parentis,  
Augeat et circa stet veneranda senem.

May a generation arise after you, which shall emulate the deeds of their parents, and stand with reverence around you when you are old men.

(31) Page 31. Quid ex eo boni sperari, atque effici potest, qui in patris luxurie sic vixerit, ut nullum unquam pudicum, neque sobrium convivium viderit?

What good can be anticipated of him, or what can he do, who so lives in the luxurious style of his father that he never beholds a modest or a sober companion?

(32) Page 109. Non obstabunt P. Valerii ædes libertati vestræ, Quirites; tuta erit vobis Velia; deferam non in planum modo ædes, sed colli etiam subjiciam, ut vos supra suspectum me civem habitatis; in Velia ædificent, quibus melius quam P. Valerio, creditur libertas.

Romans! the edifices of Publius Valerius shall not be a stumbling-block to your liberty. Velia shall be harmless to you. Not only will I bring my palaces to the plain below, but I will place them at the foot of the hill, so that you may regard me a citizen above suspicion. Let them build upon Velia whose patriotism is more trusted than that of P. Valerius.

(33) Page 109. Nihil volo derogare legibus, nihil institutis; æquum inter omnes cives jus sit; utere sin eme beneficio meo patria; causa tibi libertatis fui, ero et argumentum. Exeo si, plus quam tibi expedit, cævi.

I wish not to derogate from your laws or your customs; let there be equal justice among all citizens; let my country use me without my personal advantage. I was the cause of your liberty—I will be an argument for its preservation.

(34) Page 110. Opibus nimis ad injuriam minorum elati.

They are elevated by too much power, to the injury of the less fortunate.

(35) Page 113. Cum judicaveris, diligere oportet, non cum dilexeris judicare.

You ought to love after you have formed your opinion, and not form your opinion after you have settled your esteem of an individual.

(36) Page 114. *Serpunt enim vitia, et in proximum quemque transiliunt, et contactu nocent.*

Vices creep upon us, and they defile, by the contact, whatever they approach.

(37) Page 119. *Solet enim aliud sentire et aliud loqui.*

He is wont to think one thing and speak another.

(38) Page 125. *Sæpe censores renaissance theatra destruebant, moribus consulentes, quorum scilicet periculum ingens de lascivia providebant.*

Often the censors destroyed the reviving theatres, having regard to the public morals, which their lasciviousness greatly endangered.

(39) Page 125. *Quonam illæ leges abierunt quæ theatra stuprandis moribus orientia statim destruebant ?*

Where are those laws which immediately destroyed theatres, which arose to injure the morals of the people ?

(40) Page 125. *Letitiæ magis quam lasciviæ dari paucas quinquennii noctes.*

A few nights were given, every few years, to pleasure rather than to lasciviousness.

(41) Page 129. *Quicumque ille fuit puerum qui pinxit Amorem,*

*Nonne putas miras hunc habuisse manus ?*

*Is primus invidit, sine sensu vivere amantes.*

Whoever he was who painted Love as a boy, do you not think he had wonderful skill ? He first discerned that lovers are senseless beings.

(42) Page 130. *Pro qua non metuum mori, si parcent animæ fata superstiti.*

For whom I shall not fear to die, if the fates will still longer spare her life.

(43) Page 130. *Nam pransus jaceo et satur supinus.*

I lie upon my back when I have dined and am fully satisfied.

(44) Page 130. *Quando uxore ab Octavia nobili quidem, et probitatis spectate, fato quodam, an quia prævalent illicita, abhorrebat.*

He was abhorred by his wife Octavia who was a noble woman and of approved virtue, either from some fatality or because of the prevalent infidelity.

- (45) Page 132. Non pudet Alcide victricem mille laborum  
 Rasilibus calathis imposuisse manum ?  
 Crassaque robusto deducis pollice fila,  
 Æquaque formosæ pensa rependis horæ.  
 Diceris infelix scuticæ tremefactus habenis  
 Ante pedes dominæ pertimuisse minas.

Is not Alcides ashamed that the victor of a thousand difficulties should place his hand upon the polished reed? You draw forth the new thread with your lusty thumb, and pay a proper regard to your beautiful mistress! Poor wretch! you shall be represented trembling at her scourge and fearing her threats.

- (47) Page 132. Me nunc Thressa Cloe regit.  
 Thressean Cloe rules me now.

- (48) Page 132. Amor, ed io si pien di maraviglia.  
 Love, and I filled with wonder.

- (49) Page 132. Come chi mai cosa incredibil vide,  
 Miriam costei, quand 'ella parla oride.

Like one who has never seen anything, when Miriam speaks she smiles.

- (50) Page 132. Noster amor tales tribuit tibi Cynthia laudes.  
 Such praises our love gives to thee, O Cynthia!

- 51) Page 133. Sperando agli occhi, suoi piacer si adorno.

- (52) Page 133. O ego cum dominam aspicerem, quam fortiter illie  
 Versarem valido pingue bidente solum!

When I can behold my mistress, how gladly will I turn the rich soil with the lusty young oxen!

- (53) Page 133. Pavit et Admeti tauros formosus Apollo.  
 Ipse Deus solitus stabulis expellere vaccas,  
 Et potum pastas ducere fluminibus.  
 Delos ubi nunc Phæbe tua est, ubi Delphica Pytho?  
 Nempe Amor in parva te jubet esse casa.



Beautiful Apollo fears the bulls of Admetus. The God is himself accustomed to drive the heifers from the stables, and when fed to lead them to drink from the rivers. Oh Delos, where is now thy Phæbus—where thy Delphic Pytho? Now Love calls thee to her little bower.

(54) Page 134. Quo feret ira sequar.  
I will follow whither anger leads me.

(55) Page 134. Perfida, nec merito nobis inimica, merenti  
Perfida, sed quamvis perfida cara tamen.

Perfidious, inimical without cause; yet though so faithless, still not the less dear to me.

(56) Page 134. Asper eram et bene dissidium me ferre loquebar;  
At mihi nunc longe gloria fortis abest.

I was harsh and said I would tear myself away; but lofty determination is far from me now.

(57) Page 134. Insomma so, com'è incostante e vaga  
Timida ardita vita degli amanti.

In a word, I know wild and inconstant is the burning life of the lover.

(58) Page 135. A qua, quum erat ad eum ventum, et in aurem ejus insusurratum, alias revocabat eos, inter quos jam decreverat, decretumque mutabat: alias inter alios contrarium sine ulla religione decernebat, ac proximis paulo ante decreverat.

When she had come to him and had whispered in his ear, he recalled those things which he had just ordered, and reversed the order. He decided differences between one and another without any regard to right, and gave to one what he had just adjudged to another.

(59) Page 136. Cur quisquam faciem dominæ jam credat amico?  
Sic erepta mihi pene puella mea est.

Who now would entrust the person of his mistress to a friend, since my maiden was well nigh taken from me?

(60) Page 136. Hospes in hospitium Menelao venit adulter.  
An adulterous guest comes to the hospitable house of Menelaus.

- (61) Page 137. *Hei mihi difficile imitari gaudia falsa ;  
Difficile est tristi fingere mente jocum.*  
It is not easy for me to dissemble a false happiness, and force pleasure upon my saddened mind.
- (62) Page 137. *Mercé di quel Signore,  
Che gira la fortuna del dolore.*  
Wo to the man who follows the fortune of grief !
- (63) Page 138. *Pascomi di dolor.*  
I feed myself on grief.
- (64) Page 138. *E le mie notti il sonno sbandiro.*  
And I forget my slumbers in the night.
- (65) Page 138. *Se 'l pensier che mi strugge.*  
If the passion that destroys me.
- (66) Page 138. *Né i piè sann' altra via.*  
The feet know no other path.
- (67) Page 139. *Per una donna ho messo,  
Equalmente in non cole ogni pensiero.*  
Upon a woman I have bestowed every power of my soul.
- (68) Page 140. *Il non secondar con le parole.*  
Not to countenance vice.
- (69) Page 141. *Curæ non ipsa in morte relinquunt,  
Quos durus amor crudeli tabe peredit.*  
Anxiety will not relinquish even in death its hold upon those whom love has destroyed by its consuming disease.
- (70) Page 142. *Si linguam clauso tenes in ore  
Fructus proicies amoris omnis ;  
Verbosa gaudet Venus loquela.*  
If your tongue keeps silence, you will banish every effect of love ;  
Venus delights in senseless conversation.
- (71) Page 142. *Donec me docuit castas odisse puellas.*  
Until she taught me to hate modest women.

- (72) Page 143. *Mistam te varia laudavi sæpe figura,  
Ut, quod non esses, esse putaret amor,  
Et color est toties roseo collatus Eos,  
Cum tibi quæsitus candor in ore foret.*

I have praised you under various changing forms, so that my love regarded you as something you are not. Your complexion I have sought in the rosy tints of the morning, when an unnatural paleness covered your features.

- (73) Page 143. *Constiteram, exorientem Auroram forte salutans,  
Quum subito a lævo Roscius exoritur.  
Pace mihi liceat Cælestes dicere vestra,  
Mortalis visus pulchrior esse Dea.*

I have stood lowly saluting the rising Aurora, when lo! Roscius stood at my left. Ye Gods! allow me to sing a countenance of more than mortal beauty.

- (74) Page 145. *Lucius Cæsar optime sentit, sed quod avunculus est, non acerrimas dicit sententias.*

Lucius Cæsar judged correctly, but because he was his uncle he would not declare his severe opinions.

- (75) Page 148. *Nihil istac opus est arte ad hanc rem, quam paro,  
Sed his, quas semper in te intellexi sitas,  
Fide, et taciturnitate.*

There is no need of artifice in this thing, only of fidelity and silence, which I know you always possess.

- (76) Page 150. *Nulla enim minantis auctoritas apud liberos est.*  
Freemen regard not the power of a threat.

- (77) Page 155. *Ut malis tibi placere quam populo, ut æstimes judicia, non ut numeres.*

You should prefer to please yourself rather than the multitude, that you may respect the opinions rather than enumerate them.

- (78) Page 156. *Et prælatus ille, facilitate summittentis se comiter respondebat, communicando consilia, laudesque, et æquando imparem sibi.*

Though he was preferred in his command, he appeared his equal in communicating advice and praise, &c.

(79) Page 157. *Cur nescire pudens prave, quam discere malo?*  
Why do I prefer to be ignorant rather than learn?

(80) Page 162. *Quid tam distans, quam a severitate comitas? Quis tamen unquam te aut sanctor est habitus, aut dulcior?*

How far removed from austerity is your affable manner! Yet who is regarded with more reverence, or is more esteemed?

(81) Page 163. *Si mehercule te tuam pecuniam, non populi Romani in provincia fœneratum docerem, tamen effugere non posses. Principalibus constitutionibus cavetur, ne ii qui provinciam regunt, quive circa eos sunt, negotientur, mutuam pecuniam dent, fœnusve exercent.*

If indeed I should tell you that you could not place at usury your wealth in provinces of the Roman people, you could not, nevertheless, escape. It is forbidden in our constitution that those who rule a province, or are connected with them, should engage in business, exchange money or seek usury therefor.

(82) Page 165. *Nunquam inutilis est opera civis boni, auditu enim, visu, vultu, nutu, obstinatione tacita, incessuque ipso prædest.*

No deed of a good citizen is useless; for even by his attention, his appearance, his nod, his silence, or his step, he may avail something.

(83) Page 167. *Nec quidquam ex omnibus rebus humanis est præclarius, aut præstantius, quam de republica bene mereri.*

Of all things human, there is nothing more glorious or more excellent than to "deserve well of the republic."

(84) Page 168. *Fortissimum quemque, generosissimum esse.*  
To be bravest is to be noblest.


(85) Page 171. *Quam vellem nescire litteras.*  
How I wish I was ignorant of letters.

(86) Page 174. *Non me impediunt privatæ offensiones quo minus pro reipublicæ salute etiam cum inimicissimo consentiam.*

Private disagreements shall not so affect me that I shall the less strive for the welfare of the republic, even with the most inimical.

(87) Page 174. Non est magnus pumilio, licet in monte constiterit: colossus magnitudinem suam servabit etiam si steterit in puteo.

A dwarf cannot increase its size, although it may stand on the mountain top; but a giant will appear large even in the valley.












12

8







**THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY  
REFERENCE DEPARTMENT**

**This book is under no circumstances to be  
taken from the Building**

MAY 1 - 1953

JUN 10 1953

JAN - 6 1953

